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Introduction to the Year of Russia Special Issue
Dan Paracka
Kennesaw State University’s (KSU) Year of Russia program provided an in-depth
opportunity for our campus community to learn about Russia at a very important
point in time. The program featured more than 30 events including a robust lecture
series, special courses focused on Russia, a symposium on U.S.-Russia relations,
and a faculty and student interdisciplinary seminar that traveled to Moscow and St.
Petersburg. These different elements were intentionally organized to create
synergistic opportunities for sustained intercultural exchange. For example, Dr.
Tom Rotnem’s POLS 4449: Russian Foreign Policy class conducted eight Skypeenabled classroom discussion sessions with Russian counterparts (faculty and
students) from Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Topics
for the discussion sessions included: 1) NATO/Russian relations; 2) Ukraine; 3)
Syria; 4) Russia’s global economic status; and 5) Russia’s developing relationship
with China. Later, a delegation of the MGIMO faculty and students attended the
symposium on KSU’s campus and then KSU faculty and students visited MGIMO
in Moscow.
The U.S.-Russia Relations Symposium, co-hosted by KSU and the Georgia
Institute of Technology, attracted 140 people including presenters from six different
countries (Brazil, Japan, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States). There were
representatives from three different Russian universities and there was also a
delegation of 11 students from Campbell High School and 17 students from the
University of Central Florida in addition to the KSU and Georgia Tech participants.
Overall, across all of the Year of Russia events, more than 3,300 KSU faculty and
students participated in the program.
Many of the articles in this journal were first delivered at the conference. The
articles examine a wide range of both historical and contemporary issues in Russia,
its international relations, and unique position in global affairs from diverse
perspectives. Topics include: Soviet-American economic relations at the end of
World War II; the tragic consequences of the Soviet experiment with socialism;
historic influences of Russian and American ideologies on foreign policy; Russian
foreign policy as anchored in the restoration of world power status; an analysis of
Ukraine’s strategic geopolitical position; political homophobia as a state strategy in
Russia; the danger of rhetoric that promotes United States adversarial policy
towards Russia; an improving Sino-Russian relationship particularly in the Arctic
region; and the application of Konstantin Stanislavsky’s acting lessons on life,
leadership and international relations.
For the past 10 years, with the help of many colleagues, I have written an
introductory essay focused on the country of study at the beginning of each year to
serve as a starting point for student inquiry and understanding. What follows is an
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adapted version of the essay. I hope it will also provide a useful introduction to the
issues examined in this volume.
Russia’s story consists of both tragic suffering and tremendous
accomplishments that have helped shape the character of its people, making them
resilient and proud. At the same time, Russian society and geography are too
complex, too diverse, and too large for a single culture to serve as the national
heritage (Figes, 2002, p. xxviii). Russia, situated in the middle of Eurasia, is both
Eastern and Western and it is this ambiguity, this pull in two directions, which has
helped make Russians skilled diplomats and negotiators. Having experienced
invading forces from both directions, it has also made them wary and put them on
guard. For this reason and “as a general rule, Russia has pursued balance-of-power
policies” (Donaldson, Nogee, & Nadkarni, 2014, p. 4). Moreover, “Russians have
traditionally had a deeply ingrained fear of anarchy and the centrifugal forces that
tug at the unity and stability of their vast state … [which] has made Russians prize
order and security” (Smith, 1976, p. 251). Unfortunately, the efforts to build a
strong state have, at times, led to “subverted institutions and personalistic rule”
(Kotkin, 2016, p. 4). This view, a type of Russian exceptionalism, where Russians
are seen as having suffered under oppression for centuries and subjected to
continuous external threats and harsh political realities, emerged first during the
enlightenment period and was amplified as the Red Scare and Cold War emerged
(Pate, 2016). However, Russia, in continuous relationship with its neighbors,
influencing them and influenced by them, is not so different from the rest of the
world.
Notably, the United States’ views of Russia have often been biased tending
towards such negative interpretations due, in part, to limited direct interaction and
staunch ideological differences. Characterized by Cold War acrimony and
antagonism, there has been far too little collaboration between the two countries.

Moscow as the Third Rome
The early history of Russia consisted of a collection of principalities. The Viking,
Rurik of Rutland, defeated the Slavs at Novgorod in 862 becoming ruler of Northern
Russia and his successor Oleg conquered Kiev. According to legend in 988, “after
considering and rejecting Judaism and Islam, Great Prince Vladimir of Kiev
embraced the Christian faith and established it as a state religion” (Taruskin, 2009,
p. 156). Nicholas Riasanovsky (2005) has asserted that adopting Orthodox
Christianity is the single most important event shaping Russian identity. One of the
first cities to establish broader control and establish itself as a center of trade was
Kiev, which flourished between 882 and 1125. Moscow was founded in 1147 by
Yuri Dolgoruky (a monument in his honor stands in front of the city hall). The cities
of Kievan Rus with the exception of Novgorod and Pskov were completely
destroyed in 1240 by the vastly superior military of the Mongols (also known as the
Tatars). The Mongols indirectly ruled the territory from the 13th to the 15th century.
It should be noted that the Mongol Empire brought many advances, not only in
military technology but also in trade, taxation, and administrative systems
(Weatherford, 2004, p. xxiii).
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Christianity came to Russia through Constantinople but ties were severed when
the Ottoman Turks took control of Constantinople in 1453. The patriarchate of the
Russian Orthodox Church transferred north to Moscow. After Kievan Rus was
shattered by the Mongols, there was no large Rus state until one was reconstituted
by Muscovy. Muscovy’s strength gradually grew under Ivan the Great and it was at
this time that the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome was firmly established,
making Muscovy an heir to the older Byzantine and even Roman classical
civilizations and the origins of Christianity. Historically, Russia has tried to set itself
apart from its Asian neighbors by emphasizing its Christian nature although many
of its people follow Muslim, Buddhist, or Shamanic traditions. In this regard, it is
important to distinguish between “Russian” as an ethnic identity from the broader
community of peoples who make up the Russian state.
According to Orlando Figes (2002), “the entire spirit of the Russian people,
and much of their best art and music, has been poured into the Church, and at times
of national crisis, under the Mongols or the Communists, they have always turned
to it for support and hope” (p. 297). Under Christian theology, poverty was at times
cast as a virtue among Russia’s peasants, and excessive wealth was viewed as a sin.
The liturgy in Russian Orthodox Church services is always sung and the chants and
choral songs of the church are known for their beauty. However, instrumental music
was long banned by the church and sacred compositions were not played in concert
halls until Pyotr Tchaikovsky’s Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom was performed in
1878 (Figes, 2002, p. 298).

Imperial Russia and the Rise of Colonial Nationalism
As both Russia and Western Europe grew and consolidated, Peter the Great, who
ruled Russia from 1689-1725, took on an immense project, the construction of a
new capital, St. Petersburg. He led the effort to Westernize/Europeanize the empire
and his most successful military efforts concentrated on establishing Russia as a
Baltic Sea power. The transformation was so great that historians tend to mark
Peter’s reign as the end of one era, Muscovy, and the start of another, the imperial.
By the time of Catherine the Great, who ruled from 1762-1796, Russian noblemen
and women were emulating European language, customs, and attitudes, and
immersing themselves in the secular culture of the French Enlightenment (Figes,
2002, pp. 55-57). Catherine’s Russia competed with the other great empires of the
age defeating Sweden again and partitioning Poland. Much of Catherine’s military
expansion concentrated on establishing Russia as a Black Sea power. The Black
Sea port of Odessa was founded in 1796, the year of Catherine’s death.
Alexander I, who ruled Russia from 1801-1825, defeated Napoleon, but he
never could have done so alone. Alexander needed alliances with other European
powers especially the Prussians and later decisively the Austrians who switched
their allegiance away from France. Many have credited geography and climate for
Napoleon’s failure, but strategic leadership and skillful diplomacy were equally if
not more important than the cold weather or even Russian patriotism in defeating
Napoleon. It was a strategy of deep retreat and restrained patience similar to one
used by Peter the Great against Charles XII of Sweden and by the Mongols to defeat
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the Russians in 1223 at the Kalka River (Lieven, 2009, p. 132; Weatherford, 2004,
p. 263). Between 1812 and 1814, the Russian army first retreated from Vilna to
Moscow and then advanced from Moscow to Paris. In 1815, after defeating
Napoleon, Alexander I signed what came to be known as the Holy Alliance with
Prussia and Austria.
The Napoleonic Wars accompanied rising European nationalism where British
sea power had confined French imperialism to mainland Europe, while Russian
imperial interests lied primarily southwards towards the Ottomans and Persians.
The Portuguese monarchy escorted to Brazil and rescued by the British from
Napoleon opened the entire Portuguese Empire to British trade, indicating the
importance of collaborative alliances to compete globally. Russia’s defeat of
Napoleon also served to embolden and strengthen British imperialism, thereby
increasing competition between Britain and Russia.
Interestingly, the War of 1812 seems to have served as both a glorious imperial
victory of salvation and a watershed moment in Russia’s movement towards
national liberation (Figes, 2002, p. 138). The leaders of the 1825 Decembrist
uprising were influenced greatly by soldiers and officers who had returned from the
Napoleonic battlefield. It was the first attempt ever to overthrow the imperial
political system. Nobleman had witnessed side-by-side the sacrifices of peasants on
the battlefield who more than proved their worth as patriots. Russia mobilized over
230,000 men for the war effort, most of them serfs. Returned officers hoped to
establish a new constitution that every man could understand, protect, and defend
but their plans were ill-conceived and poorly timed, choosing to revolt at the
swearing in ceremony for Tsar Nicholas I, whose royal soldiers were also assembled
and who dealt harshly with the mutineers. Five hundred Decembrists were arrested
and 121 conspirators, including the so-called peasant prince Sergei Volkonsky,
were found guilty and sentenced as convict laborers to Siberia (Figes, 2002, pp. 8390).
Nicholas I ruled with an iron hand from 1825-1855. He turned his ambitions to
the Ottoman Empire defeating the Turks in 1828, winning independence for Greece
and extending Russia’s control over the Caucasus region. Later, when Russia
assisted the Ottoman Sultan’s call for assistance in putting down a revolt by
Mohammed Ali in Egypt, Russia was rewarded with the rights to have its warships
pass through the Turkish straits, but the British and French objected. Encouraged
by Britain, the Turks declared war on Russia in 1853 and Russia was defeated in
the Crimean War (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp. 22-23). It was a defeat that the
Russians would not forget. European competition including Russian ambitions for
control over the Ottoman Empire and its important sea trade routes would only
intensify, eventually resulting in World War I.
Following the death of Nicholas I, Alexander II (who ruled from 1855 until his
assassination in 1881) signed the treaty that ended the Crimean War and began
initiating several important reforms, most importantly the Emancipation of Serfs
(1861). The economic imperative calling for emancipation asserted that free labor
is more productive than slave labor. Militarily, Russia turned to its Eastern borders
winning territory in the Amur region of China and founding the city of Vladivostok
in 1860. In 1874, Russia successfully defeated the khanates of Kokand, Bukhara,
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and Khiva in Turkestan and later Tashkent right up to the borders of Afghanistan
and British India (Figes, 2002, p. 411). In 1877, Russia renewed its conflicts in the
Balkans attempting to liberate Bulgaria from Turkish occupation leading to the
1878 Treaty of Berlin (involving all of the major European powers of the time) and
an uneasy accord between Russia and Austria. The Treaty of Berlin “created a series
of Christian nation states in the Balkans and forced a realignment of Muslim
populations” setting off massive migration movements (Karpat, 2010, p. 48).
German Chancellor Bismarck also organized the 1884 Conference of Berlin known
for unleashing the Scramble for Africa as the European powers divided the world
into spheres of influence and their leaders engaged in a dangerous chess match of
shifting allegiances and self-serving treaties.
Following the Berlin Conference, Germany increasingly saw itself vying with
France, Great Britain, and Russia for predominance, and therefore looked to the
Ottoman Empire as an important sphere of influence and potential ally. The Young
Turks reformist movement also saw in Germany a successful, rapidly
industrializing country able to help protect them from Russian expansionism
(Fromkin, 1989, p. 66). German railroads connected Berlin with Istanbul.
It is during this period in the 19th century of rising nationalism and competing
colonial empires that Russia expands and solidifies its rule into the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and East Asia regions. Russian nationalism, like that of other 19th
century nationalisms, was brutal in its treatment of minorities. It has long been
argued that since Russia itself was a frontier society, its borders were relatively
undefined and under-fortified contributing to expansionist tendencies. Perhaps for
these reasons, Russia had also become quite adept at using local elites to promote
its imperial agenda long before the British attempted to do the same in India.
Russia’s frontier colonialism also had much in common with the United States’
frontier subjugation of native peoples especially in its promotion of a Christian
civilizing mission. In addition, “the need to transform pasturelands into agricultural
colonies and industrial enterprises kept the [Russian] government on a
confrontational course with its nomadic neighbors” (Khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 222).
At the end of the 19th century, the so-called “Great Game” in Asia pitted the world’s
two most powerful nations of the period, Britain and Russia, on a collision course
for control over the Middle East (Fromkin, 1980, p. 936).

Serfs, Slavophiles, Artists, and Intellectuals
Following the emancipation of serfs, groups like the narodniki (populists) as well
as many intellectuals, artists, and writers increasingly celebrated and romanticized
the peasant as a heroic figure capable of withstanding great suffering with human
dignity (Figes, 2002, p. 220). There was a new found fascination with a rural life
little known or understood by the ruling classes of the urban centers. These artists
and intellectuals viewed peasants as oppressed and in need of liberation, and
increasingly advocated for all Russians to adopt the collectivist, in some ways
quasi-socialist form of organization, that prevailed in peasant villages.
At the same time, Europe was also increasingly viewed by Russians as a
morally corrupting influence̶decadent, materialistic, superficial, and egotistical, and
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it was portrayed this way in many of the works of Russia’s literature. This reflected,
in part, what came to be known as the Slavophile movement calling for a
rediscovery of Russian roots and values, and where history might belong to the
people (Figes, 2002, pp. 65, 135). Morality, spirituality, and social justice were core
themes in their works. In general, the Slavophiles tended to be political
conservatives, while the populists were revolutionaries. Both groups generally
opposed those advocating for greater Westernization which was also a prevalent
view at the time.
Artistically and intellectually, what began in the 1830s as largely a romantic
view of the beleaguered peasant, by the latter half of the century began to challenge
the received truths linking Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalism under Romanov
rule, and by the 1930s became an almost blind faith in progress under Communist
state control eventually giving rise to more outspoken dissidents after World War
II.

The Trans-Siberian Railroad and East Asia
The development of railroads was a central aspect of infrastructure development in
Russia at the end of the 19th and throughout the 20th centuries. Railways, a symbol
of modernity, attracted people to towns and brought growth, replacing the old world
of rural Russia with a new more urban context. Birth rates also increased
dramatically during the second half of the 19th century with the population rising
in Russia from 50 to 79 million. As more and more land was farmed (primarily in
the southern regions) soil quality declined along with agricultural and livestock
production, resulting in shortages and eventually famine (Figes, 2002, p. 258).
Overall, less than 15% of Russian land is fit for agriculture as the tundra is a treeless
plain with poor soil and little precipitation, while the taiga region, over half of the
nation’s land mass, has cold winters, hot summers, leached soils, and is covered in
forest.
In 1898, China granted Russia a 25-year lease over the Liaotung Peninsula and
Russia completed the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1903. In 1904, Japan, concerned
about losing its trade privileges with China due to Russian expansion, launched a
surprise attack on the Russians at Port Arthur. Japan’s substantial military victories
against Russia (the Russian navy was defeated at Tsushima and the army lost 80,000
men at Mukden) resulted in concessions of Manchurian territories to Japan and
contributed to revolutionary fervor throughout Russia. The 1905 Revolution in
Russia was fueled by striking workers, peasant unrest, and military mutinies, which
led to the creation of the State Duma, a multiparty system and a Constitutional
Monarchy in 1906. The 1905 Revolution largely failed to create real change in the
political power of Tsar Nicholas II and it would not be until the middle of World
War I and the additional suffering placed on the nation that a more complete
revolution would occur.
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The Russian Revolution and World War
Russian losses during World War I exceeded 3 million people and caused great
hardship. In 1917 in the middle of the war, Russia experienced two revolutions,
revolutions that were a reaction to over 300 years of monocratic rule. The
Bolsheviks led by Vladimir Lenin came to power during the second revolution in
October 1917 and promised to end Russia’s involvement in World War I. They
signed a peace treaty with Germany in 1918 but continued to face incursions by
Allied forces, especially Polish forces. They signed a peace treaty with Poland in
1921 ceding parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia to Poland. Conditions in Russia
continued to deteriorate. At least 5 million Russians died of starvation and disease
during the famine of 1921 and the Bolsheviks had no choice but to accept foreign
assistance. Three million Russians fled their native land between 1919 and 1929
(Figes, 2002, p. 528). In 1921, “Lenin’s answer to the crisis was the New Economic
Policy which represented a retreat from socialist economics. The peasants were
given greater freedom, and private trade and private ownership of small businesses
were again legalized” (Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 51).
Lenin also revised Marxist thought to emphasize its international dimension
highlighting how imperialist nations exploited their colonies exacerbating the
problems of class struggle. He believed that Russia would lead a worldwide
movement of liberation from the oppression of bourgeois capitalism. Lenin’s death
in 1924 resulted in a divisive power struggle with Joseph Stalin emerging as the
leader, ruling from 1929-1953. He immediately created large state-run farms to
collectivize agricultural lands, expand industrial output, repress religion and close
churches, and purge all opposition. It is estimated that as many as 10 million people
died during the manmade famine of 1932-34, and an additional 7 million people
were killed and 8-12 million arrested during the purges of 1934-38.
With the onset of World War II, the Soviet Union crippled by Stalin’s Great
Purge of 1937, having executed or imprisoned many high ranking officers, was
generally ill-prepared for war and signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany.
They were caught off guard when attacked by Nazi Germany in June 1941. By midSeptember 1941, Hitler’s forces had cut off the city of Leningrad and advanced to
within a few hundred miles of Moscow. With great sacrifice, the Russians stopped
the Nazi advance and slowly began to push them back. The siege of Leningrad
lasted 900 days and as many as 1 million people died of disease and starvation
before it was broken in January 1944 (Figes, 2002, p. 492). By the end of the war,
27 million people in Soviet Russia (especially many Ukrainians, Belarusians,
Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians, and many of the civilian victims were Jews)
had died but the country emerged with control of vast territory in Central and
Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Donaldson et al. (2014) stated, “That the Soviet
Union not only survived but emerged from the War as Europe’s strongest power
was a tribute to Soviet military valor and diplomatic skill” (p. 62). World War II, or
The Great Patriotic War as it is known in Russia, mobilized all of Russia’s resources
including more than 1 million women who served with the Soviet armed forces as
medics, scouts, snipers, and communication operators, and in combat positions in
the infantry, artillery, armored tank, and anti-aircraft divisions (Pennington, 2010).
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Stalinism and the Cold War
Under communism, old aristocratic ideas were abandoned for new proletarian ones
where science and a mechanized collectivism promised to transform the world,
where faith in religion would be replaced by scientific progress. Communism called
for the abolition of private ownership over the means of production, state control of
everyday life, and subordination of the individual to the power of bureaucracy.
While the socialist ideal called for equality and the destruction of hierarchy, it
especially targeted the privileges afforded to both the well-educated and religious
institutions (Shafarevich, 1974, pp. 44, 53-54). The Soviet economy largely
operated on plans from above rather than consumer demand from below. While
very successful as a tool of industrialization, the planned economy did not
necessarily promote individual initiative or innovation. It has been highly criticized
for lacking quality and competitiveness. Solzhenitsyn (1974) criticized the
communist state for usurping land ownership from peasants, political power from
trade unions, and voice from minority communities (p. 11).
Following World War II, “both the USSR and the United States perceived
themselves as heading coalitions struggling for peace and justice against an evil and
determined rival” (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp. 73-74). Under such a competitive
nationalistic framework, the United States and Russia viewed compromise and
accommodation as forms of unpatriotic treachery. Solzhenitsyn (1974) described
the context thus: “not a single event in our life has been freely and comprehensively
discussed, so that a true appreciation of it could be arrived at and solutions found”
(p. ix). He called for the USSR and the United States to find common interests, to
cease being antagonists, and ensure respect for human rights (Solzhenitsyn, 1974,
p. 8). He was critical of unfettered freedom devoid of moral responsibility and
immersed in protecting its own self-interests. He called for both social justice and
the renunciation of violence, for freewill in joining the social contract.
After Stalin died, Nikita Khrushchev took over denouncing Stalin in a secret
speech and released 5 million people from the gulags (forced labor camps that
housed mainly political prisoners). Khrushchev’s rule saw numerous challenges and
confrontations including the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956), the Suez Canal
crisis (1956), Sputnik and the space race (1957), the erection of the Berlin Wall
(1961), and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).
The Cold War began with stalemates dividing East and West Berlin and North
and South Korea, leading to divisiveness in other parts of the world and increases
in arms sales. The Cold War begins in the Middle East with the Suez Canal crisis.
In 1955, Gamal Abdel Nasser obtained $200 million dollars of advanced Soviet
weaponry from Czechoslovakia, a move that angered the United States, which then
withdrew funding for the Aswan High Dam project leading to the 1956
nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent British, French, and Israeli
attack on Egypt (Ahmed, 2011, p. 58). Weapons were the chief export of the USSR
to the Third World (Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 86). In 1962, Soviet-supported Nasser
began carrying out a proxy war in Yemen that spread into Saudi Arabia resulting in
increased military support to Saudi Arabia from the United States (Bronson, 2006,
pp. 85-88). U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East were to ensure access to oil
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and prevent any hostile power from acquiring control over this resource. During the
Cold War the Soviet Union was seen as the primary threat to those interests (Sick,
2009, p. 295). In 1968, when the British announced their intention of reducing their
presence in the Middle East, the United States looked to partner with Iran and Saudi
Arabia in order to counter the threat of Soviet expansion. This Twin Pillars policy
ignored the issue that both Iran and Saudi Arabia were unhappy with Israel’s
aggressive stance in the Middle East. For Iran, the United States’ support for Israel
was untenable; however, “the Saudi leadership considered its geostrategic
competition with the Soviets and its relationship with the United States more
important than the Arab-Israeli one, and viewed the United States as its long-term
central partner in that larger struggle” (Bronson, 2006, p. 120). Saudi Arabia and
the United States became partners against “Godless” communism. Saudi Arabia
was the United States’ most important ally during the Cold War, assisting the
United States to conduct proxy wars in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua,
Yemen, and the Sudan. The U.S.-Saudi partnership helped bankrupt the Soviet
Union and contributed to its defeat in Afghanistan and losses in Africa (Bronson,
2006, p. 203).
Khrushchev was succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev in 1964. During the Brezhnev
era, the major conflicts and issues included the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia (1968), the Vietnam War, war in Bangladesh (1971), Yom Kippur
War (1973), SALT I & II ballistic missile agreements, war in Angola (1975), Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
It was estimated “that from 1950-1970, Soviet per capita food consumption
doubled, disposable income quadrupled, the work week was shortened, welfare
benefits increased, consumption of soft-goods tripled and purchases of hard-goods
rose twelve-fold” (Smith, 1976, p. 58). By 1970, life expectancy reached 70 years
and the Soviet Union had the highest ratio of doctors to population in the world.
Furthermore, in 1974, 85% of all working-age women were employed, the highest
percentage in the industrialized world (Smith, 1976, pp. 72, 130). However, by the
late 1970s, there were significant signs of trouble. New York Times correspondent
Hedrick Smith, in his 1976 book, The Russians, reported that the Soviet
underground economy or black market grew out of the system’s inefficiencies,
shortages, poor quality, and terrible delays in service (Smith, 1976, p. 86).
Communism became a patronage system where who you knew and their
administrative position in the party’s privileged class was decisive to improving
one’s quality of life (Smith, 1976, p. 29).
By the early 1980s the costs of war abroad had seriously undermined the Soviet
economy fueling disillusionment if not despair at home. Between 1982 and 1985
the USSR had three successive leadership changes. Mikhail Gorbachev was elected
general secretary by the politburo in March 1985 inheriting dismal prospects̶most
notably a stagnant economy, poor agricultural productivity, substandard housing,
declining life expectancy, and rising infant mortality. His first unexpected crisis was
the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in April 1986.
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Perestroika and Glasnost
Aimed at restructuring and not dismantling the Soviet system, Gorbachev’s
perestroika (restructuring) reforms and glasnost (openness) campaigns required
great courage as they nonetheless challenged the foundations of communist
ideology. He recognized how military power and expenditures had been generally
unproductive and that there was a need to shift focus and find a way to empower
people to become more competitively engaged in the global economy. He was also
particularly focused on curbing nuclear proliferation and the arms race. In the late
1980s, Gorbachev began withdrawing troops from conflicts in Angola (1988) and
Afghanistan (1989), ending military aid to Nicaragua (1989), sponsoring a ceasefire in the Iran/Iraq war (1987), and encouraging Vietnam to withdraw troops from
Cambodia (1989).
The opening up of reforms in Soviet Russia soon spread in unexpected ways
throughout the region. In the spring of 1989 Poland conducted elections with Lech
Walesa’s Solidarity labor union winning the majority of contested seats; this was
followed by a wave of mass demonstrations in Hungary, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, all leading to the ousting of Communist
Party control and new elections. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and
the reunification of Germany signaled an end to the Cold War as Gorbachev was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990.
In 1991, concerned about the slow pace of reforms in Russia and the collapse
of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, Russia became an
independent state under pro-democracy President Boris Yeltsin, the first freely
elected leader in Russian history, and soon thereafter formed the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), first with Belorussia and Ukraine and then adding
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Moldova,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Russia’s first order of business was to negotiate new
relationships and promote economic integration with the former Soviet republics
and gain acceptance/membership in organizations such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, there
were many hurdles and roadblocks to joining these European and global
institutions, and the CIS proved to be a very loose federation with each of the
members pursuing their own interests and memberships in these international
organizations, and each establishing its own currency. Russia offered CIS nations
below market prices for commodities such as oil and gas, asking in return that these
countries not enter into external defense treaties or allow foreign military bases to
be established in the region, but this tactic largely failed and soon Russia was
increasing prices to assert greater control (Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 178). The
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) gained membership in the European
Union in 2004 along with former Communist bloc countries of Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in
2007 and Croatia in 2013. More concerning to Russia, these countries also all joined
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance originally
created to prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Notably, Finland, which
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has as much reason to distrust and fear Russia as any nation, is a member of the
European Union but not of NATO.

Conflicts in the Balkans and Caucasus Regions
Continued NATO expansion was based on old fears of the potential for Russian
aggression and was viewed by Russia as a broken promise that limited their
influence in partnering to resolve regional conflicts. Immediately following the
breakup of the Soviet Union, several conflicts arose in the former republics
including civil war in Tajikistan, two secessionist movements in Georgia (South
Ossetia and Abkhazia), the war over Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and
Armenia, and the independence struggle of the Trans-Dniester region in Moldova,
all of which contributed to these fears and to declining regional trade. The total
volume of trade between Russia and the former Soviet Republics dropped by half
between 1989 and 1993. In 1992-93, despite pledges of a $1.6 billion assistance
package from the United States and a ten-year deferral on debt obligations, Russia
continued to experience severe economic hardships, hyperinflation, unemployment,
and reduction in social services (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp. 170, 237-238, 252,
257). It is estimated that by mid-1993, more than 40 million Russians were living
below the poverty line.
The biggest conflicts in the region testing the evolving relationship between
Russia and the West (NATO) were the wars in the Balkans and the war in Chechnya.
The West did not question the right of Russia to assert authority over Chechnya but
it did object to the brutality of fighting forces and the killing of civilians. Russia
charged that the violations of human rights were being committed by Chechen
rebels. The two-year war in Chechnya ended in 1994 with a compromise agreement
providing some local autonomy to the region. However, the failure of Russian
troops to win the war contributed to a gradual decline in Yeltsin’s popularity as he
was increasingly viewed as inept and weak, capitulating to Western demands.
(Indeed, the West was treating Russia this way in its refusal to involve them more
closely in actions in Kosovo.) Yeltsin was also increasingly seen as undemocratic
following a Constitutional crisis and legislative power-struggle that included his
impeachment and bombardment of the Russian White House in 1993.
Terrorist attacks by Chechen rebels involving over 2,000 hostages at hospitals
in Budyonnovsk in 1995, and Kizlar in 1996 continued to force the question of how
to deal with the region. In 1997, Yeltsin and Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov
signed an agreement that was to extend autonomy, end hostilities, and follow the
rules of law. Of special note, Chechnya is strategically important because it
provides a vital link in the flow of oil from Baku, Azerbaijan, to the Black Sea port
of Novorossik (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp. 240-245, 264). Comparatively, the level
of concern and regulation over the placement of oil and gas infrastructure between
the United States, Canada, and Mexico as regards to environmental protection and
impact studies pales with the security risks and economic competition over the
placement of oil and gas pipelines in the Baltic, Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Central
Asia regions. Throughout the region of the former Soviet Republics, the process of
controlling oil and gas resources and supply pipelines is highly contested.
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Oligarchs and a Powerful Petro State
More recently, economic growth was accompanied by the rise of oligarchs, a small
number of people who gained control of a large share of what had earlier been state
assets as the Soviet economy privatized. The means by which they gained control
has also been called into serious question. Jerrold Schecter (1998) noted that “six
hundred bankers and business people have been killed since the fall of the Soviet
Union” (p. 13). Some of these oligarchs have treated Russia like their own personal
property while others invested in building a stronger civil society through
supporting democratic institutions such as a free press (Gessen, 2012a, pp. 124134). A number of high profile corruption and murder cases have emerged in recent
years including cases involving not just oligarchs but also political dissidents such
as: the arrests of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, Dmitry
Rozhdestvensky, Pussy Riot, and Alexei Navalny, and the deaths of Sergei
Yushenkov, Alexander Litvinenko, Boris Berezovsky, Galina Starovoitova, Anna
Politkovskaya, Sergei Magnitsky, and Boris Nemtsov.
Helped by soaring revenues of petroleum exports, the rise of Vladimir Putin
has been largely ascribed to his success in responding to the “dizzying economic
decline of the early 1990s [that] produced a profound sense of national humiliation”
(Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 117).
In 1999, Chechnya invaded the Dagestan region of Russia and Yeltsin
appointed Vladimir Putin to put down the incursion. This was followed by several
terrorist bombings in different cities across Russia including two in Moscow that
resulted in more than 100 deaths and led Putin to initiate a full-scale war on
Chechnya producing hundreds of thousands of refugees (Gessen, 2012a, pp. 23-27).
Later that year, Yeltsin resigned and Putin became his successor. Putin won the
election for president in 2000.
Beyond the important policy differences on the wars in Kosovo, Libya, and
Iraq, NATO enlargement, and attempts to establish U.S. military bases and missile
defense systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Putin has generally been
supportive of developing good bilateral relations with the United States. This is best
exemplified through Russia’s support for the war on terrorism. At the same time,
Putin has insisted that Russia’s role in regional and world affairs be recognized.
Since he became president, Vladimir Putin has worked to concentrate power and
eliminate critics and competitors. As one of his vocal critics has observed, “three
months after his inauguration, two of the country’s wealthiest men had been
stripped of their influence and effectively kicked out of the country [and] less than
a year after Putin came to power, all three federal television networks were
controlled by the state” (Gessen, 2012a, p. 174).
After 9/11, the war against Chechnya was largely portrayed as part of the
West’s war on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism (Gessen, 2012a, p. 229). The 2004
hostage crisis at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, in which 342 mostly children
were killed was followed by “Putin’s decision to centralize Moscow’s control over
Russia’s regions by discarding the popular election of regional governors and
republic presidents” (Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 384).
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Russia’s growing economic success and Putin’s efforts to take back control
from the oligarchs was largely touted among the emerging BRIC countries’
multipolar world (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (Gessen, 2012a, p. 243). The
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was another sign of Russia’s attempts to
develop strong regional partnerships. Putin won a landslide victory for re-election
in 2004. In 2008, Dmitry Medvedev became president and appointed Putin prime
minister as he was ineligible to run for a third consecutive term.
Today, “most economic production is in private hands, the ruble is fully
convertible, and prices are free to fluctuate with supply and demand” (Donaldson
et al., 2014, p. 9). Russia also has a large domestic market and well-educated
workforce. Russia has joined the IMF and WTO but continues to be very dependent
on oil and gas revenues which have been subject to significant price fluctuations
effecting economic stability. Gazprom has a near monopoly on natural gas
production and transport in Russia and about 17% of the world gas production, 18%
of estimated reserves, and 15% of the global transport network (Donaldson et al.,
2014, p. 150). Unfortunately, Russia has poor protection of property rights,
relatively high levels of corruption, increasing state ownership, and an
unpredictable judicial system (Guriev, 2016, pp. 21-22). Prospects for Russia’s
future economic growth are unclear and will depend largely on the degree of
improvement in regional trade relations, legal protections, and controlled
government spending.

Syria and Ukraine
Lukyanov (2016) wrote,
In February [2016], Moscow and Washington issued a joint statement
announcing the terms of a ‘cessation of hostilities’ in Syria agreed to by
major world powers, regional players, and most of the participants in the
Syrian civil war … Even as it worked with Russia on the truce, the United
States continued to enforce the sanctions it had placed on Russia in
response to the 2014 annexation of Crimea. (p. 30)
Russia’s actions in Crimea and in Syria represent in part a response to U.S.
aggression around the world since the end of the Cold War and what it generally
views as an overly assertive U.S. foreign policy (Lukyanov, 2016, pp. 32-35). Many
Russians see Putin’s annexation of Crimea “as righting a historical injustice and
reclaiming Russia’s status as a world power” (Lipman, 2016, p. 44). But Russia
needs to develop good relations with Ukraine and its other neighbors through
diplomacy not force of arms. The biggest threats to Russia are not European
expansionism and certainly not the ambitions of neighbors and important potential
trading partners like Ukraine; rather it stems from on-going destabilizing conflict in
the Middle East. In many ways, the West needs a stable Russian military presence
in Sevastopol (it had a lease agreement through 2042) which makes Russia’s
aggression in Crimea, the Ukraine, and even Syria all the more troubling. Russia
has played and can play a productive role in Syria as it did with the removal of
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chemical weapons. It would be interesting to consider what influence the Moscow
Patriarchate might have in regards to policies or relief efforts on behalf of Syrian
Orthodox Christians. Russia’s Middle East relations are critically important in
resolving conflicts there, especially its relations with Turkey and Iran. Therefore, it
is critical the United States and Russia come together over strategic policy in Syria.
There will not be real or lasting security in the region without stable cooperation
with Russia.

Conclusion
To summarize some of the main points of this introduction, Russia has tended to
have strong leaders with centralized control. It is a predominantly Christian society
with diverse ethnic populations and neighbors. It has suffered and sacrificed greatly
through serfdom, war, and famine but remained very patriotic, hard-working, and
high-achieving in both science and the arts. It has been very conscious of protecting
its interests through strategic defense and diplomacy working to maintain a balanceof-power approach in its foreign policy and international relations.
The storied history of U.S.-Russia relations over the last century, epitomized
by the Cold War era, has often been antagonistic resulting in disastrous third world
proxy wars, a tragic and wasteful consequence. Real collaboration in joint problemsolving efforts has been lacking, collaboration in space exploration being one
exception and disarmament another. Direct trade with Russia has also been limited.
There is a great deal of trauma and tragedy in Russia’s history and current
context that give cause for caution and concern (the same is true for most countries
including the United States and its genocide of Native Americans, slavery, Vietnam,
and Iraq), but these faults and mistakes need not define the future. We must learn
from such mistakes rather than allowing them to become self-fulfilling prophecies
where participants become complicit in a never-ending narrative of distrust and
fear. As noted in this essay, it has been asserted that “centuries of invasion from
both east and west engendered fear and distrust of the outside world” by Russia
(Schecter, 1998, p. 26) but such circumstances have also promoted a strategy
emphasizing a desire to form alliances and mutually beneficial relationships to
weather such storms. Generally speaking, in global affairs, we should be looking to
societies’ strengths for answers, not the weaknesses for excuses. A paradigm shift
from a worldview of competing empires to one of mutual responsibility is critically
needed.
Rather than blaming others, people and nations need to recognize the creative
power of collaboration across communities and cultures. War is costly and wasteful
but we should not think that building coalitions and relationships is inexpensive or
easily accomplished. It takes time and patience to develop trust and understanding.
As this issue goes to publication, investigations continue into the Trump
campaign and its possible collusion with Russia to influence the U.S. presidential
election. Regardless of the role of the Trump campaign, there does appear to be
evidence of Russia’s involvement in trying to influence American voters especially
through social media platforms. It is not unusual or unheard of for foreign
governments to try to interfere or influence the outcomes of elections. According to
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Dov Levin of Carnegie Mellon University, the United States has done so more than
80 times worldwide between 1946 and 2000 (NPR, 2016). One thing that makes the
current case different are the new tools available for carrying out such cyber-attacks.
The use of social media that involves Americans themselves in spreading
misinformation seems aimed at dividing society against itself. In many ways, we
should be less worried about whether democrats or republicans win an election (as
both are American parties that despite differences should have America’s best
interests at heart), and more concerned about issues of bipartisanship in support of
the union. When the issue first emerged, Stephen Cohen (2017) wrote,
The allegations are driven by political forces with various agendas: the
Hillary Clinton wing of the Democratic Party, which wants to maintain its
grip on the party by insisting that she didn’t lose the election but that it was
stolen by Russian President Vladimir Putin for Trump; by enemies of
Trump’s proposed détente with Russia, who want to discredit both him and
Putin; and by Republicans and Democrats stunned that Trump essentially
ran and won without either party, thereby threatening the established twoparty system. (n.p.)
More recently, Masha Gessen (2012b) wrote that there is no reason to believe that
“a tiny drop in the sea of Facebook ads changed any American votes” but a more
likely explanation is that “a great many Americans want to prove that the Russians
elected Trump, and Americans did not” (n.p.). The current crisis seems to have more
to do with the new tools of social media and American divisiveness at home as it
has to do with foreign affairs. Given the relentless ubiquity of access to the 24-hour
news cycle on our mobile devices, the American public needs to learn how to
become more responsible and discerning users of media technology. At the same
time, these phenomena also underscore just how much we live in a global society
and how much we have to learn about living cooperatively for the common good in
such a world.
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The Economic Roots of the Cold War: The IMF,
ITO and Other Economic Issues in Post-War
Soviet-American Relations
Kristina V. Minkova

Abstract
In light of newly released archival resources, this article examines the traditional
historiography of Soviet-American relations focusing on economic relations at the
end of World War II.

The Cold War had an immense impact on the historical development of the world
in the second half of the twentieth century, and its consequences continue to
influence international relations. Examining the origins of the Cold War, the role of
the U.S.S.R., and the United States in waging it remains highly relevant and topical
today.
This study reveals the intensions of the Soviet government to participate in
international economic cooperation at the end of World War II, undermining the
distorted Cold War view of the 1950s-1980s propagated by both Soviet and Western
propaganda. This new understanding is partly explained by the fact that the bulk of
the documents had been for a long time unavailable to researchers. 1 Meanwhile, it
shows that the history of Soviet-American relations and particularly that of the
period considered is not indisputable. Nor should such studies be limited to the
political problems that have traditionally been the focus of such scholarship. These
enduring stereotypes significantly impede an impartial assessment of the current
state of Russian-American relations. The paper further demonstrates how
diplomatic missteps, fears, and hesitations contributed to the beginning of a long
disastrous period in international relations known as the Cold War.
Economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States in 1944–1946
cover a significant range of issues: the settlement of deliveries under the LendLease Agreement; the question of the American loan to the U.S.S.R.; and the
1

A significant bulk of the documents was declassified in 1992 but they are not freely
available. They are preserved in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation which can be accessed only with a special license. Unfortunately, the researcher
will not necessarily receive the documents he or she needs but only the documents that the
keepers find appropriate to serve out. Many documents are still under seal.
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American initiative to create several international economic and financial
institutions including the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, and
the International Trade Organization, and the Soviet participation in these
organizations.
It should be noted that neither the Soviet nor the American leadership had a
unified position on any of these issues. Within three years, 1944–1946, Washington
had changed its attitude to the very consideration of the issues listed above: one day
they were planned to be discussed all together, another day, strictly separately. From
the beginning of the talks the Soviet Government declared its desire to discuss each
issue separately, but in the process it agreed to unite some of them into blocks.

Background
During the Second World War the future of international economic cooperation was
addressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Lend-Lease Master Agreement, but it was
more precisely taken up only at the Moscow Conference of the Allied powers in
late 1943. This conference was preceded by exchange of memoranda from both
American and Soviet sides regarding the necessity to start bilateral confidential
negotiations on major problems of post-war economic development (AVPRF 624,
1–2). On November 1, 1943, the Soviet, U.S., and British foreign ministers signed
a secret protocol containing 10 annexes. The ninth annex was entitled “The bases
of our program for international economic cooperation” (FRUS, 1943, pp. 763–
766). This program contained a list of issues that the “Big Three” considered the
most important not only for the normalization of international economic
cooperation, but also for the success of the post-war system of international
relations as a whole. The list was topped by the expansion of international trade on
a non-discriminatory basis and the regulation of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade
in goods, as well as the establishment of solid international currency exchange rates
and the organization of currency exchange.
The Americans and a lesser extent, the British, took the laboring oar in
developing draft proposals on these issues. In the Soviet Union the People’s
Commissariats of Finance (Narkomfin) and Foreign Trade (NKVT), in co-operation
with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) also worked on the
Soviet position regarding post-war international economic relations.
The American proposals regarding the development of international trade led
to the drafting of the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). It was
signed by 53 countries at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment on March
24, 1948, but never ratified by the United States and, therefore, most of the other
signatory countries (Minkova, 2006, pp. 118-120). As for the establishment of fixed
exchange rates and the organization of free currency exchange, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) were founded in the aftermath of the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in
July 1944.
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The Settlement of Deliveries under the Lend-Lease Agreement
On May 12, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew sent Soviet chargé
d’affaires in Washington Nikolay Novikov a note informing the Soviet government
that "the shipment of supplies under the current program of Lend-Lease will be
immediately modified in view of the end of organized hostilities in Europe" (FRUS,
1945, pp. 1000–1001). The Soviet side was completely unprepared for this message
(the answering note stated that “The note referred to and the discontinuance of
deliveries have come as a complete surprise to the Soviet Government” (AVPRF
702, 1), and reacted very negatively. This perception of the situation settled deeply
both in Soviet/Russian and American historiography becoming the basis of many
false assumptions. To begin with, this note was considered authentic evidence of
the abrupt change of U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union after the death of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Fleming, 1961, p. 269; Herring, 1973, p. 181; Pechatnov,
2006, p. 328). As a matter of fact the situation was completely different. Firstly, the
United States was considering a program of post-war assistance to the Soviet Union
since 1943 (FRUS, 1945, p. 937). Secondly, Washington was determined to fully
implement its commitments on deliveries in the framework of the Fourth Protocol
to the Lend-Lease Agreement and negotiate the Fifth Protocol, as State Department
repeatedly notified the Soviet embassy in various documents (AVPRF 624, 13–14;
FRUS, 1944, pp. 1032, 1084). Third, the termination of supplies under the LendLease Agreement stemmed from the wording of the U.S. Lend-Lease Act,
according to which the deliveries under this program were to be ceased with the end
of hostilities.
Further delays in the talks on this issue ended with the signing of the
“Agreement between the Governments of the US and the U.S.S.R. on the
disposition of lend-lease supplies in inventory or procurement in the United States”
(United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, p. 2819–2822) on
October 15, 1945. The delays were mostly caused by the actions of the Soviet
leadership which greatly delayed answering notes and other messages in the
framework of negotiations. In addition, the U.S. side interpreted the Soviet violation
of the Article III of Mutual Aid Agreement from June 11, 1942, as an inappropriate
and egregious breach of trust. This article prohibited the Soviet government “to
transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information,
transferred to it under the Act of March 11, 1941, of the Congress of the United
States of America, or permit the use thereof by any one not an officer, employee, or
agent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (Mutual Aid
Agreement). Meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow Averell Harriman
reported to the State Department in March 1945 that Stalin had presented Poland
with 500 trucks received by lend-lease. Another 1,000 trucks were "donated" by the
Red Army to Łódź. In addition, Harriman mentioned deliveries of lend-lease flour
to Poland and sugar to Finland (FRUS, 1945, p. 990).
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The Negotiations over the U.S. Loan to the U.S.S.R.
The idea of granting the Soviet Union a credit worth several billion U.S. dollars for
post-war reconstruction emerged in the U.S. Treasury even before an official
request from the Soviet side. Throughout 1944, Trade Secretary Henry Morgenthau,
Jr. repeatedly discussed with various U.S. officials the possibility of giving such a
loan to the Soviet Union (FRUS, 1945, pp. 938-939).
The official request from the Soviet leadership was set out in the memorandum
handed to Harriman by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyatcheslav
Molotov on January 3, 1945. The Soviet Government asked for a $6 billion credit
for a period of 30 years at a 2.5% interest rate to purchase American industrial
products and equipment required for the speedy restoration of their war-ravaged
economy (AVPRF 29, p. 1). The reaction to this request came immediately: on
January 6, 1945, Harriman wrote to then Secretary of State Edward Stettinius: "It is
my basic conviction that we should do everything we can to assist the Soviet Union
through credits in developing a sound economy. I feel strongly that the sooner the
Soviet Union can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant they will
become" (FRUS, 1945, p. 947). At the same time Harriman insisted that
negotiations on credit came completely separate from the negotiations on the lendlease settlement.
On January 10, 1945, Secretary of Trade Morgenthau sent a memorandum to
Roosevelt proposing to grant the Soviet Union a $10 billion credit for 35 years at
2% interest rate (FRUS, 1945, p. 948). Appropriate attention should be given to the
uniqueness of this situation: the U.S. government, in fact, showed willingness to
provide the U.S.S.R. with a larger credit on more favorable terms and for a longer
period than requested!
However, it is here where the first difficulties emerged. The Soviet side insisted
on discussing the loan jointly with the settlement of the Lend-Lease Act,
considering it virtually one question. In the United States the State Department
began debating on the form of the credit, conditions of its granting and, most
importantly, on how to make Congress adopt relevant legislation to realize the
procedure. Unable to find a quick compromise with the Soviet leadership the United
States suspended deliveries under the Fourth Protocol to the Lend-Lease
Agreement. Both sides found themselves frustrated.
If the Soviet Union were to enter the war with Japan it would be in the need of
supplies under the Fourth Protocol; but until then the State Department could not
justify the need of their renewal to the Congress. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Joseph C. Grew communicated this problem to Soviet charge d'affaires in the
United States Nikolay Novikov in a note dated June 26, 1945 (FRUS, 1945, pp.
1027-1028). However, the next day Grew sent Novikov another note informing the
latter about the possibility of delivering to the U.S.S.R. those goods from the list
submitted by the Soviet side which could be found and prepared to ship by August
31, 1945. In a note dated July 17, 1945, this period was extended for one month
(FRUS, 1945, pp. 1029-1030).
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By this time the balance of power between the Allied Powers shifted
significantly. The successful nuclear test of July 1945 made the United States and
its President Harry Truman feel that they now occupied a unique position in postwar international relations. Being sure that the Soviet physicists would need another
15-20 years to develop their own nuclear bomb, President Truman began acting
abruptly. In his famous letter to the U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes, he
confessed that he was “tired of babying the Soviets” (Truman, 1955, pp. 551–552).
Hence in any negotiations the American side stopped seeking compromise. The
question of credit was firmly tied to other problems in the economic relations
between the two countries. In a memo of General Wesson, Director of the U.S.S.R.
Branch of Foreign Economic Administration to its Administrator L. Crowley the
former stressed the need to conclude a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, an agreement
on fishing rights in the Bering Sea and around the Aleutian Islands, and to settle
violations of the Article III of the Lend-Lease Agreement mentioned above.
Repeated U.S. notes to the Soviet leadership were left unanswered and Moscow did
not terminate supplies of the lend-lease goods and equipment to third countries
(FRUS, 1945, pp. 1038-1039). Meanwhile, the protracted negotiations between
different U.S. administrations left Soviet requests for American credit unanswered.
Stalin commented on this situation at a meeting with Senator Pepper and other
American Congressmen in Moscow in September (Kennan, 1967, p. 179). Given
the urgency of Soviet requests, it is further notable that it was not until August 9,
1945, that Harriman informed the Soviet leadership on the introduction of the U.S.
law authorizing the Export-Import Bank to provide loans to other countries
(AVPRF 669, p. 67).
The signing of the already mentioned Agreement on lend-lease supplies on
October 15, 1945, was the last success in the Soviet-American talks on economic
issues. After that the negotiations stalled despite the persistent interest from both
the Soviet and American sides. On December 21, Harriman sent James Byrnes a
telegram stating that “Little information has been received by this Embassy
regarding our over-all economic policy towards the Soviet Union and particularly
as it relates to Soviet economic policies .... Since Soviet political policy appears to
be influenced by economic objectives it would seem that we should give at this time
greater attention to the concerting of our economic policy with our political policy
towards the Soviet Union” (FRUS, 1945, p. 1049).

The U.S.S.R. & the Creation of the International Trade Organization
Harriman’s telegram to Washington was well received. The same day, December
21, Harriman forwarded to Molotov’s deputy A. Vyshinsky “Proposals for the
expansion of world trade and employment.” Similar texts were sent to 13 other
countries two weeks prior (AVPRF 47, pp. 137–139). Being the result of an
exhaustive bargaining between Washington and London, the “Proposals” were a
clear expression of the American view of the post-war economic order. The Soviet
Government was asked whether it would agree to participate in the negotiations
scheduled for March or April 1946. This document caused a major stir in the NKID
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and NKVT that had already developed their own views on post-war organization of
international trade. By December 31, 1945, the “Proposals” have been carefully
studied in several departments of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.
That day Molotov received a memo “On the US proposals to expand world trade
and employment” (AVPRF, 700), signed by one of his deputies, Amazasp
Arutyunyan, and the head of the NKID economic department Vladimir
Gerashchenko. The letter briefly considered the American proposals for the
preparation of an international conference on trade and employment, which was
supposed to convene in the summer of 1946 under the aegis of the UN. In addition,
the letter contained a summary of the basic principles of the Charter of the World
Organization Trade and Employment. Arutyunyan and Gerashchenko wrote, “The
American proposals to expand trade and employment – in particular as regards our
foreign trade are largely unacceptable for us” (AVPRF 700, p. 3). However, they
would find it possible to agree to participate in the preliminary discussions in March
and April 1946 on the issues of world trade and employment, “not being bound,
however, by any obligations with respect to our participation in the World
Conference on trade and employment”( AVPRF 700, p. 3). They concluded that
Soviet participation in the “said preliminary discussion of the US proposals on
world trade” was advisable “regardless of whether we participate or not in the
projected global organization” (AVPRF 700, p. 4).
These officials substantiated the need for the Soviet Union's participation in the
talks by the fact that even in the case of a decision not to participate in the activities
of the ITO, it would have been advisable to try removing from its charter provisions
any aspects disadvantageous for the U.S.S.R., in order to test American, British,
and other participants’ intentions in the negotiations as well as to examine the
current state of trade and economic contradictions etc. If, however, Soviet
participation in the Organization would be recognized in the future as desirable,
participation in the preliminary discussions of the proposals for the conference,
which would resolve the issue of the creation of the International Organization on
Trade and Employment, would be all the more important (AVPRF 700). On January
3, 1946, Molotov forwarded this letter and the “Proposals” to his other deputy,
Vladimir Dekanozov with the following note: “Please, present the project agreed
with Comrade Mikoyan” (AVPRF 700, p. 1). All internal correspondence was
classified as “secret”.
During January and February 1946 both NKID and NKVT were actively
studying American proposals and their potential impact on the Soviet economy,
Soviet-American relations and the U.S.S.R.'s position in the post-war world.
However, at that time Moscow did not produce any response to the “Proposals.”
The consequences were disastrous. On February 21, 1946, Byrnes sent to Soviet
charge d'affaires in Washington Fyodor Orekhov a note stating that from that day,
all economic questions between the two countries would only be negotiated
together. By that time this list of questions included:
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(1) Claims of American nationals against the government of the U.S.S.R.,
including claims arising from actions of the U.S.S.R. in occupied and
liberated areas;
(2) Determining the concerted policy to be followed by the United States,
U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom in assisting the peoples liberated
from the domination of Nazi Germany, and the peoples of the former
Axis satellite states of Europe to solve their pressing economic
problems by democratic means;
(3) Arrangements of free, equal, and open navigation on rivers of
international concern to individuals, commercial vessels, and goods
of all members of the United Nations;
(4) Preliminary discussions of a comprehensive treaty of friendship,
commerce, and navigation between the United States and the
U.S.S.R., and agreement to enter into negotiations in the near future
for the conclusion of such a treaty;
(5) Arrangements to assure the adequate protection of the interests of the
writers and inventors and other copyright holders;
(6) Methods for giving effect to the United States “Proposals for
Expansion of World Trade and Employment” transmitted to the
Soviet leadership on December 21, 1945 (the date of transmission was
surely put intentionally to show Soviet unwillingness to co-operation
in this project of ultimate international importance);
(7) General settlement of lend-lease obligations in accordance with the
provisions of the Lend-Lease Agreement on the basis of an inventory
of lend-lease supplies in the possession of the U.S.S.R. or subject to
its control at the end of hostilities;
(8) Civil aviation matters of mutual interest to the two countries;
(9) Discussion of other economic questions (FRUS, 1946, pp. 828-829).
It took the Soviet side almost a month to work out a suitable reply to that note.
In his memoirs the then People's Commissar for Foreign Trade Anastas Mikoyan
sparingly explained the reasons of such delay: “It was to our disadvantage, because
for credits they wanted us to make concessions on other issues, that we were not
ready to make decisions on” (Mikoyan, 1999, p. 495). Thus, only on March 15,
1946, Novikov informed Byrnes that the Soviet government agreed to discuss with
the following questions: the amount and terms of credit; the conclusion of a treaty
of friendship, commerce, and navigation; methods for giving effect to the provisions
of Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement; and the question of lend-lease
supplies. As for other issues, the Soviet Government did not consider it “expedient
to connect the discussion of any other questions with the discussion on credit” but
expressed its willingness to discuss them at a time and place to be agreed upon by
both parties (FRUS, 1946, pp. 829-830).
This time it was the U.S. leadership that took over a month to reply. On April
18, 1946, in a note to Novikov, Byrnes welcomed the readiness of the Soviet side
to discuss the issues listed in the note from March 15. However, Washington
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considered three matters not included in the Soviet list–that is the claims of
American nationals against the government of the U.S.S.R; the concerted policies
for economic assistance for liberated nations and the protection of intellectual
property–closely connected with the issues that the Soviet Union government has
already agreed to discuss immediately. He therefore suggested starting negotiations
on these issues on May 15 in Washington, and on the technical aspects of lend-lease
supplies–10 days before. Later on Byrnes expressed his pleasure from noticing the
presence of a Soviet observer in the first meetings of the Boards of Governors of
the IMF and IBRD, and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would soon
become a member of these organizations and participate in their activity (FRUS,
1946, pp. 834–837).
The Soviet experts from NKVT took about a month to finalize the answering
note. On May 17, Novikov communicated to the Acting Secretary of State Dean
Acheson a note repeating almost word for word the text of the Soviet note of March
15. The only exception was the date–the Soviet side agreed to begin negotiations in
May that year (already late for a few days to the date proposed earlier by the
Americans)–and the addition of the question of navigation on the rivers and civil
aviation to the discussion agenda. As for other issues of American concern, the
Soviet leadership repeated its position that they had not been directly connected to
key issues it agreed to discuss, but again expressed its willingness to start a
preliminary exchange of views on an agreed date (FRUS, 1946, pp. 841–842).
On May 23, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs W. Clayton
received from the Office of Financial and Development Policy a memorandum
containing new measures for the response to the Soviets. It proposed two scenarios
for further actions:
1. To make use of the phrasing in the Soviet notes, and to suspend the
negotiations on credit; and
2. To defer discussions of a larger loan in the Congress until there is a
guarantee of the successful completion of negotiations with the
U.S.S.R. while providing the Soviet Union with a minor credit of $
250-500 mln from free sums of Export-Import Bank (FRUS, 1946, pp.
842–843).
The United States’ response followed in another month arriving only on June
13. Byrnes still insisted on the simultaneous discussion of all economic issues and
appointed a new date for the commencement of negotiations–July 10, 1946 (FRUS,
1946, pp. 844–845). At the very bottom of the note it was stated that the U.S.
government would be grateful for a quick response–a very clear allusion to the fact
that there had been no progress in negotiations for six months. Meanwhile,
representatives of 19 countries had already been actively working out the draft
Charter of the ITO, the discussion of which was due to begin on October 15 in
Geneva (Minkova, 2006, p. 111).
At the end of June 1946, the U.S. State Department prepared a draft of a new
lend-lease agreement that the United States had hoped to discuss with the Soviet
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Union and sign in a short time. However, no reaction to the note from June 13
followed from the Soviet side until early September. By then the State Department
had to admit the need to offer Moscow separate talks on the Lend-Lease Agreement
to get it off the ground and achieve at least some kind of positive result. William
Clayton sent the corresponding note to Fyodor Orekhov on September 14, 1946. In
addition, U.S. officials regarded these negotiations as a means to win back three
American icebreakers transferred to the Soviet Union by lend-lease. Instead of
being returned to the United States after the end of hostilities, these vessels were
illegally held by the Soviets in violation of all agreements.
Clayton’s note remained unanswered. On December 31, 1946, the U.S.
ambassador to the U.S.S.R. W. B. Smith had to “remind” Molotov about it (FRUS,
1946, p. 865).
It should be stressed that in reality the Soviet attitude to the American proposals
was by no means so indifferent as it may seem from the correspondence discussed
above. It is true that in accordance with Anastas Mikoyan recollections the LendLease Agreement did not represent any interest to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet
leadership did everything possible to hold up talks on this issue (Mikoyan, 1999, p.
495). However, Moscow regarded an invitation to participate in the negotiations on
the ITO as extremely important. The American “Proposals” had been carefully
studied in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and approximately
since the end of May 1946 the Ministry of Foreign Trade started developing detailed
guidelines (“directives”) for the Soviet delegation to participate in working out the
draft Charter of the ITO. Beside a very detailed analysis with a separate conclusion
on every paragraph of the “Proposals for the expansion of world trade and
employment,” and a draft of the ITO Charter in its version from December 1945,
these guidelines contained positions on all the economic issues listed in the note
from February 21. These directives had even been approved by a special resolution
carried by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
(RGASPI 28, 68–173). Another proof of the great desire of the Soviet leadership to
take an active role in multilateral talks could be found in the renaming of the
Council of the People's Commissars to the Council of Ministers and the People's
Commissariats to the Ministries in March 1946 in order to conform to international
standards (Law on Transformation, 1946). Some groups within the American
leadership and academia had also been confident about the potential participation
of the Soviet Union in the post-war economic cooperation, especially in the
activities of the IMF and the ITO talks. This attitude survived Churchill’s famous
Fulton speech and lived up to mid-1947. In May 1947, the respected journal The
American Economic Review published an article authored by a famous American
historian and economist Alexander Gerschenkron (1947) entitled “Russia and the
International Trade Organization.” This article analyzed in considerable detail the
applicability of each article of the draft ITO Charter to the economic and political
situation in the U.S.S.R. In conclusion, Gerschenkron (1947) expressed confidence
that Soviet participation in the ITO would contribute to “laying the basis of peaceful
economic collaboration between different economic worlds” (p. 642).
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The Participation of the U.S.S.R. in the IMF and World Bank
In early 1944, active talks were held between the Soviet and American experts
regarding the basic principles of the IMF. Although almost every amendment
proposed by the Soviet side had been declined by the Americans, in the middle of
March 1944, the latter made counter-proposals for virtually all the points in
question: the ruble exchange rate; the discount in contribution in gold for the
countries severely damaged by war; the amount of basic economic information to
be presented to the Fund; and the executive force of the Fund’s decisions. However,
at that stage of the talks the Soviet experts concluded that the Soviet Union would
not get any economic gains from participation in the IMF, which would have only
political importance for securing Soviet influence in international affairs (AVPRF
171, 10).
The Soviet leadership was eager to play a major role in the post-war economic
and political order. This made Moscow agree to some clearly disadvantageous
concessions to remain on board of economic negotiations. It is my belief that Stalin
was not fully aware of all the complexity of the big economic and political game
between the United States and Great Britain, which gained momentum in 1943.
While the latter was struggling to save the remnants of its empire and was
bargaining madly for credits vitally important for its survival, the former were
clearly demanding the role of a world leader. For example, no Soviet documents
show any hint of the Soviet understanding of the role of Canada in this bargaining,
though in 1944 negotiations with Canada on economic issues were clearly more
important to the United States than those with the U.S.S.R. Thus, in American
documents the concern over the terms of the British-Canadian bacon contract
outranks the Soviet-American discrepancy in the basic principles of the IMF
activity (FRUS, 1944, pp. 50, 60, 78, 89).
In July 1944, Soviet representatives attended the United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, where the Soviet delegation made some
further concessions to the American proposals by agreement with the Kremlin. On
July 22, 1944, the chair of the delegation Mikhail Stepanov signed the Final Act
along with the delegates from other 43 Allied Nations. Immediately after the
Conference, the Soviet delegation submitted detailed observations on the
advantages and disadvantages of the Soviet Union's membership in these
organizations to the NKID, NKVT, Narkomfin, and the State Bank (Gosbank).
Apparently, this question was consistently mooted in the NKID, NKVT,
Narkomfin, and Gosbank throughout the entirety of 1945 (AVPRF 197, 1–4, 10–
18; AVPRF 194, 196–205).
Documents deposited in the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation
suggest that the U.S.S.R. was about to join both the IMF and International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) until December 31, 1945. In particular,
the collection includes a draft Resolution of the Politburo “On accession of the
U.S.S.R. to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development,” and the findings of a special commission
authorized by a decree of the Council of People’s Commissars from March 5, 1945,
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to develop proposals regarding the possible participation of the U.S.S.R. in the
International Monetary Fund and the IBRD. This commission concluded its work
on November 27, 1945, with recommendations to the Soviet leadership to join the
IMF before December 31 as the entry conditions after that date were to be
determined by the Fund (AVPRF 194, 200).
However, during 1945 the position of the Soviet government to joining the IMF
changed dramatically. Rapidly worsening relations with the United States made
Stalin feel at a loss. The necessity to completely review his foreign policy led him
to make some poor decisions. The decision to postpone the Soviet Union accession
to the IMF might well be one of these poor decisions. Urged by both the Soviet and
American officials to make a statement on the Soviet policy regarding joining the
IMF, on December 29, 1945, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Vyatcheslav Molotov communicated to Harriman that “the Soviet government
considered it impossible at that time to sign the draft agreement drawn up in Bretton
Woods ... the Soviet Government found it necessary to subject the issues raised by
these projects to further study in the light of the new conditions of postwar economic
developments” (AVPRF 704, 8).
This was obviously a difficult decision. A week earlier, on December 21, 1945
(the day when the “Proposals for the expansion of world trade and employment”
were communicated to Vyshinsky), Molotov got another report on the IMF from
his staff. This report presented weighty considerations from the Soviet Union to
take part in the work of the IMF and the World Bank. In particular, it was believed
that “the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the membership of the International Monetary
Fund would be considered by the United States and other United Nations as a proof
of its desire to participate in international economic cooperation. On the contrary,
the Soviet Union's refusal to participate in the international monetary organizations
would play into the hands of reactionary elements in US and British financial circles
opposing the post-war cooperation between the main countries in the maintenance
of postwar peace and order” (AVPRF 194, 8). Two days before Molotov’s refusal
to sign, the United States ratified the IMF agreement thus making it come into force.
No doubt following the example of Great Britain, the Soviet Union hoped to
barter its signature on the IMF agreement in exchange for guarantees of a large
credit from the United States (Pollard, 1985, pp. 67–68). Since by the end of
December 1945 the issue of the loan still remained unresolved (Van Dormael, 1978,
p. 192), the Soviet Union turned out to be a prisoner of its own aspirations–signing
the agreement without getting the loan could be considered both in the United States
and Great Britain as a clear evidence of the political and economic weakness of the
Soviet Union (Gaddis, 1972, p. 23). It would be fair to say that this viewpoint has
never been proved, but the bulk of documents and literature studied on the subjects
makes very high the probability that the Soviet Leadership was motivated by these
considerations.
The Western countries and the United States, in particular, met the refusal of
the Soviet leadership to join IMF in 1945 with mixed reaction. Opponents saw it as
another proof of the dictatorial aspirations of the Soviet leadership, who did not
want to make any compromises with its former allies. Proponents of more liberal
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positions reminded policymakers that the Soviet Union was not the only country
that had not signed the IMF agreement on December 31, 1945. The list of these
countries included, for example, Australia and New Zealand.
In effect, Molotov’s statement was not an empty excuse and really did not mean
the final rejection by the U.S.S.R. to joining the IMF and the World Bank.
Otherwise, it is doubtful that Moscow would have allowed Czechoslovakia and
especially Poland to become IMF members (Lavigne, 1990, p. 25). In addition, in
March 1946, the Soviet Union took part in the first meeting of the IMF Board of
Governors Fund as an observer (Brabant, 1991). Due to the anticipated entry of the
Soviet Union in 1946 it was decided at this meeting to extend the period for
acceptance of new members on the initial terms until the end of that year (Hexner,
1946, p. 640).
However, 1946 brought drastic changes to the character of the U.S.–Soviet
Union talks on the issues of economic cooperation. As mentioned before, the Soviet
membership in the IMF was no longer a separate question; it had become part of
the whole complex of economic problems of multilateral and bilateral nature, which
Washington agreed to consider only in tandem. The directives for the Soviet
delegation prepared in May 1946 for the talks on the ITO still contained a few
phrases concerning the Bretton Woods institutions. In particular, the document
stated: “If the US government agrees with our proposals and will sign an agreement
on granting a loan, the full and final settlement of the Lend-Lease, the delegation
may declare the readiness of the Soviet Union to join the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization” (RGASPI 28, 70).
The documents discussed in this study present us with a completely new picture
of Soviet-American relations in 1944–1946. The Soviet leadership appears more
open to international cooperation, at least in the economic sphere, than traditionally
believed. Accordingly, the perception of 1946 as the first year of the Cold War takes
a completely different hue. As we can see, in 1946 the Soviet leadership was still
willing to participate in international affairs and did not seek isolation. However,
its decision to take some time out to watch how the events would develop and
consider from outside all the benefits and dangers of an active participation in
international affairs proved to be a fatal mistake. The push-back and foot-dragging
of late 1945–early 1946 turned fatal for Moscow, as the Soviet Union was cut off
from the work of major international institutions, causing significant damage to its
own national interests.
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Lessons on Economics and Political Economy
from the Soviet Tragedy
Peter J. Boettke and Rosolino A. Candela
Abstract
This paper explores the economics and politics of the tragic Soviet experiment with
socialism. Beginning with the period of “War Communism” between 1917 and
1921, the Soviet government’s attempt to implement socialism failed to achieve its
stated objectives, namely to create social harmony, eliminate class struggle, and to
unleash advanced material production. It attempted to achieve these ends by
abolishing private property and market prices in the means of production,
eliminating the incentives and information necessary to guide production in an
efficient manner. The unintended political and economic results were disastrous,
leading to tyranny, famine, and oppression. Failing to achieve its stated objectives,
after 1921 the Soviet Communist regime continued to survive only by changing
the meaning of socialism. De jure socialism in the Soviet Union continued to mean
the abolition of private property and market competition of the means of
production. However, de facto, this meant the monetization of political control
over resources, via black market exchange, in a shortage economy, and competition
for leadership in the Communist Party to control such resources. As a result, the
Soviet political system failed to achieve the ideals of socialism on its own terms,
not only because central planning eliminated the institutional conditions necessary
to allocate resources productively, but also because central planning created the
institutional conditions by which the worst men, those most able and willing to
exercise force in a totalitarian environment, got to the top of the political hierarchy.

Introduction
The old saying goes that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. After 100
years since the Bolshevik Revolution, there is no mistake that socialism has been
an immense failure everywhere it has been attempted. The consequences in the 20th
century of collectivism in the Soviet Union was drastic not only in terms of
economic performance, but also for overall human welfare. To say that socialism
wrought deprivation and death in the Soviet Union is an understatement. R. J.
Rummell (1994) estimates that between 1917 and 1987 the Soviet Union was
responsible for 61,911,000 deaths at the hands of the government. Is this because
human beings are imperfect, and therefore failed to live up to the ideals of socialism,
or did socialism as a doctrine fail to live up to the demands of humanity? To put it
another way, did socialism fail because the “wrong people” were in charge, or did
socialism fail because it generated the very conditions for the wrong people to
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become in charge? This question is as timely as ever, not only because of the
centennial anniversary of the October Revolution, but also because of the recent
resurgence of socialism in Venezuela. As Steve Hanke (2014, n.p.) writes,
Despite frequent references to the late Hugo Chavez’s ‘Bolivarian’
revolution, the [Nicolas] Maduro playbook is nothing more than a
rehashing of Marx and Engels’ ten-point plan. This was laid out in the
Communist Manifesto–a crystal-clear road map of where they wanted to
take their adherents. Once you reflect on the Manifesto’s ten-point plan,
you realize that Maduro (and many other politicians elsewhere) aren’t very
original.
Among these ten points, socialism included, as its fundamental basis, the abolition
of private property and, by implication, money prices, which are vital in both
delivering the incentives and indirectly providing the information necessary to
allocate scarce resources and generate social harmony among the plans of millions
of individuals.
The Soviet experience with socialism was the largest social experiment of
the 20th century, influencing both directly and indirectly the rise of other socialist
regimes throughout Europe, Africa, and Asia. In this paper, we will explore the
economic history of the Soviet Union to understand the institutional arrangements
under which the Soviet economy operated.
As we discuss in Section II, both in theory and in practice, socialism in the
Soviet Union, as first implemented by Vladimir Lenin between 1917 and 1921, was
an immanent failure, meaning it failed to live up its own goals as first outlined by
Karl Marx and followed by Lenin, namely to abolish scarcity by superabundant
material production and thus create social harmony among classes. Just like his
predecessors in political economy going back to Adam Smith, Marx shared the goal
of delivering the least advantaged of society from poverty. His dispute, however,
was not with the ends of classical political economy, but with the means by which
to fulfill such ends, namely the abolition of private property in the means of
production. Between 1921 and 1928, Lenin and the Soviet regime abandoned
socialism in practice, retreating from its original theoretical outlines, and
substituting it with the New Economic Policy for the promise of socialism in the
future. However, this future was never realized.
In Section III, we explore how, after 1928, the Soviet government claimed to
be upholding the practice of socialism, but only by changing the original meaning
of socialism. In reality, what socialism came to mean was the political allocation of
monopoly privileges to cronies of the Communist Party and the Soviet Planning
Committee, known as Gosplan. To quote economist and Sovietologist, G. Warren
Nutter (1968), markets without property is a grand illusion. Socialism de jure meant
the abolition of private property and markets, but only to resurface de facto in
politics as monopoly rights acquired through the use of personal influence, for the
purpose of monetizing these rights in the Soviet black market; this practice became
known in the Soviet Union as blat (Boettke, 1993, p. 168; Levy, 1990, p. 218).
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Section IV discusses Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to reform the Soviet
economy after 1985, similar to Lenin’s New Economic Policy. In practice, however,
Gorbachev’s reforms represented only a reshuffling of patronage appointments
within the Soviet political system, not of the overall system itself. Under the guise
of reform, Gorbachev only changed the “players” holding political rights to allocate
resources in the Soviet economy. By not changing the rules that govern economic
activity within the Soviet economic system, the Soviet economy continued to
experience shortages, bribery, and corruption as it had before Gorbachev rose to
power. Section V concludes.

From Marx to Lenin: The Implementation of Socialism and the New
Economic Policy in the Soviet Union
As John Reed (1985) reported in Ten Days that Shook the World, at his first
appearance before the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution of 1917, Vladimir
Lenin took the podium, stared out into the cheering crowd and simply said, “We
shall now proceed to construct the Socialist order” (p. 129). Their plan of social
construction after the revolution was not a by-product of improvisation. Moreover,
it cannot be interpreted as simply an unavoidable consequence of the Russian Civil
War between 1919 and 1922 (Boettke, 1990b, pp. 16-21). The notion that the
Bolsheviks had begun to collectivize property and devalue the currency through
inflation due to the necessities of war is merely an ex-post rationalization. For
example, the economist Maurice Dobb and the historian E. H. Carr argued that
given the necessity for the Bolsheviks to fight the civil war, inflation was used as a
forced tax on the moneyed bourgeois class. Once money became worthless, it
became necessary to abolish private property by confiscating resources by force for
the war effort.
This ex-post rationalization is fundamentally flawed in two respects. First, even
though the civil war influenced the way that policies were implemented, the war
itself had little or nothing to do with what fundamentally motivated the policies.
The socialist project would have failed even if no civil war took place, precisely
because socialism as it was understood was inconsistent with the goals of delivering
a post-scarcity world of advanced material production, namely by eliminating the
wastes of capitalism. Secondly, Lenin and the Bolsheviks possessed a concrete
ideological intention of constructing a socialist order along Marxist lines prior to
the outbreak of the Civil War. The period now known to economists and historians
as “War Communism” (but at the time simply known as Communism), refers to a
series of policies which constituted the economic program of the Bolsheviks from
1917 to 1921 (although for purposes of exposition it is perhaps more accurate to
place the beginning of this program as December 1917 or January 1918, when the
Supreme Economic Council was formed and the nationalization of industry began).
As indicated in Table 1, the deliberate march towards socialism had already been
outlined and begun to be implemented before the beginning of War Communism.
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Table 1: Major Economic Decrees and Resolutions Passed by the Bolsheviks
during the Period of War Communism
Dates (Western calendar)
8 November 1917

Decrees and resolutions
The Council of People’s Commissars is formed

8 November 1917

Decree on Land abolished the landlords’ right
of property and called for the confiscation of
landed estates

27 November 1917

Decree on Workers’ Control over Production

15 December 1917

Supreme Economic Council is established

27 December 1917

Declaration of the Nationalization of Banks

15 January 1918

Dividend and interest payments and all
dealings in stocks and bonds are declared
illegal

16 January 1918

Declaration of the Rights of the Working and
Exploited People abolished the exploitation of
man by man

10 February 1918

Repudiation of all foreign debt

22 April 1918

Nationalization of foreign trade

1 May 1918

Abolition of inheritance

9 May 1918

Decree giving the Food Commissariat
extraordinary powers to combat village
bourgeoisie who were concealing and
speculating on grain reserves

9 June 1918

Labor mobilization for the Red Army

28 June 1918

Nationalization of large-scale industry and
railway transportation

2 November 1918

Decree on the Extraordinary Revolutionary
Tax to support the Red Army and the
International Socialist Revolution
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22 March 1919

The Party Programme of the Eighth Party
Congress; called for increased centralization of
economic administration

29 March to 4 April 1920

The Outstanding Resolution on Economic
Reconstruction is passed, calling for increased
centralization of economic administration to
insure the unity of the plan necessary for the
economic reconstruction after the civil war and
foreign intervention

29 November 1920

Decree of the Supreme Economic Council on
the nationalization of small industrial
enterprises; all enterprises with mechanical
power who employed five or more workers,
and all enterprises without mechanical power
who employed ten or more workers, were
nationalized

March 1921

The Kronstadt Rebellion

8–16 March 1921

Resolution on Party Unity abolishing
factionalism within the Party is accepted

23 March 1921

The Tax in Kind is established and the New
Economic Policy is introduced
Source: Boettke, 1990a, p. 122.

The socialist utopia that Lenin wished to construct was based on works of Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels, who argued that the market economy–based on private
property, money prices, and production for exchange–was not only unjust, but also
wasteful. The original Marxian paradigm saw rivalry, or what Don Lavoie (1985a)
refers to as “the clash of human purposes” (p. 22), as an inherent aspect of the
market economy and the price system. For having this rivalrous attribute, Marx
condemned capitalism as being anti-social and alienating to the proletariat, since he
regarded all of the surplus value of commodity production to be derived solely from
labor. Moreover, Marx’s critique of the market economy is that the antagonistic
mode of capitalist production, based on market exchange, was an unnecessary waste
because all of social production was not rationally planned in advance. From a
Marxian perspective, capitalism expresses an internal contradiction between, on the
one hand, the widening and deepening interdependence of producers upon one
another and, on the other, their antagonistic struggle in the market. Because
capitalism involves the simultaneous pursuit of conflicting plans by separate,
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“alienated” producers, he wished to eliminate alienation and the wasteful circulation
of goods and services between consumers and producers through buying and
selling. Instead, Marx wished to eliminate such commodity production for market
exchange and pursue commodity production for direct use under a single,
deliberate, and unified plan, as if all production in the economy was organized like
one immense factory. Marx viewed central planning as a way of facilitating social
harmony and eliminating class struggle by pre-coordinating productive plans in
society.
Although Marx said little directly about the nature of socialism, in Das Kapital
he described its fundamental attributes by clarifying its antithesis–capitalism. To
put it another way, “where Das Kapital offers us a theoretical ‘photograph’ of
capitalism, its ‘negative’ informs us about Marx’s view of socialism” (Lavoie,
1985a, p. 30). Implicit to Marx’s view of socialism was the abolition of the
institutional prerequisites of rivalry in the market economy, namely private property
in the means of production and money prices. In other words, the abolition of private
property, the negation of capitalism, would abolish rivalry and therefore
exploitation of the proletariat with it (see Marx & Engels, 1988, p. 198). It was this
Marxian vision that Lenin wished to construct, with the Bolsheviks leading the way.
However, in an article titled “Economic calculation in the Socialist
Commonwealth,” Ludwig von Mises (1975) argued why this project was
predestined to fail. Given the stated ends of the socialists, namely to deliver
advanced material production, to eliminate the wastes and alienation characteristic
of capitalism, and create social harmony, Mises argued that abolishing private
property and money prices as a means to achieve this end would make economic
calculation impossible. “Where there is no free market,” Mises argued, “there is no
pricing mechanism; without a pricing mechanism, there is no economic calculation”
(1975, p. 111). To put it differently:
1.

Without private property in the means of production, there will be no
market for the means of production.

2.

Without a market for a means of production, there will be no monetary
prices established for the means of production.

3.

Without monetary prices, reflecting the relative scarcity of capital
goods, economic decision-makers will be unable to rationally
calculate the alternative use of capital goods (Boettke, 1998, p. 134).

His argument was not a normative assessment of the goals of the socialists. Rather,
his indictment of the socialist project was a positive analysis of the means they
wished to use to achieve their goals. In the world in which we live, economic
decision-makers are confronted with an array of technologically feasible production
projects. What economic calculation provides is a means to select from among an
array of technologically feasible projects those that employ resources in an
economic manner, meaning that they are employed according to consumers’ most
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highly-valued uses. Moreover, in order to illustrate the crucial point of his
argument, Mises granted as assumptions the best-case scenario in which the
socialists are regarded as completely benevolent and possessing all the available
technological knowledge about different production processes. Even in this bestcase scenario, central planners would still would not know how to economically
allocate resources, precisely because the economic knowledge required to make this
decision is contextual: it is knowledge that is embodied only in an institutional
context of private property rights. That is, it is only through the act of exchange that
the relative and subjective valuation of scarce resources are translated into
economic knowledge. Whereas on the one hand, central planners are precluded from
access to such contextual knowledge, as Mises (1975) states clearly, “[t]he property
owner on the other hand himself bears responsibility, as he himself must primarily
feel the loss arising from unwisely conducted business. It is precisely in this that
there is a characteristic difference between liberal and socialist production” 1 (p.
122).
The utopian aspiration under socialist production, however, resulted in a
nightmare by early spring of 1921. In all areas economic output fell far below prewar levels. In 1921 the Soviet Union, as Stephen Cohen (1980) has pointed out, lay
“in ruins, its national income one-third of the 1913 level, industrial production a
fifth (output in some branches being virtually zero), its transportation system
shattered, and agricultural production so meager that a majority of the population
barely subsisted and millions of others failed even that” (p. 123)2. Never thereafter
did the Soviet Union attempt to implement socialism in its purest form.
The Bolsheviks were forced to retreat from their attempt to implement Marx’s
utopia and instead re-introduced market relations of exchange and production with
1

Although Mises had directed his theoretical critique of central planning at actual attempts
at “war planning” in Austria and Germany and “war communism” in Russia, his argument
applies no less to a mixed economy, which attempts to combine the market mechanism, based
on private ownership, with non-comprehensive planning in the production and allocation of
resources. Moreover, the actual practice of socialism in the Soviet economy was “mixed” if
we include the use of black markets and world market prices to allocate resources alongside
central planning. However, government officials by definition did not legally own the capital
value of the resources over which they are responsible, even though they had de facto control
over their use. More specifically, whether bureaucrats direct the allocation of resources
through direct ownership, taxation, regulation, or government lending, under a “mixed”
economy, they do not directly bear the costs and benefits of their decision-making in terms
of owning the appreciation or depreciation of the capital value of such resources in alternative
uses at the time of their decision (Alchian, 1965, p. 822; see also Rothbard, 1962, pp. 828829 and Boettke & Coyne, 2004). Costs for the decision-maker only have economic
significance at the moment of choice (see Buchanan 1969/1999). This contextual knowledge
simply does not exist outside the context of exchangeable private property, whether planning
is comprehensive or non-comprehensive. For “the knowledge problem” under noncomprehensive planning, see Lavoie (1985b, pp. 52-57).
2
Similarly, economic historian Alec Nove gives similar estimates of the tragic
consequences of War Communism. See Nove’s An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.
(1969/1984, p. 68).
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the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the spring of 1921. This “mixed system”
produced varying results over its lifetime (1921-1927), with the high-water mark of
economic recovery coming in 1925. The relative freedom of exchange and
production produced a drastic recovery from the catastrophe of war communism,
particularly through the entrepreneurial activity of middlemen, known as Nepmen.
These entrepreneurial middlemen acted on discrepancies in prices between stateowned trusts and private cooperatives to exploit opportunities for profit, generating
a more efficient allocation of resources.
However, the NEP did not dismantle the institutional infrastructure within
which production took place. Thus, the NEP that was implemented with incentive
incompatibilities, failing both economically and politically. For example, the
cornerstone of the NEP was the substitution of the tax in kind for the grain
requisitioning of “War Communism.” Peasants, though, with the war communism
period still fresh in their memories had to be convinced that arbitrary requisitioning
was not a policy option. The ideological commitment of the leading figures of the
Communist Party, not only Lenin, but also Nikolai Bukharin and Leon Trotsky,
prevented them from fully adopting the institutional prerequisites of a market
economy under the rule of law. Thus, without the government making a credible
commitment to maintain the NEP, peasants could not feel secure in their possession
of their grain. As a result, by the end of the 1920s (i.e., 1928) peasants no longer
had an incentive to market grain surplus. While industrial production was
reorganized such that by 1923, of the 165,781 enterprises accounted for in an
industrial census 88.5% were owned by private persons, 8.5% were state owned,
and 3.1% were cooperative enterprises. Although these private enterprises
amounted to 88.5% of the total enterprises, they employed only 12.4% of the total
number of workers employed in industry, while the state-owned enterprises, which
comprised only 8.5% of the total enterprises, employed 84.1% of employed
workers. Thus the state was freed from administrating small enterprises, while at
the same time holding fast to the industrial base of Russian society. The
"commanding heights" of industry remained state property. The NEP saw a great
recovery from the cataclysm of the communist experiment with economic planning,
but the system itself was a massive interventionist system possessing its own
dynamic (Boettke, 1990b, p. 116).
Moreover, the NEP did not result in any political liberalization. The adoption
of NEP was an admission that the task of centrally planning an economy was
beyond the ability of the Bolsheviks. But, by moving to market methods of
economic organization, Lenin inadvertently threatened the political survival of the
Communist Party. So at the same time that Lenin re-introduced market mechanisms
he outlawed all political factions within Soviet politics, including factions within
the Party. Thus the political monopoly of the Bolsheviks was maintained and
solidified. That was the political system that Stalin inherited and manipulated in his
struggle for succession after Lenin’s death in 1924 and his subsequent consolidation
of power in the late 1920s. With Stalin in power, the NEP was abandoned in 1928.
The NEP failed not because of the partial liberalization of the Soviet economy.
Rather, the internal contradictions of the NEP led to an ever-increasing bias towards
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political intervention into the marketplace. Since no credible commitment could be
made towards market or political liberalization, the only logical alternative for the
Communist Party was to reassert authoritarian control over the economy.
The failure of the experiment with pure socialism, the subsequent failure
of the NEP, and the rise of totalitarian rule under Stalin, cannot be explained by
having malevolent individuals in charge of planning the economy. As Mises argued
above, the institutional conditions of socialism precluded central planners from
achieving their objectives even under the best of intentions. However, what must
also be understood is that the rise of totalitarianism like Stalin is a consequence of
socialism, not its cause (see Hayek, 1944). 3
The rationale behind this tragic consequence can be understood by Adam
Smith’s notion that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. In
the marketplace, as the extent of voluntary exchange increases, individuals are
encouraged to exercise specialization in production to a greater degree in order to
increase to their ability to buy goods and services for consumption. In an
environment such as the Soviet Union, as resources became increasingly allocated
by central planning, the extent of the market must contract at its expense. In the
context of central planning, the type of specialization that emerges differs radically
from markets. As the extent of central planning increases, the incentive structure
within this political context will select leaders who are willing and able to specialize
in the use of force over other men. To put it metaphorically, “success” in this
institutional context is judged by the ability to treat people like pawns on a
chessboard, treating them as a mere means to serve the “common good.” The
complexity of centrally planning an economic system implies that that planners
must be granted almost unlimited discretion in order to respond to its unintended
consequences. As a consequence, we should expect that only those that have a
comparative advantage in exercising discretionary power will survive.
Totalitarianism is neither a consequence of “corruption” nor “historical accident,”
but rather a logical consequence of the institutional incentives of the attempt to
centrally plan an economy (Boettke, 1995).

The Institutional Nature of the Soviet System
Having retreated from the Marxist utopia of socialism after 1921, the textbook
model of socialism, namely abolition of private property in the means of production,
no longer applied to understanding how the Soviet economic and political system
operated. Although the Soviet Politburo continued to invoke the abolition of the
injustice of market competition through central planning as its legitimating rhetoric,
Soviet-style socialism in reality was best understood as a monopolistic, rent-seeking
society (Anderson & Boettke, 1997), one in which property rights over resources

3

On a related note, it is important to recognize that a communist political regime will
continue to significantly impact a society even after its fall. Negoita (2011) addresses this
issue in the context of Romania in recent decades.
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were acquired through political competition, rather than untrammeled market
competition (Kasper, Streit, & Boettke, 2012, p. 44; see also Tullock, 1967).
Why is this an effective model to understand the Soviet economy? First, given
the Soviet economy’s inefficiency in terms of delivering economic prosperity to the
masses of the population, it explains the political logic by which the Soviet system
was able to last so long. This logic was to concentrate benefits on those in power
and disperse costs on the masses of impoverished Soviet citizens. As a result, the
Soviet system incentivized the creation of a loyal bureaucracy, who benefited
directly from maintaining the existing system. 4
Secondly, since rent-seeking is simply the non-market manifestation of
competition for income, derived from political control rights over resources, this
model seems uniquely well-suited to analyzing resource allocation in non-market
settings, such as in politics. Rather than abolishing private property and rivalrous
competition of the marketplace in the name of justice, in reality property rights and
competition were simply transferred to the political marketplace of patronage,
known as the nomenklatura system. The nomenklatura refers to a vast political
cartel of interlocked state monopolies, which worked to provide and protect
perquisites to those in appointed positions of power, namely by controlling entry
and competition to these positions. In effect, the nomenklatura enforced a collusion
among the separate state-owned firms and ministries so that the Soviet system
operated as an effective political and economic monopoly. Illicit entry and
competition by one monopolist into the privileged market domain of another statesanctioned monopolist was controlled so as not to chisel the value of the latter’s
monopoly privilege, which came in the form of bribes and perquisites received from
de facto control of state resources.
Third, it also provides the rationale behind the persistence of a shortage
economy and the bias in centrally planned prices throughout the history of the
Soviet Union (see Levy, 1990 and Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). That is, it explains
why the incentive was to hold down prices over scarce goods and services, not keep
them up, in order to perpetuate shortages. Why is this case? In a market economy,
the entrepreneur who organizes the firm is the residual claimant, or the individual
who absorbs the profits as well as the losses from his or her decision-making. By
metering and monitoring of the marginal productivity of individual workers into
team production, namely by reducing shirking by employees (Alchian & Demsetz,
1972), and by using capital and other inputs in a cost-effective manner, the
entrepreneur is disciplined to earn profits and avoid losses.
From a property-rights perspective, we can usefully distinguish between cashflow rights, or the ability to exchange resources for money, and control rights, the
ability to exclude others from the use of resources. The Soviet economic system
was one where control rights rested to a large degree at the management level of
state-owned enterprise, but managers did not possess full cash-flow rights. This
4

With this recognition in hand, the effectiveness of Soviet bureaucrats in achieving desired
outcomes for politically connected elites could perhaps be assessed by developing notions
of equity similar to the heterodox notions of tax equity defined by Mathews (2015).
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meant that any losses accrued by firm managers from misallocating inputs
according to consumer demands were borne by the state, in effect dispersed as costs
in the form of lower standards of living to the masses of Soviet citizens. As long as
output targets set by Gosplan, the central planning agency of the Soviet Union, were
met and everyone received their perquisites due to them, then the firm manager was
judged as a success. Moreover, any waste incurred in the production process was
not penalized, since the Soviet bureaucracy was not intending to allocate resources
in a wealth-maximizing manner for the Soviet citizenry, but in a manner that would
maximize their own private gain from controlling the allocation of scarce resources.
In addition, at all levels of the Soviet planning bureaucracy, from the Politburo
to Gosplan, the state agencies which outlined and administered central planning, set
output targets, and planned prices, no single individual could legally accrue
additional profit from increasing output beyond a pre-determined target to meet any
excess demand by consumers of goods and services. Any additional output that was
officially reported as produced and sold, in effect, was a 100% tax to the managers
of the state-owned firms, the benefits of which would go the coffers of the state
treasury. Moreover, any bureaucrat ordering an increase in the price of a good, so
as to approach a market-clearing equilibrium, would not accrue the marginal
revenue from the increased prices of such goods. Unable to legally derive a profit
from the sale of output, it is in the mutual interest of the firm managers to restrict
output and for bureaucrats to hold centrally set prices below market-clearing prices,
which results in shortages (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992, p. 239). Firm managers and
bureaucrats benefited from creating a shortage by being able to monetize their de
facto control of goods and services in the form of bribes from consumers, whose
valuation of such goods and services exceeded the official price ceiling. In essence,
a state shortage of buns and a state shortage of sausages translates into a black
market sandwich sold out the backdoor, with a corresponding high price.
Alongside this shortage economy, there emerged a secondary supply system
around a special group of middlemen, known as the tolkachi, whose role was to fill
the gaps in the failure of the state enterprises to fulfill their output targets. Acting
on behalf of such state enterprises, the tolkachi worked to sell surplus commodities
on the one hand and to purchase needed products on the other to facilitate
production. On the consumption side, they attempted to correct for long queues and
poor quality of consumer goods found in official state stores, namely by
transforming these non-monetary costs to consumers of obtaining goods into
economic gains for themselves, via black market side-payments (Boettke, 1993, pp.
65-66). While Communist Party officials enjoyed queue-free stores, the
underground economy operated to prop up these missing benefits to the rest of
Soviet society.
The centralization of the Soviet economy metaphorically into one big factory
manifested itself as a divergence between the de jure system of central planning, in
which property, free pricing, and profit/loss were formally abolished and their de
facto existence, both externally in the form of black markets, and internally in the
evolution of informal property rights over state-produced resources, which were
monetized via exchange on the black market. Rather than produce for direct use, as
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outlined in the textbook model of socialism, production became divided into two
categories: production in the state sector of the economy for its own sake (i.e., to
maintain the illusion of socialism as a legitimizing ideal) and production for
exchange, which sustained the rest of the population. It is this institutional
framework that Mikhail Gorbachev inherited when he came to power in 1985.

Perestroika under Gorbachev
When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, he had inherited an economic and political system that had long been
stagnant and corrupt. Despite the corrupt and stagnant nature of the Soviet state, it
had proved to be a remarkably stable autocracy from its inception until Gorbachev’s
succession. However, just as Gorbachev rose to power, the Soviet Union’s
bureaucracy was undergoing a massive turnover. Given the entrenched interests of
the Soviet bureaucracy, the claim could be made that, under the status quo, the
earlier “reform” efforts by Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were
not possible. However, unlike these previous autocrats, Gorbachev faced a radically
different situation.
One of the consequences of Joseph Stalin’s purges during the 1930s was the
creation of a young and loyal cohort that would control the appointment of Soviet
bureaucrats for decades. A comparison of the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934
and the Eighteenth Congress in 1939 demonstrates this purge effect. At the 1934
Congress 80% of the delegates had joined the Party prior to 1920, but at the 1939
Congress 50% of the delegates were under 35 years old. 5 Although Stalin’s purge
of the “Old Bolsheviks” served, among other things, to create a layer of very young
and loyal apparatchiks (Boettke, 1993, p. 82), from a political economy standpoint,
it also created a situation that would later prove to be un-robust and unstable.
By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union’s aging bureaucracy began to retire or die,
resulting in a “demographic transition” during this period. With them, these
personnel took a network of informal contractual agreements that formed the
cartelizing basis of the Soviet patronage system. This meant that “the transaction
costs associated with the realignment of rent flows and patronage opportunities
were rapidly, and significantly, lowered” (italics original, Anderson & Boettke,
1993, p.110). In effect, positions controlling rent flows went on the auction block
in the mid-1980s.
However, this did not present an opportunity for Gorbachev to be a laissezfaire reformer of the Soviet economy. His attempts at “reform” under Perestroika
were not instituted to change the rules of the game within the economy; they were
As Michael Voslensky (1984) points out, “In 1930, 69 per cent of the regional and district
secretaries and secretaries of the central committee of the Union’s constituent republics had
joined the party before the revolution. In 1939, 80.5 per cent had joined the party only after
1924, i.e., after Lenin’s death. Of the 1939 secretaries, 91 per cent were under forty; in other
words, they were adolescents at the time of the revolution. The figures for the secretaries of
regions and towns are similar. In 1939, 93.5 per cent had joined the party only after 1924,
and 92 per cent were under forty” (p. 61).
5
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not attempts to institute a market economy, fundamentally based on well-defined
and exchangeable property rights. Indeed, the word perestroika in Russian means
“restructuring,” but this only implied a restructuring of political appointments with
the Soviet political system, not a restructuring of the system itself. Upon closer
examination, the succession of Gorbachev in general and the perestroika reform
program in particular closely resembled other Soviet government policy
adjustments which followed shifts in the top leadership. Perestroika did not emerge
as a central plan to end central planning and introduce a market economy, but rather
represented the “Gorbachev” distribution of patronage perquisites, couched in
liberalization rhetoric. Any real attempt to reform the institutional infrastructure of
the Soviet economy would run contrary to the logic of political decision-making,
which is to concentrate benefits on well-organized special interest groups, and
disperse the costs of such policies on the masses of the population.
The most dramatic evidence of “reform” under the Gorbachev regime was the
alleged relaxation of controls on private economic activity. From 1985-1991,
Gorbachev introduced at least 10 major policy packages for reform under the name
of perestroika, yet not a single one was implemented fully. An example of these
half-measured attempts at reform were two key legal components of perestroika,
which included the Law on Individual Enterprise of 1986 and the Law on State
Enterprises of 1987.
The Law on Individual Enterprise allowed individuals to engage in
activities which previously had been deemed illegal, the intent of which was to
encourage individual economic enterprise and market experimentation. Family
members of state employees or individuals such as students, housewives, and
pensioners were allowed to work full-time if they desired. But in order to do so,
individuals had to apply for a license granted by local authorities and pay either an
annual income tax or a fee, which in particular cases was required where it was
difficult to monitor income, such as driving a taxi. For example, the fee for a private
taxi, in 1987, was 560 rubles, which meant that a worker who was “moonlighting”
as a taxi driver had to earn the equivalent of three months’ wages before driving the
taxi would cover its costs (Boettke, 1993, p. 101). Given these prohibitively high
licensing fees, the unintended consequence of this policy was the persistence of a
black market: very few if any of the Moscow chastniki (private taxis) were
registered and, therefore, official. The Law on Individual Enterprise, in effect,
amounted to simply regulating and taxing an activity that had gone on “unofficially”
for years.
An even more fundamental problem with the law on private economic activity
was the existence of the campaign against unearned income. The campaign required
individuals to have appropriate documentation explaining how they had made their
money, the unintended consequence of which was the emergence of an illicit market
in documentation. The attitude of the regime conveyed by the campaign simply
reinforced the lack of trust citizens possessed concerning the commitment of the
government to reform. Without a credible conveyance of commitment to market
reform, farmers, workers and so on, did not have any incentive to invest in the
above-ground market.
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The intended effect of the Law on State Enterprises was to reintroduce selfaccounting, self-financing, and self-management of state enterprises. However,
given the Soviet Union’s commitment to full employment, there was no credible
commitment to reintroduce true residual claimancy analogous to a firm in a market
economy, in which the firm owner absorbs both the profits and losses of his
decision-making. Despite whatever announcement made about self-financing, there
was no precedent in previous reforms, not even from the New Economic Policy,
regarding this. Given the expectation that Gorbachev would later renege on full
liberalization of profits and losses, what incentive do firm managers have in this
uncertain context? As long as there was a credible commitment to full employment,
enterprise managers faced a “soft budget constraint,” meaning they would not bear
any losses, they would not be allowed to go bankrupt, and they would continue to
be subsidized by the state. As a result of the contradictory goals, firm managers
increasingly monetized their discretionary power by approving wage increases. In
other words, they were privatizing the benefits of the law, but socializing the losses
onto the rest of the economy. As a result, the Soviet Union ran increasingly large
budget deficits and resorted to monetization of its debt in order to pay it off.
The inability for Gorbachev to convey any kind of commitment to reform
sealed not only the fate of perestroika, but also the fate of his own political career.
The reforms simply could not get the economy going, and the situation in the Soviet
economy continued to deteriorate. The political instability of failed reforms,
alongside deflated expectations on the part of the population, produced a highly
troublesome situation for Gorbachev, not only costing him his credibility with his
more liberal allies in the Communist Party, but also with hardline conservatives.
When hardliners in the Party failed to reassert control through “constitutional”
means, they resorted to an attempted coup d’état in 1991. It was the failure of
perestroika that in fact led to the attempted coup, the unintended by-product of
which led to the official unravelling of the Soviet Union as a political entity on
December 26, 1991. Although the transition from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris
Yeltsin was peaceful, and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union ended without firing a shot, the collapse of the Soviet Union took with it a
horrific legacy of poverty, famine, tyranny, and murder.

Conclusion
The terrible consequences of the Soviet experience with communism were not a
behavioral failure, but an institutional failure. The Soviet economy failed to achieve
economic prosperity and social harmony not because the Soviet people and its
leaders were self-interested and inhumane, but because the institutional rules by
which the Soviet economy was organized failed to channel the self-interest of
individuals in a socially beneficial, humane manner. Rather than craft a set of
institutions within which bad men could do least harm, it only created the very
conditions for such a tragic consequence. Its failure was not its attempt to achieve
an idealistic end, but its attempt to choose a particular set of means that were
inconsistent with the demands of humanity. The abandonment of private property,
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money prices, and profit/loss signals under a socialist utopia only led to the
abandonment of our ability to cooperate in a peaceful and productive manner via
exchange. With this abandonment came the embrace of the most inhumane coercive
efforts to destroy the aspirations, and most unfortunately, the lives of millions of
individuals, all to serve the interests of a governing elite under the justificatory guise
of a unified, central plan that would supposedly deliver a just, post-scarcity world.
The Soviet experience with Communism is a lesson of economic history that we
must never forget, not just for pedagogical reasons, but for the sake of posterity, so
as to prevent its return.
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U.S. - Russian Relations:
Dissonance of Ideologies
Elena Glazunova
Abstract
This paper examines Russian and American ideologies and their influence on the
foreign policies of both countries in historical retrospective and today. The paper
especially illustrates the role of ideology in Russia and U.S. relations during
different periods with different intensity. In the relatively “calm” periods of
history ideology was not that noticeable. However, at other times, Russia and the
United States have engaged in a clash of ideologies that provided a powerful
impulse to the formation of new models of international relations. Despite the
post-Cold War hope that there would be less ideology in international relations in
recent decades the role of ideology seems to have increased.

Introduction
The current foreign policy of the Russian Federation, to a significant extent, is a
historical legacy formed by tremendous calamities and immense triumphs. The
Russian Empire played a major role in thwarting Napoleon’s relentless expansion.
The Soviet Union subverted Germany’s advanced war machine during the Second
World War and came to dominate the world scene just two decades later
(Shevchenko, 2015). But during its more than 1,000-year history, Russia has had
four catastrophic events which crushed it as a state: the 13th century Mongolian
invasion, the 17th century “Time of Troubles” (Smuta), the Bolshevik Revolution
of 1917 (after which Russia became a battlefield for civil war and foreign
interventions), and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (which was
accompanied bу a series of civil wars in post-Soviet space, a catastrophic
economic downturn, and the unprecedented geopolitical breakdown of the
country). This collective history helps to explain key specifics of Russian
idiosyncrasy–the sense of vulnerability, the very painful reaction to any foreign
influence and foreign ideological “experiments,” and the struggle to preserve not
only her territories and statehood itself, but her moral values also.
The notion of “statehood” (derjavnost) has become very important in the
contemporary political discourse within Russia. This is different from the notion
of “state,” which mainly refers to administrative, managerial, law-enforcement,
and judicial functions. The notions of derjava (power) and samoderjavie
(autocracy) point to sovereignty, full self-sufficiency, independence, and the
significance of the country in international relations. Furthermore–they connote
the spiritual and moral mission of the Russian state–resisting evil in the world.

49

Elena Glazunova

That is why the first Russian political ideology, which was formulated in
1833 by the Secretary of Education Count Sergey Uvarov, included these notions.
The so called Uvarov’s Triad– “Orthodoxy, Autocracy (samoderjavie) and
Nationality”–also known as the Official Nationality–was a Russian national
version of an international European ideology of restoration and reaction (Yanov,
2013). Since 1833, and to the present time, this triad remains the best way to
explain the specifics of Russian historic conservatism and its modern incarnation.
In contrast with universal and international ideologies like socialism and
liberalism, conservatism has always represented a national phenomenon. Like K.
Leontiev, a 19th century philosopher, wrote, “each nation has its own protective
ideology: the Turks have Turkish one, the Englishmen–English, Russians–
Russian; and liberalism is everyone’s” (Leontiev, 1885). While liberalism has not
tended to find much expression within Russian identity, conservatism has.
Each time when Russia lost “statehood,” it cost her people blood, suffering,
misery, fear, and humiliation. The most fresh, and for several generations a still
unhealed wound, was the first post-Cold War decade which resonates with defeat,
the loss of identity, and subservience to the West. Russians throughout society
were inclined to blame the “de-ideologization” of Yeltsin’s failed policies for all
of their disasters.

The Importance of Ideology to Guiding Social Action
Today most Russian specialists in political science (including the author of this
essay) would probably characterize themselves as “inertial Marxists” (Bogaturov,
Kosolapov, & Chrustalev, 2002; Manykin, 2009; Pechatnov & Manykin, 2012,
Setov, 2010). To apply this term to the theory of international relations, most
Russian scholars share the views of the realist paradigm which has a lot in
common with Marxism (material interests are basic, ideas are “superstructure”
etc.). It is interesting to note that this statement applies not only to specialists who
received their education in Soviet times, but also to the younger generation of
Russian scholars who embrace this theoretical position. The liberal or
constructivist approaches have not yet taken strong roots in the current Russian
academic community. The classical definition of ideology given by the French
philosopher of 18-19th century Antoine Destutt de Tracy as “a science of ideas”
(Kennedy, 1979) seems to be too broad for contemporary challenges of scientific
analysis. In this circumstance, Russian scholars tend to include Marxist precepts
as an element of their methodology of the study of ideology.
The key Marxist position about ideology (expressed in his famous German
Ideology in 1846) is that it is just a “reflection” of socio-political reality: “. . . The
production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear
at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior . . .” (Marx 2000, p. 8).
Nevertheless, we also cannot miss another famous Marx thought, expressed in

Journal of Global Initiatives

50

1844: “Ideas become a material force when [in the] possession of the masses”
(Marx, 2000, para7).
Why is ideology so important? In contrast with philosophy that seeks to explain
the universe, but does not offer concrete actions, the main function of ideology is
to provide human beings with guidance for social actions. Ideology supplies
motivation for the long-term purposes of political behavior and the methods of
gaining them - as Russian eminent specialists in international relations theory point
out (Кosolapov, 2002, pp.234-235; Voytolovsky, 2015). However, not all ideas can
become so influential. In order to become influential, they must resonate with and
address the aspirations of the masses. This “connection” best occurs in very
particular circumstances and conditions of human life. Such a situation can be
illustrated by examples of U.S.-Russian relations in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Ideology in Russia and United States Relations
in the 18th and 19th Centuries
Ideology became a significant element of international relations at the end of the
18th century. The turning point was the French Revolution and the wars of
Napoleon. This statement is generally accepted in both Russian and Western
literature. However, by accepting this point we risk overlooking a very important
fact: the birth of the United States as a new country in the Western hemisphere.
Appearing as a first “practical” result of the Enlightenment, this new state carried a
powerful ideological charge - and well before the French Revolution, it challenged
the European “ancient regime.”
Alan Cassels (1996) in Ideology and International Relations in the Modern
World writes, “Behind the revolt of the thirteen American colonies in 1776 lay
political theories regarding a ruler’s obligation under a social contract and the
iniquity of absolute monarchy or despotism” (p. 15). The phrase “we the people of
the United States …” officially confirmed the principle of popular sovereignty two
years before it was included in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen. This could not have been to the liking of Catherine the Great. Thus,
the ideology of the United States of America a priori had the potential for conflict
with Russian autocracy. However, conflict did not develop. Just the opposite
occurred: Catherine the Great in fact chose to help American patriots in their fight
with Britain, first refusing to honor the request of British King George III to send
Russian troops for the suppression of the uprising colonies, and later initiating the
League of Armed Neutrality (1780-1783) to protect trade between neutral states
and the countries which were involved in the war.
The Russian Empress, being an adherent of the traditional 18th century
European balance of power policy, tried to weaken Britain. There were also
ideological considerations. For example, several years later Russia, while actively
trading with the young American Republic, was steadily waging war with
revolutionary France. The explanation for this perhaps puzzling choice is that
Catherine the Great did not take American free-thinking and sedition as a serious
practical threat to the Russian regime. Moreover, the reason is not only the
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distance involved–the American revolutionary contagion, of course, was much
further away than the French Revolution. The American Revolution also did not
look that bloody and radical. In comparison with the French “Peace to the shacks!
War on the palaces!” the American “Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”
seemed pretty harmless. The concept “pursuit of happiness,” upon closer
examination, turned out to be much closer to the John Locke's triad of “life,
liberty, and property” than to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of property,
which became even more radicalized by the French Revolution. The personality of
the Empress also mattered: Catherine the Great was known for her fascination
with the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which she skillfully used to disguise
the most unsightly features of Russian autocracy, and for improving the image of
the throne.
Meanwhile, the former colonies had to decide how to deal with the rest of the
world. The founding fathers encountered a serious dilemma. Should the young
republic concentrate its efforts on creating a “City upon a Hill” which would be a
superior model and a lighthouse for humankind? Alternatively, should the country
share its unique experience with the Old World? In many ways, making the first
choice implied isolation and not adopting the idea of a noble mission, whereas
making the second choice would be to step into the morass of involvement in
eternal European wars and conflicts.
In 1796 in the famous Farewell Address, President George Washington laid
out the route for future America foreign policy: “The great rule of conduct for us
in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with
them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed
engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.
Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of
which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise
in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her
politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities”
(Washington, 1796, para 38.). Thus, the decision was made to reduce involvement
in any conflicts outside the American continent. This reduced the risks for
Catherine the Great and her successors, who already had too much engagement in
Europe.
The French Revolution was also a revolution in international relations. Before
the revolution all European states were monarchies, so any diversity of concepts
could not exist in principle. Afterwards, it was very different. The Jacobins
revolutionary wars and later the Napoleonic military campaigns, in fact
represented a struggle for a new “social project,” the spread of new liberal values
and ideals. This circumstance demanded adequate countermeasures from the
European autocracies. The military victories over Napoleon were not enough–
powerful liberal ideas could not be stopped just by military methods.
Russian Tsar Alexander I articulated the fundamental principle of the new
international system through the Holy Alliance of European monarchs which was
created on September 26, 1815, with the purpose of preserving the social order. In
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1820, Alexander I invited the countries - participants of the European “concert”–
to sign a protocol that proclaimed the right to suppress revolutionary unrest in any
country even without agreement of its government. Austria and Prussia
consolidated their position with that of Russia. France and Great Britain refused to
join.
At the beginning of the 19th century, the ties of Russia and the United States
began to strengthen. The common interest was the protection of the rights of
neutral shipping and active trade during blazing European wars (Bolkchovitinov,
1966, p. 336). There was mostly no place for ideology in U.S.-Russian relations
throughout the 19th century. America was not even a part of an international
system of that time while Russia was a member of “The Great Powers' Club,” one
of the most significant actors of the multi-polar and mainly Euro-centric world.
Ideologically, Russia remained a bulwark of autocracy and conservatism.
Sometimes considerations of ideological solidarity even prevailed over Russian
national interests; for instance, in 1848-1849 Tsar Nicolas I helped Emperor Franz
Joseph to suppress the Hungarian rebellion.
In general the Vienna model of international relations as well as the previous
one, the Westphalian model, was based on the principle of national sovereignty,
which did not require any country to have a particular type of governance or social
order. European states mainly acted according to these models. In RussianAmerican relations, this was manifested very brightly with the outbreak of the
American Civil War. The autumn of 1862 marked a most dramatic point of
cooperation between Russia and the United States. In a critical time for the Union,
Russian Emperor Alexander II made a very risky decision–he ordered two
squadrons of the Russian Navy to sail to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the
United States. Neither Russian nor American historians have reached a consensus
on the motivations behind the dispatch of the Russian fleets to both the Atlantic
and Pacific Coasts of the United States (Bolkchovitinov, 1996; Saul, 1991, p. 339354). The story was not as romantic as it may appear after reading enthusiastic
reviews of American federal newspapers of the time. Helping President Lincoln
and the cause of the North was not the first priority for Alexander II. The decision
to dispatch the fleet came in the midst of a very tense time in the relations between
Russian and European countries, primarily Britain and France. In January 1863,
an uprising of national liberation began in the territory of “Russian Poland” (the
territory Russia got after the Third partition of Poland in 1795 and Vienna
Congress in 1815). After Russian troops started to suppress the rebellion, Britain
and France presented to the Russian government a series of diplomatic notes
demanding independence for Poland. Britain and France also demanded the
convening of a European conference on the Polish question in order to discuss the
future structure of the Polish state. Russia was just recovering from the Crimean
War and a threat of a new European anti-Russian coalition was very serious.
Emperor Alexander II declined to agree to the demands of the powers. He ordered
Prince Gorchakov to answer with a firm “no” and protest against interference in
the internal affairs of Russia. At the same time St. Petersburg did not want a new
war. The difficulty of the situation in Russia was exacerbated by the fact that the
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Russian fleet was much weaker than the united Anglo-French naval forces. In the
event of war, Russia was vulnerable to the maritime operations of the European
allies. In addition, there was a high probability that the Russian fleet would be
blockaded inside the Baltic Sea. In this situation, the manager of the Marine
Department, Admiral N. K. Krabbe, offered an exit - sending the fleet out of
harm’s way as a preventive measure.
The second intention at the time was to threaten to disrupt British sea trade.
Russia's plan was implemented, and the calculation was accurate: the anti-Russian
coalition completely collapsed. There is every reason to believe that the results of
the visit of Russian naval squadrons to the United States exceeded the initial
calculations and expectations of the naval ministry. Russia was able to solve the
complex problems of both a political and a military-strategic nature. The mere
presence of Russian warships in the U.S. ports forced England and France to
abandon their intentions to intervene in the Polish question, helped to change the
situation in the U.S. Civil War in favor of the North by siding with the Lincoln
government, and demonstrated that the Russian fleet had once again become an
effective force in international politics (Bolkchovitinov, 1994). At the same time it
is important to highlight that Alexander II did not hesitate about which side of the
American Civil War to support. The endorsement of the government of Abraham
Lincoln was based on principles of sovereignty and legitimacy. Commenting on
British-French intrigues and their plans for intervention against the Lincoln
government, Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs Prince Alexandre Gorchakov
wrote to his American colleagues,
“You know the sentiments of Russia. We desire above all things the
maintenance of the American Union as one indivisible nation. . . .
Proposals will be made to Russia to join some plan of interference. She
will refuse any intervention of the kind. . . . You may rely upon it, she
will not change. But we entreat you to settle the difficulty. I cannot
express to you how profound an anxiety we feel — how serious are our
fears” (Taylor, 1862, p.764).
For Russians a dilemma about whom to support in this war did not exist. For
the British it definitely did. Both conflicting American parties proclaimed ideas
that mattered for the British liberal conscience. The Confederacy claimed the right
of self-determination–the same as German, Italian, and other liberals had
advanced in 1848. At the same time, Southerners in the United States also
advocated for the institution of slavery, which was incompatible with liberal
values. William E. Gladstone personified this liberal dilemma. Early in the war he
was decidedly sympathetic to the Southern right of self-determination. It was at
the worst time for the North–in the fall of 1862–that the British and French were
planning intervention against Lincoln (Jones, 2011; Tarpley, 2011). Sending fleets
to the American coasts was a signal to the British and French that the United
States would not stay without allies if European powers make a decision to
intervene in support of the “Southern insurgency”. Perhaps this partly led to the
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fact that “by the close of 1865 Gladstone had been converted . . . to regard slavery
as the key moral issue at stake and to switch his allegiance to the Union cause”
(Cassels, 1996, p. 68). The contrasting positions of Russian solidarity and British
equivocation could not be more clear. By the time Gladstone came to support the
Lincoln government the Civil War was reaching its conclusion.
In the 19th century, ideology was not a primary factor in international
relations. The situation radically changed in the 20th century when the struggle for
the minds of people became a constant part of world politics. That is why the 20th
century has been called the “century of ideology.” Different periods of this
century were marked with uncompromising conflict between various ideologies.
Each of them (whether the liberal-democratic internationalism of Woodrow
Wilson, or the Bolshevik project of world revolution, or Nazism, or the Soviet
version of Marxism-Leninism) not only proposed new types of social systems
inside the countries which they represented, but sought to establish a New World
Order based on their particular ideology. The wars of the 20th century were wars
for “new social projects.”

Communist Internationalism vs. Liberal Internationalism
The first “phase” of the U.S.-Russian ideological contest in the 20th century
started during World War I. Before the war, the idea of “Manifest Destiny” was
limited within the Western Hemisphere. During the war, the United States broke
free from the clutches of isolationism. For the first time in history, the United
States tried to project a global dimension. Woodrow Wilson, the 28th president of
the United States, eventually tried to realize Thomas Paine’s (1776) vision that “a
cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind,” written in the
introduction of his famous Common Sense (p.68). By the beginning of the war, the
United States had become an economic giant, but primarily remained a minor
player in global politics.
Relying on the growing power of his state, while preparing the United States
to go to war, President Wilson, who was perceived in Europe as an idealist,
formulated a new American approach to international relations: “We insist upon
security in prosecuting our self-chosen lines of national development. We do more
than that. We demand it also for others. We do not confine our enthusiasm for
individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements
of affairs which affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there are people that try
to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right. . . . In this we are not
partisans but heralds and prophets of a new age” (Wilson, 1915, para 10).
For Europeans the most striking idea was that the American goals in war were
formulated not as much in the national interest but to make “the world safe for
Democracy” (Wilson, 1917, para 18). A stunning result was that the nation
accepted this idea. However, having said that in April of 1917, the president could
not have foretold that six months later his revolutionary approach would meet a
not less powerful ideological competitor on the other side of the globe. In
November of 1917, Russia offered the world another social project: the new
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Soviet leadership declared its intention to spread the Bolshevik Revolution beyond
the borders of Russia.
It is well known that President Wilson’s Fourteen Points allowed Germany’s
new chancellor, Prince Maximilian, to end the war on dignified terms and to reach
an armistice without admitting defeat. This American plan also became the basis
of the Versailles peace settlement. But it is not widely known that Wilson’s
Fourteen Points actually were an answer to Lenin’s most thundering
proclamation–the Decree on Peace: “The workers' and peasants' government,
created by the Revolution of October 24-25 and basing itself on the Soviet of
Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, calls upon all the belligerent peoples
and their government to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace”
(Lenin, 1917, para 1). This was the appeal of the new Russian leader to the entire
world. This looked like the Bolsheviks, whom Wilson deeply despised, had seized
the initiative from the country that had just declared itself the leader of the liberal
world. Paradoxically, Lenin and Wilson were campaigning for the same goals–
democratic peace, open diplomacy, national self-determination–but the ways of
achieving them were totally antithetical.
The American vision, based on the principles of a liberal-democratic
interventionism, was presented in Wilson’s style–grandiloquently and in the
abstract:
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves.
It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it
be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes
to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice
and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and
selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in
this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice
be done to others it will not be done to us. (Wilson, 1918, para 2.)
Lenin’s goal was much more concrete: “The workers' movement will triumph and
will pave the way to peace and socialism” (Lenin, 1917). Both nations proclaimed
a crusade. This ideological standoff predetermined not only the character of the
bilateral relations, but also the nature of two international models–the VersaillesWashington and the Yalta-Potsdam (or bipolar) models.
Within a short period of postwar “Wilsonianism” (before America returned to
isolationism) the United States managed to realize in practice a crusade of ideas.
Notwithstanding the negative position of the War Department, Wilson responded
to the request of France and Great Britain and sent American troops to Russia.
The American Expeditionary Force was under the command of Major General
William S. Graves. It was called Siberia, and consisted of 7,950 officers and
enlisted men. Despite its stay in the Russian Far East from August of 1918 until
April of 1920, the Siberia force did not take part in any battles, but the
involvement of the United States in the Russian Civil War is an indisputable
historical fact (McMaster, 2014).
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Collective security, President Wilson’s most cherished concept that found
embodiment in the League of Nations, became the foundation of the new VersaillesWashington world order. From the moment of its creation, the Treaty of Versailles
was doomed. The Senate of the United States never ratified it. Its distinct antiGerman and anti-Soviet character - Soviet Russia was not invited to the Paris
Conference; and Germany was declared the main and only culprit of the war (Peace
Treaty of Versailles, 1919) - led humankind to World War II.
The specificity of this conflict for the first time since the end of the 18th
century consisted of ideology in addition to the more traditional complex of
factors (geopolitical, economic, etc.). The Axis powers fought not only for
territories and resources–they strived also to impose on the world a certain manner
of life and a distinct system of values.
There were a variety of reasons why most major Western democracies and
the Soviet Union became allies in this war. First, of course, they united in their
efforts to stop the attempts of the Nazi revisionist powers to establish world
dominance. But there was also an ideological factor: communist internationalism
with its preaching of the equality of working people all over the world had the
same humane charge as the liberal system of values–freedom and equality
dovetailed with it better than with the misanthropic racism of Nazi Germany and
Japanese militarism.

The Cold War Paradox
Following the defeat of Germany and of fascist ideology the world entered into a
new epoch–so called “bipolarity.” On one hand, the Cold War seemed to represent
the quintessential and most complete form of the U.S.-Russian ideological
conflict. The military power and “soft” power of both states were called upon to
serve the spread of moral values, the world-views, and the legitimacy of the two
“superpowers.” In the big picture this represented a rivalry between two social
systems and alternative ways of life–capitalism and socialism. The ideological
component of international relations was acknowledged even by the pillars of
realistic theory. Hans Morgenthau, by way of example, argued that “. . . the
struggle for the minds of men” needed to be added to “the traditional dimensions
of diplomacy and war” (Morgenthau, 1966, Preface).
There has been no period in the history of international relations when such
number of ideological conceptions, doctrines, and theories were invented From
George F. Kennan’s “containment” to Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire,” from the
proclamation of Marxist-Leninist ideology with the reference to the old
Bolsheviks’ principles of proletariat internationalism to Mikhail Gorbachev’s new
political thinking with its priority of universal values over class, national, religion,
etc.–all this diversity fitted into 45 years of the bipolar confrontation.
On the other hand, in the worst period of bilateral relations–the Cold War ideological disputes were not that meaningful. During the almost half century of
bipolar confrontation each of the two countries tried to stick to rational approaches
to bilateral relations. It meant balancing interests with values and avoiding
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extremes. Of course there were periods when the ideological messages in the
rhetoric of both countries dominated. For instance, during the Eisenhower years,
United States foreign policy seemed to be highly ideological. But in practice the
famous John Foster Dulles concept of “immorality and short-sightedness of
neutrality” - countries had to take sides in the ideological struggle because
neutrality was not a moral option - had to be implemented in concert with the
geopolitical and geostrategic interests and intensified American involvements in
Third World countries with the purpose to change uncomfortable regimes or vice
versa–to support “the right” ones (Dulles, 1956). By way of example, cooperation
between the United States and the most odious Latin American dictatorships
continued throughout the Cold War. While the priority task of Soviet foreign
policy in the Third World remained the support of “friendly regimes,” the decisive
criterion for making decisions to grant aid (military, economic, technical) was the
amount of practical and geostrategic benefit that the U.S.S.R. could obtain.
It is also hard to say whose foreign policy was more ideological–the
American or the Soviet. Shortly after World War II, despite the flows of
ideological rhetoric, Josef Stalin approached foreign policy from the point of view
of balance of power. For him, Eastern Europe belonged to the Soviet sphere of
influence. Ideology was not his priority. Even if at the beginning of his
revolutionary activity he shared the belief that working masses in their hearts are
internationalists, the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 convinced him otherwise. The
Polish proletariat and peasants did not support Lenin’s idea of overthrowing the
bourgeois government and the “sovietization” of Poland. Stalin built his foreign
policy on the principles of raison d’état and political realism. He did not support
Greek communists, in fact leaving Greece for the Western sphere of influence.
After 1947-48, when early post-war hopes that communist parties in Europe
would strengthen their positions disappeared, Stalin started to enhance the
“security belt” along western borders of the U.S.S.R., increasing the pressure on
Eastern European governments. One of the measures to get their loyalty was
“sovietization.” However, the determining factor of this politics was, of course,
the presence of the Red Army. Stalin’s successors mostly continued this policy.
For instance, Nikita Khrushchev rhetorically supported China’s claims to the
islands of Taiwan but rejected any military action. Sometimes ideological rhetoric
practically disappeared from the dialogue of both countries. This occurred when
the opportunities for mutually beneficial partnership overpowered ideology–like
in the first half of 1970s, during the détente era. Leonid Brezhnev, in spite of
widespread opinion, did not give real assistance to the government of Salvadore
Allende in Chile because he did not want to overly upset détente with the United
States. A little detail can illustrate the Soviet approach: the cost to the Chilean
government for leasing its Moscow Embassy was actually increased. Brezhnev
too cherished the détente to expose it to risk for the sake of supporting the
socialist experiments of the government of a distant Latin American country
(Glazunova, 2017).
Generally, the Americans accepted these rules and played mostly the same
game: not to challenge the vital interests of the other. Thus, American reactions to
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events in Hungary in 1956 and during the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact Invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 were not more than diplomatic protests and verbal
condemnations. The same was true for the Soviet reaction to the American
invasion of Grenada in 1983. Only once were the rules of this game roughly
violated–in the fall of 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis could have resulted in a
nuclear catastrophe, but at the same time it paved the way for the future détente.
The ideological aspect of the Cold War was more noticeable in the
superpowers competition over the Third World. The term itself had very deep
ideological connotations: in 1952 French sociologist Alfred Sauvy used it to refer
to the former colonial countries, comparing them with the third estate of French
society on the eve of the 18th century revolution - unfairly exploited and
potentially revolutionary (Sauvy, 1952). As Odd A. Westad (2007), one of the
founders of the “new Cold War history concept,” wrote, that it also assumed “the
refusal to be ruled by the superpowers and their ideologies, the search for
alternatives both to capitalism and Communism . . .” (p.2). But this alternative
was difficult to achieve. The Third World became an arena of ideological and
geopolitical competition. During almost five decades of “Cold War” American
administrations–Republican and Democratic - both “officially took the view that
adherence to Marxism-Leninism not only made governments internally repressive
but also–through their presumed subservience to Moscow–a threat to the global
balance of power” (Gaddis, 1992, p. 13). John Gaddis (1992) argues “there was
never very good evidence to support this claim” (p. 13).
The U.S.S.R. did try to use ideology to gain its objectives in so called
“developing countries” of Asia and Africa. Both Moscow and Washington experts
identified these areas as containing “vital” interests - security, strategic, economic,
and political. Both the United States and the Soviet Union aspired to be a global
power, with influence and presence across the globe as benefits a superpower. As
former Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko used to say: there is no question
of significance that can be resolved without the Soviet Union (Saivetz, 1989, p.
211). Furthermore, the Third World served as a testing ground for both sides for
their competing ideas about the nature and direction of historical changes.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked a new
historical crossroads of international relations and the beginning of a new era. In
comparison with the Cold War’s “clarity,” the post-war transitional phase seems
to be much more muddled, dangerous, and unpredictable. To a large extent, this
complexity can be explained with the growing role of the ideological factor in
world politics. The present main confrontation between liberal ideas of a universal
world and increasingly conservative antiglobalistic tendencies give a powerful
impetus to the process of formation of a new international model. It is clear that
U.S.-Russian relations in the present continue to be a testing ground for any global
system.
Present U.S.-Russian relations are surviving hard times. European and
American media blame Russia. Putin’s Russia is called revisionist, aggressive,
nationalistic, authoritarian, etc. Experts (mostly Western, but a few Russian also),
trying to understand the overwhelming support and popularity of President
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Vladimir Putin in Russian society, sometimes make conclusions having nothing to
do with reality. For example, in 2015 Senior Associate and Chair of the Carnegie
Moscow Center A. Kolesnikov published an article titled “Russian Ideology after
Crimea” (Kolesnikov, 2015), where he expressed his distinctive opinion:
Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Russian public
has embraced an increasingly conservative and nationalistic ideology. . . .
The new ideology is based on a deliberate recycling of archaic forms of
mass consciousness, a phenomenon that can be termed the sanctification
of unfreedom. Confined to a besieged fortress, surrounded by external
enemies, and faced with a domestic fifth column, the people of Russia
have begun to experience Stockholm syndrome and have thrown their
support behind the commander of the fortress, President Vladimir Putin. .
. . This sacralization of unfreedom gives birth to militarism.
In this long citation there are only two words which are supported by evidence:
“conservative and nationalistic.” The rest of the judgements–especially the
existence of the “Stockholm syndrome” and the “sacralization of unfreedom”–are
groundless assessments.
Conservatism (in both meanings–as a system of moral values, and as a
political ideology) definitely dominates in Russia today. In 2016, among 75
registered political parties (Spisok, 2016) about 20 directly declared conservative
values and principles. At least another 15, according to their program rhetoric, can
be named “near-conservative.” Two of the four parties represented in the Duma
openly declare their adherence to conservatism (United Russia) and nationalism
(the Liberal-Democratic Party). A third party in the Duma–the Communist Party
of Russian Federation–also appeals to historical traditions and cultural roots–the
views that are the main definition of all kinds of conservative thoughts. The
ideological credo of the Russian President is expressed by the notion
“conservatism.” A favorite concept of Premier Dmitry Medvedev is “conservative
modernization” (Shirinyants, 2014). To paraphrase Russian philosopher
Konstantin Leontiev, one can say that being a severest conservative in Russia
today is profitable and easy like it was in the 1990s to be a liberal (Leontiev,
1885).
“Conservative-preservative” thinking, which shapes current Russian foreign
policy, did not appear after Crimea. Practically all experts conclude that it is a
product of the shaping of several hundred years. However, there is not enough
attention to the role of the more recent period of Russian history–the 1990s. There
is no doubt that the current way of thinking in Russia emanates from the top.
Nevertheless, a most important and interesting consideration is not this
circumstance, but why there is such a strong request for it from the bottom. Why
are Russians ready to sacrifice their well-being to support President Putin’s
politics, in particular his anti-Western and anti-American course?
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Examining the First Post-Cold War Decade
The answer to why Putin is supported by the Russian people is found by
examining the first post-Cold War decade following the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the disastrous consequences for the people of Russia. A frame for this
ill-fated period of time is the negative attitude within the country to what was
perceived widely as the “de-ideologization” and “Westernization” of Yeltsin’s
domestic and foreign policies.
Of course the “de-ideologization” of Yeltsin’s foreign policy is only a myth.
The ideological credo of Yeltsin’s first foreign minister, A. Kozyrev, was
expressed very clearly: “Our choice is . . . to progress according to generally
accepted rules. They were invented by the West, and I’m a Westernizer in this
respect–the West is rich and we need to be friends with it. . . .” (Stent, 2014,
p. 24). Throughout the 1990s Washington’s policy toward Russia was
conducted out of a traditional conviction that the internal socio-political
regime shapes the international behavior of a country. In the view of
American experts, Yeltsin was a guarantor of liberal and democratic reforms
in Russia, and of not returning to some kind of totalitarian or authoritarian
regime that could jeopardize U.S. interests. So the West had to support it
financially. Money was given in the format of “structural adaptation”: Russia
had to provide the conditions for democratization of its internal life, and to
follow the rules that were dictated by the single “superpower”–the United
States–in its foreign policy. Throughout the first half of the decade Russia was
obedient, accepting the status of America’s junior partner and subsequent
moves towards NATO expansion, cooperating with NATO in the Balkans, and
listening to Western criticism of the Chechen war.
Yeltsin's American honeymoon did not last long. Вy the middle of 1990s,
many Russian people already perceived that Yeltsin's domestic and foreign
policies were a betrayal of the national interest. At the beginning of 1996
Yeltsin's popularity was at a historical low point, with only an 8 percent
approval rating. He was in fifth place among presidential candidates, while the
Communist Party leader G. Zyuganov was ahead with 21 percent. It compelled
new Russian oligarchs, scared about the looming prospect of a communist
victory, to join together their financial resources in order to re-elect the
incumbent President (so called semibankirshcina–seven bankers). Still,
Yeltsin’s victory would not have been possible without American support. In
February of 1996 the International Monetary Fund, urged on by the United
States, granted a $10.2 billion loan to Russia (Russia and I.M.F., 1996). These
huge sums not only allowed Yeltsin’s team to pay off long-owed wages and
pensions to millions of Russians shortly before the June election, but also
deploy a massive “black arts” campaign against Zuganov. American political
technologists played an important role in the re-election.
Yeltsin’s victory, however, did not change public assessment. The period
of 1996-1999 was characterized by growing domestic criticism of Russia’s
weak and defeatist foreign policy and leading to the more nationalistic mood.
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In 1990s, listening to endless speeches about democracy, freedom, etc., and in
reality observing misery, crime, cheating, major corruption, and the aggression of
a cheap mass culture, Russians realized that notorious “common human values”
do not mean much in the absence of “freedom from need” and “freedom from
fear.” In this time frame several generations of Russians, including very young
people, got a very strong vaccination against the liberal system of values, Western
ideology, and Western culture. The “syndrome of the 1990s,” which created a
fertile soil for the growth of conservative ideology, did not mean disease. On the
contrary, for many Russians, it meant recovering.
The first bright manifestation of this “recovering” related to the U.S.-Russian
interactions was the famous “Primakov loop” in March of 1999. Russia’s new
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was on his way to Washington, D.C. to
negotiate with Vice-President Albert Gore the next tranche of IMF monetary aid.
After being informed about the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia, which was to
commence a few hours later, Primakov ordered the government official plane to
return to Russia. This case went down in history under the name "Primakov's
loop". This choice of action by Primakov was not just a gesture–it was the
beginning of a new foreign policy consensus within Russia. “Primakov loop”
had several key messages: Russia is a partner, not a client of the West; Russia
is in a unique position being both a European and an Asian country, and its
national interests lie between those two worlds; Russia is a competent actor in
a multipolar, not a unipolar world; and in foreign policy Russia values realism
(real deals), not some abstract ideas and dogmas.

Putin’s Russia and Prospects of U.S.-Russian Interactions
By the time of Putin’s coming the public mood in Russia was quite different
from what it had been a decade before. Clinton’s policy facilitated an antiWestern and anti-American mood within Russia. Outwardly benevolent and
friendly, it was in fact anti-Russian, especially because it supported NATO
expansion. In the eyes of the Russian people by “expanding democracy” in
Russia the United States actively supported the creation of a new
socioeconomic regime of “criminalized capitalism.” In general, the experience
gained from dealing with different American administrations brought Russians
to the conviction that it was easier to find a common language with
Republicans than with Democrats. Russians considered Republicans less
dogmatic and more maneuverable. They used to be closer to the realpolitik
concept, which is closer in turn to Russian conservatism. Republicans are
more inclined to prefer equilibrium in world politics. Democrats are more
exposed to the influence of ideology and strive to pursue reforms,
transformations, and crusades.
According to Henry Kissinger (2005), “This is why crusaders have usually
caused more upheavals and suffering than statesmen” (para 13). During the last
years of President Reagan’s administration, and during the presidency of George
H. W. Bush, American policy toward Russia was generally cautious. Then
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Democrats came to the White House and started a policy based on liberaldemocratic ideas coupled with a reformist activism. First, came Yugoslavia and
the 1999 NATO expansion, then more active involvement in post-Soviet space–all
this Russia at first was watching in silence, but gradually became more and more
wary. To paraphrase Prince Gorchakov’s famous words: “Russia was not only
concentrating. Russia was getting angry” (Glasser, 2013, para 1.). Russia was
preparing to counter-attack.
Putin understood this public mood very well. It corresponded with his
own convictions. The period of Russian-American partnership that was shaped
after 9/11 was short. Soon Putin announced his opposition to the U.S. "war on
terror.” Russians viewed American criticism of the wars in Chechnya and
human rights policies as an interference in its internal affairs. That
deterioration of relations occurred because of at least two big issues: the use
of military force to effect regime change in Iraq, and the illegitimacy of
Western military intervention without UN sanction. At the same time,
Americans became more and more disappointed in Russia’s lack of
democratic reforms. Meanwhile, rising oil prices strengthened the Russian
economy and the socio-political situation within Russia became more stable.
The Kremlin needed Washington less and less. Moscow increasingly accused
Washington of undermining a systemic balance, be it via NATO’s eastward
expansion or via humanitarian intervention into countries formerly known as the
Third World.
In 2005 in his Second Inaugural Address, President George W. Bush
stressed that in order to protect the American people and defeat terrorism
America had to spread its values to other countries: “The best hope for peace in
our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world” (Bush, 2005). The Bush
Freedom Agenda was just another reincarnation of liberal internationalist
ideology. Moscow perceived it as a justification for any American
involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. In contrast to the United
States, Russia firmly advocated the principle of noninterference.
In 2003, and again in 2005, Washington supported “color revolutions” in
the Russian “backyard.” Ukraine was the most sensitive for Russians. Angela
Stent (2014) identified the magnitude of support for the “Orange Revolution”
by referencing the fact that Ukraine had become the third largest recipient of
U.S aid after only Israel and Egypt (p. 111). This approach inflamed U.S.Russian relations. The result of this ideological confrontation was Putin’s
legendary Munich Security Conference speech of 2007. The Munich speech
marked a new phase in Russia’s relations with the United States and the
world, which is continuing until the present. The basic construct of Putin’s
Munich speech was the idea of “sovereign democracy,” which refers to a
“form of political life where political power, the authority from which power
is derived, and decisions are taken by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose
of gaining material welfare, freedom and fairness for all citizens, social
groups and nationalities and for the people that formed it” (Surkov, 2006). Of
course the key word of the construction was “sovereign,” not “democracy.”
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There were several core ideas in the speech: neither the United States (nor
any other nation) can teach Russia about democracy; Russia would no longer
accept an agenda dictated in Washington; and Russia’s political system meets
the needs and expectations of the Russian people. The concept was more than
just an ideological response to Bush’s Freedom Agenda: it challenged the
universality of the Western value system and proved that Russia’s ideology
and policy choices are derived from its own unique history and are as
legitimate as that of the United States or Europe. Strong
“conservative/preservative” evocative appeals to ideological and political
traditions became dominant in Russian domestic and foreign policy theoretical
discourse and practice.

Conclusion
In the 19th century Uvarov’s triad did not become an official ideology. At the
time it was not understood and rejected. It cannot be said that the creators of
today’s Russian ideology understand it better, but it is impossible not to see them
attempting to revive all three postulates and adjust them to current reality. As
Uvarov denied the godlessness of the 18th century and its mockery of faith and
church, today Russia seeks to reverse the atheism of the Soviet era as well as the
dissoluteness and permissiveness of the liberal 1990s. According to the revived
ideology, the authority of the state must be based on the dominant religion, and
only by being sanctified in the beliefs of people will it be strong and legitimate.
As Uvarov preferred constitutional monarchy over a republic form of government,
today Russia is promoting Putin’s model of a “strong state” which is based on the
idea of “managed democracy.” The most complicated element of the triad–
nationality–is also very relevant for today’s political tasks. Like Uvarov counterposed this notion to the French revolution’s fraternité (which has international
meaning declaring that all people are brothers), modern Russian conservatism
appeals to nationalism to oppose globalism which implies Western, primarily
American, dominance.
Crimea became the culmination of implementation of these concepts. In 2014
Putin returned national pride to the Russian people. For this, most of them are
ready to forgive him shortages of his domestic politics, the falling standard of
living, and the deterioration of the Russian image abroad. The degree of his
popularity in society is still high (Reitingi “Edinoy Rossii” i Putina dostigli
maksimuma. (2017). The “Crimea consensus” is a very important factor of
Russian political life. And it is going to stay this way in the 2018 election.
The Crimea annexation and following Russian participation in the war in
eastern Ukraine ultimately damaged relations between Russia and the West, in
particular with the United States. In this period, we have been watching probably
the most serious split between the ideological mainstreams of the two countries in
the history of their relations: Russian “conservative/preservative” ideology versus
American “liberal globalism.” This confrontation is being aggravated by the fact
that the Russian internationalism of the 20th century - in all its forms – is now
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changed to nationalism. One can say that the same trend is visible in America
today. But it is clear that nationalism in the United States does not have fertile soil
since it is a country of immigrants. Today’s rhetoric of nationalism may be
considered as an ideological deviation, which will not live very long.
Despite the divergence of ideologies Russia and America have several key
concerns that demand cooperation. One example is fighting Islamist terrorism. At
this time one should not overestimate President Donald Trump’s sympathies to
Russia and his aspirations for cooperation. Even if he has such aspirations, the
American system of checks and balances will not let him act alone. Therefore, the
question of the future of U.S.-Russia relations may well depend upon broader
social views of practical well-being and moral ideas, ideologies that both
countries, at different times and with different intensity, have shared in common.
In the longer term, it is more likely that both countries will come to see that,
in this globalized interdependent world, there are few great problems that can be
solved without their active cooperation. And their national interests compel it.
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Russia’s Fight for the “Globe”
Yuliya Brel
Abstract
The foreign policy of Russia in the near abroad is the continuation of its domestic
policy, which includes the consolidation of the population around a leader by
means of creating an image of an enemy, especially at times when the economic
situation in the country is deteriorating. When interpreting the inner processes in
the country, political scientists usually apply the decomposition of the totalitarian
Soviet regime as a framework. This paper suggests a broader framework through
an analysis of historical structures anchored in Russian civilization. The key to
understanding Russia's foreign policy, I argue, is rooted in the imperial syndrome
associated with the country’s history, whether one considers the tsarist, Soviet, or
post-Soviet periods. At present, Russia’s desire to restore its status as a world
power, as in the past, requires it to develop a foreign policy secured by control of
its nearest neighbors. For centuries, it purchased their loyalty and fealty with
natural resources. When this routine was disrupted, for example with a drop in the
market prices of raw materials, another practice developed where, in order to
maintain its hegemony, Russia used aggression against its nearest neighbors. This
approach is sustained by endorsement from the general public that seems oblivious
to conditions of unparalleled income inequality in Russia. For them there is
nostalgia for the restoration of a super power status for the country. The chief
outcome of the study is Russian policies of self-isolation and hybrid wars against
its nearest neighbors, which is a contemporary means used to prolong the life of an
imagined empire.

Introduction
On November 30, 2016, the United States House of Representatives approved the
Intelligence Authorization Bill. Title V of the bill (Matters Relating to Foreign
Countries) specified the creation of an interagency committee “to counter active
measures by the Russian Federation to exert covert influence over peoples and
governments” (Civic Impulse, 2017, p. 53). The matter concerned the disclosure of
disinformation and forgeries, funding agents of influence, assassinations, terrorism,
and other activities of the kind “carried out in coordination with, or at the behest of,
political leaders or the security services of the Russian Federation” (Civic Impulse,
2017, pp. 53-54).
Clearly, a full 180-degree turn in the Russian-American relations was not an
instantaneous event. Initially there was little portent of going back to the active
phase of the Cold War in U.S. relations with Putin’s Russia. After September 11,
2001, Putin was the first to call American President George W. Bush to express his
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condolences and to declare his readiness to render assistance in fighting terrorism.
Shortly after that, following the announcement by President Bush of the United
States’ intent to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (Arms
Control Association, 2002), and the International Security Conference in Munich
in 2002 (Schwartz, 2002), relations began to take a turn for the worse. Five years
later, at the Munich Security Conference of 2007 Putin announced that the unipolar
model of the modern world was unacceptable for Russia. He emphasized that Russia
“[was] a country with more than a millennial history, and [that] it almost always
enjoyed the privilege of conducting an independent foreign policy” (Putin, 2007).
Although Russian leadership might perceive NATO membership as consistent with
a unipolar vision, in March 2009, Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, talked about his desire to see Russia among the NATO member-nations
(Gołota & Wroński, 2009). In spite of numerous reservations, such a possibility was
also left open by Dmitry Rogozin, the Permanent Representative of the NATO
Response Force, in April 2009 (Rogozin, 2009).
The seeming point of no return in the Russian-American relations was
passed in March 2014 after the annexation of the Crimea by Russia. In light of
perceived United States support for the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych, the prospects of an anti-Russian government in Ukraine, and the
potential loss of Crimean ports for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Putin justified the
actions of Russia as a necessity to protect the population of the Crimea from the
repressions and reprisal raids of the Ukrainian radicals (Putin, 2014). According to
independent analysts and political writers, such a U-turn in Russia’s foreign policy
was inevitable (Gudkov, 2016; Klyamkin, 2014). These analysts regard the change
as a resort to traditional means, i.e. the use of aggression and conducting hybrid
wars against the nearest neighbors, for solving internal problems.
In this article, I will first explore the idea that in its development Russia goes
through the cycles of reforms and counter-reforms, which help preserve the
historical status quo in Russian society. I will also consider how the consolidation
of Russian society is attained by creating the perpetual image of an external enemy.
This image appeals to the people’s perception of the country as an imperial nation
and a world power. “Splendid little wars” against real or imagined enemies give the
Russian authorities an opportunity to distract the population from the internal
problems. The economy is a major part of this argument. The question of “whether
Moscow will be able to handle [this] strategic over-extension, which entails the use
of considerable resources while its economy is in bad shape” looms large (Scimia,
2017). Arguably, economic problems in Russia occasionally stem from its
intermediate geopolitical and cultural position between the West and the East that
at times have impeded trade relations.
Utilizing primarily web-based sources from Russian scholars in order to
provide readers with easily accessible references (many of these works are also
published in printed form), I will also examine how the characteristics of the
cultural core of the Russian civilization that have contributed to its survival for
millennia, actually stymie creativity in the 21st century. By reviewing the theories
of Russian historians, philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists, and by
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analyzing the outcomes of public opinion polls, as well as statistical and economic
data, I show that when change does come, it is derivative. This tendency to adapt
from external sources bears the seeds of its own destruction due to the persistence
of reactionary forces against change in the society. I will conclude with some
thoughts about how Russia compensates for its inability to exert “soft power” on its
nearest neighbors, and what the country’s current development prospects are.

Literature Review
One of the explanatory models of social transformations in the history of Russia is
the theory of the “civilizational pendulum” or “cyclic recurrence of history” offered
by Bagdasaryan (2010). According to the model, “the direction in which
development moves at a particular historical stage is determined by the combination
of the innovational and traditional potentials” (Bagdasaryan, 2010, p. 61). When the
former potential prevails (often inspired by external forces), the system becomes
transformed. Innovations, however, incite rejection and set the countermove of the
pendulum mechanism in motion. In this sense, crises can be regarded as the
maximum swing points of the pendulum. Thus, “when the maximum of the
innovation amplitude has been reached, the vector of the social development
inevitably gives way to the opposite one,” which leads to the periods of counter
reforms in Russia (Bagdasaryan, 2010, pp. 61-62).
The idea that in its development Russia goes through cycles of reforms and
counter-reforms is supported by the sociologist Vladimir Lapkin and the political
scientist Vladimir Pantin (2007). Their work connects the problem of Russia’s
image with reactionary domestic and foreign policies developed by the authorities.
Policies that the authors single out emphasize the “intermediate,” “borderline”
geopolitical and cultural position of Russia between the West and the East, whereby
“the image of Russia inside and outside the country somehow bifurcates and
fluctuates” (Lapkin & Pantin, 2007, pp. 1-2).
Lapkin and Pantin (2007) further argue that during the periods of liberal
reforms, Russian society and the state “primarily consider themselves closely
connected to European culture, and more broadly to the West,” signaling their
equality with the “civilized world” (pp. 2-3). At such times, the West tends to
perceive Russia as not posing any real threats, though “lagging behind” the civilized
world. On the contrary, when the Russian state goes through periods of anti-liberal
counter reforms, its “separate identity” and civilizational differences from both the
West and the East begin to be emphasized. These are also the times that tend to
accentuate Russia’s “greatpowerness, uniqueness, imperial might” as well as its
“special messianic role in the world process (Lapkin and Pantin, 2007, p. 3). At
such moments the West sees Russia “largely as an independent, but hostile and
unpredictable nation whose political and economic life is significantly different
from life in western countries” (p. 3). Relatedly, Bagdasaryan (2010) highlights a
set of indicators that directly lead to an increase in external aggression. Those are
the level of national focus versus the level of cosmopolitism; the etatism paradigm
(the popularity of the strong state concept); the propaganda actualization of the
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external enemy image (the West), and the nature of defining Russia’s historical
mission, among others (Bagdasaryan, 2010, p. 64).
The historian Alexander Akhiezer (1995) regarded Russia as having an
intermediate position between liberal and traditional civilizations (p. 4). In its
historic development Russia stepped over the bounds of a traditional civilization
characterized by static reproduction, i.e. the type of reproduction under which
quantitative changes in society and culture are possible only at the expense of
attracting additional resources. However, Russia did not manage to become a fullfledged part of Western liberal civilization where the dominant position is held by
intensive reproduction fueled by innovation. Situated between such forces, societal
dynamics acquired a conflict-ridden, self-destructive character which Akhiezer
(1995) called “cleavage” (p. 6).
Cleavage is “a pathological condition of society” characterized by a vicious
circle, which means that if progressive values in one of the two parts of the cleaved
society are activated, in the other part traditional forces are brought into action, and
vice versa (Akhiezer, 1995, p. 6). Akhiezer (1995) argues that the two opposing
parts in the cleaved society (progressive values vs. traditional values) act in the
opposite directions and thus paralyze and disorganize each other (p. 6).
In a cleavage-based society any attempts to substitute alternative decisions for
those just taken may form the so-called “lame decisions” (Akhiezer, 1995, p. 32).
The latter are characterized by simplification–a tendency to solve not what needs to
be solved, but what can be solved according to the understanding of the authorities
(Akhiezer, 1995, p. 34). This tendency coincides with Herbert Simon’s idea of
“satisficing.” Satisficing refers to making decisions, which are just good enough in
terms of some criterion (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2009, p. 348). Lame decisions make
the authorities “pursue a ‘satisficing’ path, a path that will permit satisfaction at
some specified level of all of [their] needs” (Simon, 1956, p. 136). The project
Novorossia envisaging the creation of a confederative union of the unrecognized
Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics may serve as an example in this case. At
the initial stage (May 2014), it was actively supported by the Kremlin. However,
having encountered resistance on the part of the West and the impossibility of
spreading the Donetsk-Lugansk experience over the contiguous regions of Ukraine,
the project was closed a year later.
According to the Russian historian Nikolai Berdyaev (2007), the immense
space of Russia subjugates the “Russian soul” instead of emancipating it (p. 115).
Organization of the vast space into the greatest state in the world was paid for by
over-centralization, “submission of life to the state’s interests, and suppression of
any independent forces, personal as well as public” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 114).
Berdyaev (2007) wrote the collection of articles, The Destiny of Russia (19141917), before the end of World War I. He hoped that the war would lead to “a radical
change in the consciousness of the Russian people” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). They
would disengage from the power of space, and instead get control over it. This
would allow them to radically change their attitude to the state and culture. Instead
of being their master, the state should become “the inner power of the Russian
people” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). As for culture, in the opinion of Berdyaev (2007),
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it was supposed to become “more intensive” (p. 120). Without such a change “the
Russian people cannot have a future … and the state is exposed to the threat of
disintegration” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). The philosopher’s hopes were not
destined to be realized. During the 20th century the state disintegrated twice. That
is why the fight for Russia’s global status still remains a main factor in the process
of consolidation for an atomized people who never managed (not without the
assistance of the state) to acquire the skills of collective action.
The problem of consolidation is pertinent to any society that has transitioned
from a traditional civilization to a liberal one. However, for Russia which is stuck
in-between, it is exacerbated by the cleavage or tensions between innovation and
tradition, between foreign and domestic. To overcome it, it is necessary to reach a
basic consensus between the conflicting cultures and their bearers, further providing
legitimacy to the state power (Akhiezer, Klyamkin, & Yakovenko, 2013, p. 45). In
early states, the legitimacy of the ruling stratum was determined by how successful
it was at coping with the protection of its subjects from external threats, and by its
ability to annex new territories. That is why “victories in wars were a powerful
source of the state power legitimacy” (Akhiezer et al., 2013, p. 44). In the words of
Akhiezer, Klyamkin, and Yakovenko (2013), “the fall of European monarchies
(German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian) … during WW I proved that the ancient
mechanism when power could be legitimized by means of victories and delegitimized by means of defeats continued to exist even millennia later” (p. 44).
These authors also contend that “the state consolidation through the image of an
enemy–real or simulated–has not been eliminated until now” (Akhiezer et al., 2013,
p. 44). Therefore, victories in wars gave Russia an opportunity to establish and
support its notion of imperial might legitimizing the ruling elite.
Wars, however, could also be “a specific means to obscure internal problems,
which under the condition of peace reveal[ed] their intractability and insolvability
… and the hidden cracks of the socio-cultural cleavage” (Akhiezer et al., 2013, p.
45). Also, the vast expanse of the Russian territory did not require much investment
from its inhabitants. It has always been possible for the state to secure additional
resources to enhance production in society making innovation unnecessary or at
least less attractive. Nevertheless, Russia’s position as an intermediary civilization
forced the country to go through cycles of reforms and counter-reforms in the course
of its history. The periods of reforms drew Russia nearer to the “civilized world,”
i.e. to the Western European culture, whereas the periods of counter-reforms incited
in the population the ideas of Russia’s uniqueness and aspirations for the country’s
messianic role in the world.

Analysis
In the remaining part of my article I will show how and why the population of
Russia currently tends to support the aggressive foreign policy of the Kremlin. The
following analysis of public opinion polls and of the statistical and economic data
shows that while previously the Russian authorities ensured support of constituents
by improving their well-being, the main focus of the current domestic policy is to
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create an image of an external enemy (or enemies). This helps politicians to distract
the masses from recognizing that Russia has been unable to create a competitive
economy. By involving the population in foreign policy endeavors, which propel
dangerous dreams about the restoration of the country's former greatness and status
as a world power, elites are trying to divert the people’s attention from the fact that
the Russian economy is currently suffering from three ongoing crises (Mirkin,
2017). The first one is the investment crisis; the second is connected with the drop
in the population’s real income that continues for the fourth consecutive year; the
third is the overpriced Russian ruble, which may become devalued at any moment.
In addition, the modern Russian economy is still mostly extractive, which makes
Russia “a great state of raw materials” unable to compete with either “the Asian
electronic ‘tigers’” or other developed countries of the world (Mirkin, 2017).

Negative Mobilization
In his book Negative Identity (2004), the Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov noted the
following, “Consolidation of the Russians happens not on the basis of positive ideas
… but on the solidarity of repulsion, denial, and demarcation. It is a deep cultural
circumstance rather than manifestation of an opportunistic potential of collective
mobilization” (p. 156). Therefore, the most important condition for the reproduction
of the negative identity is the presence of the image of an “enemy” (an “alien”). It
affixes wholeness and stability to the national identity. Gudkov provides a useful
theory about how negative mobilization forms. He identifies three conditions
conducive to the forming of mobilization waves in the Russian society. First of all,
negative mobilization begins only when the differentiation and sophistication of the
social system reaches such a degree under which the commanding top begins to lose
control over what is going on. Secondly, under such conditions the processes of
structured changes turn out to be blocked by the interests of some influential groups.
Thirdly, the intellectual elite degenerate since they become little other than
bureaucrats serving the regime (Gudkov, 2004, p. 484).
The data in Table 1 help assess the effectiveness of Russia’s aggressive foreign
policy with respect to the perception of the political elite by the population of the
country. The coercive annexation of the Crimea had a positive impact on Putin’s
rating, although many remained relatively low.
The first column shows the results of the survey which was conducted under
the conditions of a deep economic crisis five months before the default. 1 Public
opinion perceived the authorities of Yeltsin’s call-out as corrupted (63%) and alien
to the people (41%). During the “fat” years of Putin’s rule the population’s
1

The sovereign default occurred in Russian on August 17, 1998. The main reasons for the
default (the inability to service some or all the country’s fiscal obligations) were as follows:
an enormous state debt; low world prices for raw materials, which made the basis of the
Russian export; the peanut politics of the state; the establishment by the state of the Ponzi
scheme, which refers to a fraudulent investing scam; and the meltdown of the Asian
economies.
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perception of the authorities improved, but not significantly or in all categories.
Comparing the data in the last two columns it is necessary to keep in mind that by
November 2016 the real income of the population had been decreasing for 24
consecutive months. Nevertheless, the share of Russians characterizing the
authorities in a negative way substantially decreased.
Table 1
Please name the traits that in your opinion characterize the current
authorities (percentage of the number of respondents)2
March
1998

November
2012

November
2016

Corrupted

63

52

31

Bureaucratic

22

30

26

Legitimate

12

8

23

Alien to the people

41

32

23

Strong, firm

2

10

19

‘Ours,’ habitual

3

4

11

Authoritative,
respected

2

6

11

Note. Adapted from Levada-Center (2016a).
The figures in the last column support the idea of Akhiezer et al. (2013) about
wars being a convenient means for the authorities to distract the population from
internal problems (p. 45). Russian rulers have always skillfully played the strings
of the people’s “deeply-rooted patriotic sentiment” knowing for centuries that the
population possessed “a strong resilience to material shortages” (Scimia, 2017).
Thus, the events in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea turned out to be a
consolidating factor for the Russian society, at least for the time being. However,
the countdown of shaping the current mobilization wave should be taken not from
March 2014 and the annexation, but from the end of 2011 when in response to mass
protests against rigging the election outcomes, the Kremlin began to renew the
policy of societal consolidation (in opposition to external threats). The central
element of the new policy became the anti-West rhetoric.

2

The survey was conducted on November 18-21, 2016, using an all-Russian representative
sampling of the urban and rural population. The number of respondents equaled 1,600 people
aged 18 and older. The survey was conducted at respondents’ homes using face-to-face
interviews. The six answer options given in the table were the most popular ones in
November 2016.
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The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term (March 2012)
coincided with a sharp slowdown in the economic growth, which served as an
additional incentive to form an image of an enemy. The dynamics of answering the
question, “Are things in Russia going in the right direction or are the events leading
us nowhere?” illustrate the connection between the external “splendid little wars”
and positive assessments by mass consciousness of the state of affairs inside the
country (Levada Center, 2016b, p. 33). The two most important peaks of positive
assessments were recorded in August 2008 (“peace-enforcement of Georgia”), and
after the annexation of the Crimea in March 2014.

State Cultural Policy
In December 2014, Putin approved Foundations of the State Cultural Policy (FSCP)
decree. The document consists of 72 pages. The word “civilization” is mentioned
in it 30 times. According to the authors of the document, Russia is a unique and
authentic civilization, which reduces itself to neither “the West” nor “the East”
(FSCP, 2015, p. 30). It is a bridge between the neighbors on “the left” and on “the
right” (FSCP, 2015, p. 30). Civilizational authenticity is secured by means of
transferring from generation to generation the traditional values, norms, mores, and
patterns of the country’s behavior (FSCP, 2015, pp. 26, 44). It is identified as a
priority of the cultural and humanitarian development (FSCP, 2015, p. 9). At the
same time, there was no space in the voluminous document to articulate the content
of “civilizational authenticity” (FSCP, 2015, p. 3). The only exception was Russian
mentality. Its main characteristic was a pronounced priority of the spiritual over
material (FSCP, 2015, p. 31). The absence of any detailed description of the FSCP
characteristics is evidence of the declarative nature of the document that presages a
propaganda campaign for confrontation with the “other,” specifically Western
Europe and the United States.
Thus, a concise wording of the document’s main thesis would be “Russia is not
Europe” (Bershidsky, 2014). Although Putin has mentioned it many times in his
speeches that Russia had civilizational differences with the West, according to
Bershidsky (2014), the FSCP officially enshrined Russia’s “rejection of the
European path and of universal values such as democratic development and
tolerance toward different cultures” (n.p.).
Three factors seem to come into play with respect to “Russia’s non-European
path” (Bershidsky, 2014). First of all, it is a quest for security from terrorist attacks,
as well as from internal breakdown, and a perceived threat from the West. Secondly,
it is Russia’s sense of uniqueness with its growing rejection of Western values and
the idea that “Russian civilization can develop along the lines of a limited federation
of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus” (Johnson, 2014). Finally, it is an imbedded
ideology growing out of Russia’s vastness that centralized governance is necessary,
accepted, and even preferred, which in turn contributes to greater police powers on
the part of the state.
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The Russian Economy
The central idea of the cultural program seems to be accurate–Russia is a separate
civilization. This distinct civilization has survived over the course of its millennial
history thanks to this identity. In the article The Clash of Civilizations? Samuel
Huntington (1993) stated that when the Cold War ended and ideological division of
Europe disappeared, the region became divided in a cultural way (p. 29). The
division now was between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox
Christianity and Islam on the other (pp. 29-30) The important dividing line in
Europe “may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500”
(Huntington, 1993, p. 30). Thus, the peoples who live to the north and west of this
line are either Protestants or Catholics. In the course of their history they went
through the same stages as other Western European countries, i.e. feudalism, the
Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution
(Huntington, 1993, p. 30). They were also generally better off than those who lived
to the east. Therefore, Huntington (1993) predicted that those peoples would “look
forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the
consolidation of democratic political systems” (p. 30). The Orthodox and Muslim
peoples to the east and south of the line “were only lightly touched by the shaping
events in the rest of Europe; [were] generally less advanced economically; [and]
seemed much less likely to develop stable political systems” (pp. 30-31). In full
compliance with Huntington’s logic, the three former Baltic republics of the Soviet
Union focused on the integration with Europe, and “quickly evolved into genuine
and, in many respects, liberal democracies” (Diamond, 2008, p. 190). The six
republics with predominantly Muslim populations reverted to sultanic-like regimes
with strong individual rulers. The six Orthodox republics proclaimed commitment
to the principles of democracy on the forefront of the Perestroika euphoria;
however, they did not manage to realize them consistently in practice. Eventually,
with the exception of the Baltic States, all other former Soviet republics and “most
prominently Russia … regressed from democratic possibilities or reestablished
dictatorship without communism” (Diamond, 2008, p. 190).
The authors of FSCP, however, consider the cultural peculiarity of Russia as
the guarantor of the Russian statehood stability and competitiveness (FSCP, 2015
p. 49). Official economic statistics, on the contrary, do not confirm the presence of
such competitiveness. Modern Russia, just like the Soviet Union before it, suffers
from what Larry Diamond (2008) called “the exceptional curse of oil” (p. 74).
Already the economy of the Soviet Union after the discovery of the oil and gas
fields in Western Siberia began to sweepingly acquire the structure characteristic of
a petro-state. Therefore, it is not by accident that “the largest geopolitical
catastrophe” of the 20th century started in 1985 after an almost six-fold drop in oil
prices (Putin, 2005).
The modern Russian economy has been substantially dependent on oil prices
as well. In the words of the program director of Moscow Carnegie Center Movchan
(2017), in Russia in 2008 the correlation between the changes in oil prices made up
between 90% and 95% of the changes in the GDP growth rate, the federal budget
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income, and the size of reserves (p. 5). According to the Russian Ministry of
Finance, in 2014, 35.4% of the federal budget revenue came directly from the export
of petroleum. Value-added tax received from selling imported goods, most of which
(92%) were paid for with the money received from exporting raw materials, made
up additional 15% of the budget (Movchan, 2017, p. 7). Also, taxes, levies, and
payments for natural resources equaled 20% of the budget, with excise and other
duties on imported goods adding another 13%. Altogether, in 2014, “83.4% of the
federal budget income was made up by the revenue from the extraction and export
of raw materials” (Movchan, 2017, p. 7).
It would be a mistake to think that an increase in the general income of the
Russian population occurred because the state managed to create a competitive
industrial sphere. The increase should be first accounted for by the export of oil, the
extraction of which makes up about 20% of the Russian GDP. Another factor
explaining the increase in the income is the outpacing consumption growth, which
is fueled by trade “blown out of proportions due to the huge petrodollars flow of
import” (Movchan, 2017, p. 6). Citing the data of the Federal Service of State
Statistics (Rosstat), Movchan (2017) indicated that by 2014 Russia was importing
from 85% to 95% of production means, and from 50% to 70% of consumption
goods (p. 6).
A growth in the income of the Russians during the 2000s did not contradict
such a roll back as it was ensured mainly at the expense of the raw material rent.
The latter, however, is threatened today not only by the unfavorable demand-supply
situation but also by the deepening technological underrun. The methods of oil
extraction used in Russia are inefficient from the point of view of oil recovery
factor, which is on average 30% lower today than in the United States and is slowly
decreasing, whereas in the United States it is slowly growing. The maximum
possible extraction in Russia will decline and, according to some estimates, will
dwindle at least two times by 2035 (Poddubny, 2011, pp. 85-103).
Russia’s rejection of a planned economy and the shift to the market were
supposed to promote the development of knowledge intensive branches of industry.
In practice, however, the situation was reversed. According to the data of the
Russian Machine-Building Portal (2013), for the last 20 years the production of
processing units in Russia decreased almost 20 times: from 70,000 to 3,000. They
assert that the decline should be attributed to the political events that led to the
change in the country’s economic set-up in the 1990s, which “made most of the
machine-tool building enterprises in Russia bankrupt or put them on the verge of
bankruptcy” ( Machine-Building Portal, 2013).
Machine building, however, is the core of modern industry. It is impossible to
create a modern economy without it. That is why the federal program National
Technological Base adopted in 2006 and intended for the time frame of 2007-2011
was specifically earmarked to breathe new life into such an important branch of
industry (Government, 2007). The program did not produce the expected outcome,
and could not produce it. This is a direct consequence of Russia’s inability to
introduce quantitative changes into the economy by means of innovation. The
situation was also aggravated by the brain drain from the country and the overall
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low ranking of most Russian universities. According to a report by Russia’s
Committee of Civil Initiatives, human capital is actively leaving the country, and
the “quality losses due to emigration that the domestic human capital is
experiencing are significant and cannot be replenished at the expense of external
resources” (Vorobieva & Grebeniuk, 2016, p. 25). Only between 2002 and 2011,
93,000 Russians with degrees emigrated from the Russian Federation (Vorobieva
& Grebeniuk, 2016, p. 25). This process of washing out the most “educated,
proactive and motivated” citizens continues (Abramov, 2016). Also, according to
the 2017 ShanghaiRanking Academic Ranking of 500 world’s top universities,
Russia’s best university (Lomonosov Moscow State University) ranked 93
(ARWU, 2017). Its second best higher education establishment, Saint Petersburg
State University, found itself 400th (ARWU, 2017). Therefore, the absence of a
competitive industrial sphere and the non-competitiveness of the Russian economy
were not aided by government policy. Policies that isolate Russia from the world
community of nations are counter-productive. Over-reliance on natural resources
and military force are also misguided. Russia’s government and leadership have
been astute at capitalizing on traditional fears and mistrust of the other, strategies
that have long been employed in Russia to its own detriment.
In April 1985, Gorbachev began Perestroika with “uskoreniye,” which can be
translated into English as “acceleration.” The term refers to the initial stage of
Gorbachev’s reforms when the Soviet government was trying to expedite the social
and economic development of the country, thus acknowledging that the USSR had
been lagging behind the Western countries in that respect. The machine
manufacturing industry was supposed to play the central role in the process of
acceleration of the economic development, propelling a quick switch to totally new
technologies. The outcome of the attempt was illustrated by the examples cited
above. There is no quick fix and yet people are impatient. Russia’s leadership has
tended to opt for the expedient low hanging options over the hard work of human
resource development and partnership building. Twenty-five years of the
contemporary history of the Russian Federation reflects 25 years of accelerated deindustrialization. That is why the breakaway from the industrially developed
countries is growing with every passing year.

Consolidation without "soft power"
The practice of consolidating periphery around the imperial core at the expense of
redistribution of the natural resource rent is centuries-old. Let us consider the Soviet
period. In her book To Feed and to Govern: About Power in Russia in the 16th
through 20th Centuries, Tamara Kondratieva (2006) shows on numerous examples
how beginning with the Middle Ages, when Russian feudal lords would give their
noble servants lands “to feed” upon them, the concept of “feeding” emerged (p. 7).
“Governing” the lands was secondary. Thus, according to the Russian historian
Kluchevsky, in the Russian history the formation of power relationships happened
in this order: first came feeding, then governing (Kondratieva, 2006, p. 7).
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The tradition continued into the modern times when the new symbiotic
formation of the party-state became the only owner of the country’s riches and
distributor of the material benefits. The “owner” determined his monopoly power
at the individual level, in the first place, by means of distributing produce and
manufactured goods depending on the social status, labor significance, and political
orientation of citizens (Kondratieva, 2006). After the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the “feeding” practice transformed into purchasing the loyalty of the
periphery with the help of natural resources by the imperial core. If purchasing the
loyalty of its nearest neighbors was not feasible, Russia resorted to such pressuring
means as direct threats and military interventions. Russia has to employ either of
the options because it simply does not possess soft power, if one understands by it
“getting others to want what you want” by means of “cultural attraction, ideology,
and international institutions” (Nye, 1990, p. 167).
The diverse relations between Russia and its nearest neighbors are examples of
different degrees of success and failure of the feeding/purchasing practice. Russia,
for instance, was not able to hold the Baltic States in its sphere of influence by
means of the pre-dosed “feeding.” That is why the latter opted for NATO umbrella
to retain their independence. In the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, the refusal to
exchange one’s loyalty for “feeding” resulted in Russia exercising military power
to keep the former Soviet republics within its circle of influence.
The union state of Belarus and Russia may serve, however, as an example of
efficiency of “feeding.” Its history (founded on April 2, 1997) is first of all the
history of oil and gas trade “wars” whose essence boils down to the struggle of
political elites for the “fair” distribution of the resource rent. The last trade war,
unprecedented with respect to its duration, had started in the summer of 2016 and
ended only in April of 2017. The reason for noncompliance is self-explanatory. The
drop in the world prices for energy supply considerably decreased the subsidizing
abilities of the Russian budget. For Lukashenko, the head of the Belarusian state,
the present level of subsidies means the loss of social and political stability in the
country.
Although Russia is unable to recruit allies from its immediate circle with “soft
power,” it nevertheless aspires to “the world cultural expansion” (FSCP, 2015, p.
39). The official civilizational optimism recorded by FSCP finds neither
understanding nor support from the majority of liberal-minded Russians. They call
for reforming the state and its base institutions towards more inclusive, empowering
democratic institutions and market economy. For instance, here are the suggestions
of the politician and economist Yavlinsky (2017) that he enumerated in his article
on the outcomes of the latest Gaidar Forum:
•
•

changing the domestic and foreign policy, abolition of repressive
laws, emancipation of mass media, and fence-mending with the
nearest neighbors and the rest of the world;
emancipation and encouragement of entrepreneurial initiative;
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•

creation of favorable institutional environment for business that would
presuppose opportunities for business to legally and openly participate
in the political life of the country;
• provision of maximally competitive environment in all spheres; and
• forming of the so-called “development institutes” whose task would
be to encourage long-term investment, and using for this purpose the
largest part of the state’s rent income.
For Yavlinsky (2017), there is “overconcentration of power, [with] its nontransparency and irremovability, and the absence of political competition, checks
and balances.” All these obstacles turn the implementation of reforms into mission
impossible.
One may, however, argue about the efficiency of such obvious suggestions.
The overconcentration of the Russian power did not come from nowhere. As it was
rightly noted by the historian Vladimir Buldakov (2007), power in Russia is “a
derivative from the people’s ideas about it” (p. 22). The way it is formed is difficult
to grasp from the sociological point of view (Buldakov, 2007, p. 22). That is why
any attempts at reforming the Russian state by virtue of direct impact on power are
a priori doomed to failure.

Conclusion
On the one hand, in its domestic policy Russia puts a premium on the struggle for
retaining traditional values, which is an unmistakable sign of the loss of the
historical dynamics, i.e. change. Culture is not static. Russia’s foreign policy, on
the other hand, is anchored by control of its nearest neighbors. Having gone through
the disintegration of the empire, the former imperial nation suffers from the
wounded grandeur complex, which makes it an easy prey for politicians willing to
draw the people in dangerous foreign policy enterprises. Being unable to exert “soft
power” on the immediate neighbors, Russia compensates for it in two ways: by
either purchasing the loyalty of the regimes ready to sacrifice part of their
sovereignty in exchange for economic subsidies (Belarus, Armenia), or by the direct
military interference (Georgia, Ukraine).
The idea of a super power has indeed proved to be much-in-demand for the
masses. Therefore, one of the country’s prospects is the continuation of the selfisolation policy (de facto or chosen), coupled with hybrid wars. This policy,
however, limits Russia’s potential for development by stifling the ingenuity of
citizens’ entrepreneurial spirit. Although it may help prolong the life of an imagined
empire, in reality it does not contribute to Russia’s greatness. Another choice for
Russia could be the transformation into a liberal civilization, which will most
probably demand a change in civilizational identity, as well as the acceptance of
universal values such as respect for human rights and dignity, and so on. Time will
show whether Russia will choose innovation over tradition, or vice versa; and
whether it will attempt to join the “civilized world” yet again, or will continue to
lead a wretched existence on the historic sidelines.
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Russia and Its Neighbors:
A Geopolitical GIS-Mapping of the Ukrainian
Situation before the Current Conflict
Michele Pigliucci
Abstract
Within the context of a new Cold War between the Western powers and Russia,
one of the most dangerous hot spots is Ukraine. Since 2014, in fact, the Ukrainian
army has been engaged in a civil war against Russian-backed troops of selfproclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Republics. This crisis appears as a new
geopolitical tool both for Russia and for the United States: for the former, in
order to contain NATO expansion, for the latter, in order to counteract Russian
influence and to open the way for U.S. liquefied natural gas exports in Europe,
reducing European energy dependence on Russia (Chornii, 2015; Marples, 2016).
The Ukrainian position is strategic: it is one of the main transit routes of Russian
natural gas to European countries, with three main pipeline corridors. Knowledge
of Ukraine’s geographic situation is needed in order to better understand the
evolving crisis in the region.

Introduction
This article maps various data with a GIS tool, in order to point out social and
political factors underpinning the crisis. It highlights the deep differences between
Western and Eastern regions of the country in the following aspects: economic
differences, which will be described using macro-economic indicators in a regionalscaled map; demographic differences, which will be described through a regionalscaled map of population distribution by native language, in order to better highlight
the role of Russia’s influence in national identity; and political differences, which
will be shown by mapping the 2010 presidential election results (the last vote before
the crisis) in order to highlight the split among the Ukrainian people in the choice
between European or Russian spheres of influence. By combining various data, we
propose an “instability factor,” namely an index composed of the elements with
highest risk factor in the crisis. Through the “instability factor,” a regional-scaled
map will highlight the Ukrainian regions with the highest risk for an escalation of
the Donbas crisis (Kulyk, 2016).

The Ukrainian Crisis (2014 to present)
For the past three years, the NATO-backed Ukrainian army has faced a civil war
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against Russian-backed troops of the self-proclaimed People’s Republic of Donetsk
(RPD) and People’s Republic of Luhansk (RPL) (Nicolai, 2017). Overshadowed by
a more spectacular Syrian civil war, the Ukrainian war is almost ignored by
mainstream media, despite its importance and risk, especially for the European
Union (Gaiani, 2014; Sceresini & Giroffi, 2015).
The current crisis erupted during the winter 2013-14, when violent clashes
exploded in Kiev following Yanukovych’s decision to halt the country’s process of
integration with the European Union. The growing clashes forced Yanukovych to
leave the country (de Ploeg, 2017). Following his flight, a new government took
power whose first act was the proposal to repeal the bilingualism law that
recognized Russian as an official language of Ukraine (На Украине отменили
закон… 2014; White, Feklyunia, 2014). In this way, the “Euromaidan” forces
seemed to have the intention to exclude the Russian-speaking population, which
was interpreted as a hostile act against the part of Ukrainian people who speak
Russian as their first language (Dubin, 2017. cfr. Bocale, 2016).
During February 2014, armed people, pretending to be popular militia occupied
regional government buildings in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and replaced
the Ukrainian flag with the Russian one (Marxsen, 2014). On March 16, 2014,
following a controversial ballot, the Russian Federation intruded and annexed
Crimea. Russian-speaking rebels in the Eastern regions of Donec basin followed a
similar path. In May 2014, Regional Administration buildings were occupied and
self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic
(LPR) were established, following a referendum, while in Odessa, far-right
Ukrainian protesters occupied the Trade Unions house, setting the building on fire
and killing 46 pro-Russian people and injuring more than 200 (Hyde & Rudenko,
2014).
In May 2014, Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko faced off in a
presidential election, the latter won collecting 54.7% votes, but Crimea and Donec
basin population had not the chance to vote because of the crisis. One of the first
acts of the newly elected President Poroshenko was to sign again an association
agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, overriding the Yanukovych
decision.
On the 5th of February 2015, People’s Council members of the People’s
Republic of Donetsk issued a memorandum from which it is possible to find some
elements that enable a better understanding of the aims of the self-proclaimed state.
The document titled “Memorandum of Donetsk People's Republic on the principles
of state-building, political and historical continuity” reads, in part, as follows:
We, members of the People's Council of Donetsk People's Republic of
the first convocation, elected by universal democratic and free elections
on November 2, 2014, taking into account the principles of international
law, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, proclaim the
Memorandum on the principles of state-building, political and historical
continuity. Based on the will of the people of Donbass, expressed in the
referendum of May 11, 2014, in the Act of the proclamation of state
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independence of Donetsk People's Republic, the Declaration of
Sovereignty of the Donetsk People's Republic from April 7, 2014,
understanding of the need for the progressive development of law-making
and state-building process, we affirm the historical connection of the state
formations of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic and Donetsk People's
Republic (…).
We, members of the People's Council of Donetsk People's Republic,
recognizing our responsibility to the past and paving the way to the future:
- declare the continuation of the traditions of Donetsk-Krivoy Rog
Republic and declare that the state of Donetsk People's Republic is its
successor;
- call for cooperation and uniting efforts to build a federal state on a
voluntary contractual bases of all the territories and lands, that were part
of Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic. (Donetsk Republic Memorandum…,
2015).
Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic (DKR) was a Republic founded in February 1918
by the IV Congress of Soviets of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog basin, following the
Russian Revolution (Донецко-Криворожская советская республика… 19691978). The Republic comprised of the territories of Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk,
Kherson, Odessa, Nikolaev, Crimea, and Don Host oblast (область). According to
DPR and LPR memorandum, Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic never formally ceased
to exist, despite the German occupation, war, and other social disasters, and “its
ideas lived on in the hearts and souls of millions of people” (Donetsk Republic
Memorandum…, 2015).
By solemnly affirming the historical continuity of DPR with the Soviet
Republic of Donetsk-Krivoy Rog, a state created in February 1918 in order to
integrate Donec e Krivoy Rog river basins, representatives of self-proclaimed
Donbas Republics confirmed their wishes to extend control over the entire territory
of the former Soviet Republic. A similar press release, published on 6th of April
2015 on a Russian website, claimed the reconstitution of Odessa Soviet Republic,
a state proclaimed in 1918, then occupied by Germany until the end of the war.
Such press releases had no concrete results but are useful to understand pro-Russian
projects in the Ukrainian civil war.
This article aims at analyzing geographical elements of Ukraine’s territory, in
order to provide evidence related to the geopolitical situation of the country,
studying critical elements and foreseeing potential consequences. The point is to
highlight geographical elements useful to predict potential spread of conflict in
other regions of the country.
Since “geography matters” (Massey & Allen, 1984), knowledge of
territory is needed for every geopolitical analysis, in order to counteract the socalled “geographic banalization,” namely the loss of geographical knowledge due
to popularly available information tools (Borruso, 2010, p. 243). Without
geographical knowledge, it is impossible to understand geopolitical issues (Battisti,
2002). Geopolitics is the “dynamic stage” of political geography (Massi, 1931), and

87

Michele Pigliucci

requires deep analysis of mapping (Boria, 2007; Boria, 2008) varied complex
factors within and across territories, in order to understand the relationships among
economic, social, and political data.

Ukraine and the Energy Market
Ukraine is a key territory both for the European Union and for Russia. Due to its
geographical position, Ukraine is a transition area for natural gas supply coming
from Russia towards Europe (Semenenko, 2015). European import of
hydrocarbons from Russia represents 39.3% of the total for natural gas, 33.5% for
oil, as well as 6% of total European energy consumption (Eurostat, data, 2013).
The European Union is the main export market for Russian natural gas, with an
export of 161.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) (Gazprom, export data, 2013). The
whole hydrocarbons market is 15% of the Russian Federation’s GDP (World
Bank Group, data, 2013).

Figure 1. Ukraine Territory, with main cities and Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO)
Zone. Source: created by author.
The European Union, mainly pushed by former Warsaw Pact states, has, for
many years, tried to reduce energy dependence from Russia and to break free from
the supply control that serves as a Russian pressure tool on European national
governments.1 The strategy of Gazprom, a Russian state-controlled company for
natural gas mining and distribution, is the use of prices as a control tool on former
1

Mainly Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
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Warsaw Pact states. This strategy became evident during the crisis between Russia
and Ukraine, in the winter 2008-09, when Gazprom used natural gas supply (as well
as threats to block it) to stop the leaning of Ukraine towards the European Union
and NATO (Kandiyoti, 2015).
During the winter 2013-14, when the current crisis started, price policy was
openly used to sustain or to counteract policies of the Ukrainian government. In
November 2013, after Yanukovych stopped the process of association and free trade
with the European Union, Gazprom implemented a radical cut of hydrocarbons
prices to Ukraine. In the same way, in February 2014, after Yanukovych escaped
from the country, Gazprom punished the “Euromaidan” coup d’état by raising
prices by 81%. 2
A dense pipeline network (Figure 2) shows how all the natural gas and oil
exported from Russia to Europe passes through two hubs: Ukraine and the Baltic
Sea. The Nord Stream Pipeline runs through the Baltic bypassing Poland to reach
Germany. The Belarus branch of pipeline passes through Ukrainian territory before
reaching Europe, thus dependent on the relationship between Kiev and Moscow.
Market access for the main Russian state-company depends on stability and
capacity of these two hubs.
Instability in Ukraine has pushed Russia to try to open new paths for pipelines
with three main projects. These are: (a) Nord Stream 2 project against which former
Warsaw Pact countries are protesting and that would expand pipeline capacity from
33 bcm to 55 bcm; (b) South Stream projected pipeline that would bypass Ukraine
from the south passing through the Black Sea with a 63 bcm flow (hindered by
European Union); and (c) Turkish Stream pipeline that would pass through Turkey
and whose completion closely depends on many factors such as the Syrian crisis,
instability of Turkish regime, and difficult relations between Ankara and the
European Union (Paolini, 2014). The issue of building a new pipeline bypassing
Ukraine involves many European countries, like the former Warsaw Pact states,
which are trying to halt new pipeline projects from Russia in order to avoid Moscow
cutting off the Kiev gas market. Western countries are also trying to take advantage
of every opportunity to improve their national energy security.
A real arm wrestling match took place in the European Union among Italy
(pushing for the building of South Stream, in which Italian State-company ENI is
involved), Germany (aiming to reach the goal of doubling Nord Stream Pipeline),
and Greece (interested in the Turkish Stream project). In the middle, former
Warsaw Pact European countries, led by Poland, pushed the European Union to
enforce anti-trust rules against every new Gazprom project (De Maio, 2016a). In
February 2015, the European Commission approved an Energy Union Strategy,
following pressure from some Eastern-European countries, a project aimed at
finding a long-term strategy to “free” European Union from Russian dependence.
Until now, the result of this competition was the halting of the South Stream project,
2

The issue of Ukraine purchase of Russian gas has its roots in 1991. Being in Russian sphere
of influence, Ukraine have paid below-market prices until the 2014 crisis. Still today, buying
Russian gas for Ukraine is quite a bit cheaper than many other energy sources. During 2009
gas crisis, Gazprom accused Ukraine government of stealing gas from transit supplies.
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while North Stream 2 and Turkish Stream still remain on the table.

Figure 2. European pipeline network. Source: International Energy Agency, 2014.
In some sense, persistent opposition coming from the European Union to any
new pipeline project–and in particular from former Warsaw Pact states, wishful to
preserve the strategic centrality of Kiev–prevents any reduction of energy traffic
concentration in the Belarus-Ukrainian region. Since any loosening of European
dependence from Russian gas looks a long way off, Ukraine remains the main
traffic hub, as well as a geopolitical tension hub. The United States and Eastern
European countries are trying to pull Ukraine to the European side where the entry
of Ukraine into the European Union would extend the European rules on energy
and open the road to liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the United States,
hence loosening the ties through which Europe remains linked to Russia. When
visiting European countries in March 2014, President Obama aimed to propose the
United States as an alternative supplier for European energy needs, in order to “free”
Europe from dependence on Russia (European leaders ask…, 2014). This is the only
concrete project aimed to weaken European energy dependence on Russia, but it is
still far from realization (cfr. Youngs, 2009).
On the other side, Russia is trying to keep Kiev in its sphere of influence in
order to maintain control of a large part of gas and oil trade with Europe, especially
since Europe is trying to halt the pipeline projects coming from Russia that bypass
Ukraine. In the meantime, the Ukrainian war is seriously affecting the gas trade,
harming Ukraine’s economy, stressed by a fast-growing public debt. According to
President Poroshenko’s speech in the U.N. assembly (September 2015), the total
amount of war costs for Ukraine is close to $5 million per day. Not just Kiev but
also Moscow is affected by these significant losses. Gazprom energy exports are
often halted due to sanctions imposed by the United States and allies following
Crimea’s occupation. However, Ukraine’s civil war is not just related to energy.
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There are other geographic, political, economic, and linguistic reasons that need to
be understood and taken into account. Territory is never a neutral factor in such a
geopolitical crisis and it is impossible to understand the Ukrainian situation without
knowing more about its territorial background. For this reason, we need to focus the
analysis at the regional scale, in order to give place-based evidence to a complex
situation.

The Ukrainian Situation before the 2014 Crisis
Ukrainian war mainly concentrate within the territory of the Donec basin, straddling
Donetsk and Luhansk oblast, a territory now partly controlled by the selfproclaimed RPD and RPL. The Ukrainian government does not recognize neither
the republics nor the de facto annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. Kiev
calls these territories Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone. The zone encompasses
around 7.5% of national territory (Crimea included), i.e., around 45,000 km 2 on an
over 600,000 km2 national area (Figure 1).
Ukrainian territory is composed of 24 oblast – an administrative regional level
corresponding to NUTS 2 level 3 – two cities with special status (Kiev and
Sevastopol) and the autonomous Republic of Crimea. 4 By analyzing census 2001
data, the last available before the crisis, it is possible to observe that the economic
reality of various oblast is deeply unequal. 5 There are many differences amongst
regions. The first indicator chosen in this research is the regional GDP per capita.
By mapping this, it is possible to see that regional GDP per capita of Eastern oblast
is up to three time larger than Western ones, with 13,228 hryvnias produced in
Chernivtsi against 42,068 hryvnias in Dnipropetrovsk (Figure 3). 6 Eastern oblast
have an industrial infrastructure specialized in iron metallurgy and coal mining.

3

The nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, abbreviated NUTS (from the French
version Nomenclature des Unités territoriales statistiques) is a geographical nomenclature
that subdivide the territory of European Union at three different levels (NUTS 1, 2, and 3,
from larger to smaller).
4 For a better readability, in the maps realized for this paper, the Kiev data were merged to
the Kiev oblast data, while Sevastopol data were merged to Autonomous Republic of Crimea
data.
5 Except where differently specified, all the data of this analysis are referred to 2001 census.
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/. The aim is to highlight situation of the country before crisis.
6 U.S. dollar to Ukrainian hryvnia rate is 1=26.9400 (March 2017). 13.228 hryvnias is
equivalent to around $491, while 42.068 hryvnias is equivalent to around 1.561€. State
Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2011.
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Figure 3. Regional GDP per capita in hryvnias, 2011. Source: Created by author
based on State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2011.
Economic differences among regions are really deep, and they are reflected on
average wages: people living in Eastern countries earn on average $100-120 more
than Western countries. The gap between Donetsk oblast and Ternopol oblast reach
$164 average, showing a situation of dependence of poor regions on richest ones,
whose economy is based mainly on mines and natural resources.
There are also many other differences in population distribution in the oblast.
According to census questions related to mother tongue, a very significant share of
the population uses Russian language, and not Ukrainian in the home. It is helpful
to plot this data in a regional map (Figure 5) in order to better understand the
distribution of this population. The Russian-speaking people are mainly located in
Eastern oblast and in a coastal strip from Black Sea to Odessa (where it exceeds
40% of total population), while the Ukrainian-speaking population is mainly
distributed in the Western and central regions. In addition, urban population
distribution is unequal, with a distribution similar to that of mother tongue: of nine
total cities with more than 500,000 people, seven are in the Eastern side, while in
Western oblast there are just Kiev and L’viv. Therefore, by looking at the maps, we
can evaluate deep differences–economic, social, demographic–between the Eastern
and Western Ukrainian regions. The Eastern oblast are on average much richer,
more urbanized, and with higher percentage of Russian-speaking population than
the Western ones (Corsale, 2016).
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Figure 4. Salaries per region in USD, 2013. Source: (И все развалилось… 2014)
Another major difference is related to political beliefs and ideology. The last
Ukrainian presidential elections before the crisis were held in two rounds in 2010:
the first round on 17th January, and the second round on 7th February. Eighteen
candidates competed, but the biggest competition was between Russian-backed
Viktor Yanukovych and UE-backed Yulia Tymošenko, the representative of
Orange Revolution movement, which led to the government of Viktor Juščenko in
2005.
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Figure 5. Russian-speaking people in percentage, 2001. Source: Created by author based on
Census data, 2001.

Figure 6. Percentage votes for Yanukovych, first round presidential election, 17th January
2010. Source: Created by author based on election results, 2010.
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By analyzing the results of this election before the crisis, it is possible to better
understand the political differences within the Ukrainian population. In fact, this
data shows the power of two influential spheres, a Russian one and European one,
on a population deeply divided. During the last few years, debating policies of
European Union integration represented one of the main reasons for political
discord between supporters of a Ukraine closer to Europe, and defenders of the
traditional position of the country, as a Russia strategic ally since the falling of the
Berlin wall. Through territorialization of electoral data from these first and second
rounds, it is possible to determine the distribution of supporters of the two factions,
and then compare the results with socioeconomic and demographic elements.
The economic and linguistic data we observed between Western and Eastern
oblast is mostly reflected in electoral results. Russian-backed Yanukovych became
president thanks to votes collected in the Eastern Russian-speaking oblast. Despite
the high number of candidates in some Eastern oblast, Yanukovych collected more
than 50% of votes already in the first round, exceeding 70% in Donetsk and
Luhansk, and 60% in Crimea (Figure 6). The same pattern for Yulia Tymošenko,
whose votes were collected for the most part in Western and Northern oblast,
exceeding 50% in Volyn oblast (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Percentage votes for Tymošenko, first round presidential election, 17th
January 2010. Source: Created by author based on election results, 2010.
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During the second round, this difference became more evident: Yanukovych, the
pro-Russian candidate (winning with a difference slightly lower than 900,000
votes), dominated in all the Eastern regions, while his rival exceeded half of all
votes in all Western regions (Figure 8). It is possible to read the vote for
Yanukovych as a vote for a Russian sphere of influence: following the 2004 Orange
Revolution, the issue of pursuing pro-European or pro-Russian policies strongly
influenced the 2010 election campaign, representing the real dividing line amongst
candidates.

Figure 8. Distribution of votes for second round candidates, presidential elections,
February 7, 2010. Source: Created by author based on election results, 2010.
Votes for Yanukovych mainly came from Russian-speaking population, while
competitor votes came from the Ukrainian-speaking population. In this case, on a
quick analysis, the results would appear to be based on ethnicity, or on a linguisticbased preference reflected in political results. Nevertheless, by comparing the
presidential election results with the Russian-speaking population data, it is possible
to discover a different situation: only in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya
regions did votes for Yanukovych almost perfectly overlap with Russian-speaking
data, while within the other oblast this is not the case. In Crimea, the future president
collected a percentage of votes 15% lower than the Russian-speaking population
percentage; within Kiev region, this difference was 10%, while in other oblast
Yanukovych votes far outnumbered the Russian-speaking population (+22% in
Mykolayiv, +25% in Kirovohrad, even +27% in Western Transcarpathia, on the
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border with Moldavia). Yanukovych was elected because of this perhaps
unexpected support. This is a sign of the penetration power of Russian influence in
Ukrainian-speaking population, and of the general complexity of this political
situation (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Percentage difference between Yanukovych votes and Russian-speaking
population. Source: Created by author based on Ukraine Census data (2001) and
election results, 2010.

The Instability Factor
Through cartographic place evidence, it is possible to highlight some aspects
of Ukrainian regional situation before the “Euromaidan” crisis. Maps show a
complex situation, with deep social, economic, and linguistic differences. The
portrayal of Ukraine as a country with a Europhile population forced under the
energetic geopolitical pressure of Russia does not fully describe the greater
geographical complexity of the region. Through a set of data indicators, it is
possible to highlight some factors of greater influence on this crisis, and useful to
understand possible future scenarios.
Starting from analyzed territorial data, it is possible to generate a synthetic
index called the “instability factor,” which aims to summarize the major indicators
that lead and sustain the current political crisis: linguistic composition of
population; Russian-speaking population distribution; Russian political influence
(counted by percentage of Yanukovych votes in the presidential elections); and
economic disparity, counted by regional GDP per capita, which often accompanies
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political tensions.
The formula for this index is the mathematical sum of the selected indicators,
expressed in percentage: the Russian-speaking population according to 2001
census; the result of Yanukovych votes in the last presidential election before the
crisis (2010); and the regional share of GDP per capita (2011). The author decided
not to weight differently these indicators in this analysis considering them a simple
vector of loss of stability in the field of this geopolitical context. Please find the
composite scores listed alphabetically below by oblast from a scale of (64) to (281).
Table 1: Instability Factor by Oblast in the Region
Oblast name
Instability Factor
Autonomous Republic of Crimea
208
Cherkasy Oblast
98
Chernihiv Oblast
98
Chernivtsi Oblast
71
Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast
221
Donetsk Oblast
279
Ivano-Frankivs’k Oblast
75
Kharkiv Oblast
193
Kherson Oblast
281
Khmel’nyts’kyy Oblast
80
Kiev Oblast
255
Kirovohrad Oblast
107
Luhansk Oblast
228
L’viv Oblast
81
Mykolayiv Oblast
163
Odessa Oblast
183
Poltava Oblast
158
Rivne Oblast
74
Sumy Oblast
104
Ternopil’ Oblast
64
Transcarpathia Oblast
83
Vinnytsya Oblast
82
Volyn Oblast
72
Zaporizhzhya Oblast
196
Zhytomyr Oblast
91
Source: Created by author based on Ukraine Census data (2001), State Statistics
Service of Ukraine ,2001 and election results, 2010.
The data are collected from the Election results, 2001 State Census, and State
Statistics Service of Ukraine, before the deep changes brought by the current crisis,
and aims to give evidence to territorial elements on a regional basis. Through this
tool it is possible to understand which territories presented significant critical
elements before the war and consequently which territories are permeable to an
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eventual spread of conflict. The higher factor means a greater risk for the region to
be affected by an eventual spread of the crisis due to the presence of these main
elements at the outset of the current war.

Figure 10. Instability factor. Source: Created by author based on Ukraine Census
data (2001), State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2011 and election results, 2010.
A regional map of this factor allows us to understand how deep are the
differences in Ukrainian regions; furthermore, through the instability factor, it is
possible to foresee the potential spread of the current crisis particularly to
Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson oblast where the index exceeds 200, reaching the
same level as Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea regions (Figure 10).

Conclusion
The instability factor is useful to understand the major factors on which the
Ukrainian crisis and civil war are based, and their diffusion in the region. The goal
of this research is to identify trends that help to understand, examine, and foresee
the eventual evolution of crisis. This index highlights how risk zone interests
encompass all Eastern regions and the whole coastal strip of the Black Sea from
Mariupol to Odessa region.
This analysis shows that in case of the spread of civil war, these oblast would
be more permeable to secessionist pro-Russian agenda with the aim to connect
Russia to the Odessa region. Such an eventual de facto annexation of the coastal
strip–similar to what happened in Donbas–would cut off Kiev from the Black Sea,
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letting rebels to link with Republic of Moldova. In Moldova, a strong pro-Russian
movement is pushing the country to strengthen ties with Moscow. In the end of
2016, Igor Dodon, a pro-Russian leader, won the presidential elections in Moldova.
His first act as a new president was to remove the European flag from the
presidential building. In this context, the target of a self-proclaimed Republic to be
recognized as a renewed historical Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic, as written in the
statement published in 2015, indicate a new purpose: to promote the ties between
Russia and Europe, cutting off Ukraine from its current position as an energy hub.
In the case of a coastal alliance between Russia and Moldova, Gazprom’s new
pipeline would easily reach Europe bypassing Ukraine and diminishing its central
role in the European energy supply. However, access to the pipeline is crucial for
maintaining the entire Ukrainian economic system, its loss having catastrophic
consequences for Ukraine (Fasola, 2016).
The geopolitical situation of Ukraine is quite different from the previous Cold
War confrontations (cfr. Wilson, 2016). In this case, the likely direct involvement
of Russian soldiers in fighting, as well as the not-so-secret involvement of U.S.
intelligence forces in backing Ukrainian Army against DPR and LPR forces, appear
as evidence for increased possibility of direct conflict 7. The energy issue is an
economic tool used to strengthen or weaken the ties between former Soviet
Republics–like Ukraine–and Europe or Russia. The main issue for the United States
is a kind of a new “Reagan Doctrine”: according to this, the United States is directly
involved in regime change actions in the key-countries for Russian economy, such
as Ukraine (Szporluk, 2000). Destabilization of pro-Russian regimes and support to
anti-Russian movements are crucial actions that are part of strategy in counteracting
Russia’s attempts to expand influence (cfr. Khrushcheva, Maltby, 2015). 8
Similarly, the main issue for Russia is to keep Ukraine out from Euro-U.S.
influence, in order to avoid NATO to reach its borders. For Moscow, selling natural
gas is the best way to keep countries tied to Russian influence, taking advantage of
their growing energy needs. In this sense, Ukraine’s key position in the pipeline
network is the main reason for Russia to keep control on Kiev. The Russian
economy depends on energy sales to Europe, and Moscow can’t risk being cut off
from Europe by an anti-Russian regime, at least until new pipelines are built.
It is really hard to foresee how this conflict will be solved. Since 2014, Russianbacked forces are fighting against regular and irregular Ukrainian troops, in an
exhausting and bloody war. 9 Through the analysis of this article, what is possible to
7

Proof of the direct involvement of Russian soldiers are in the events of capture of some of
them by Ukrainian authorities on battleground. (Captured Russian troops… 2014; cfr. Harris,
Dreazen, 2014)
8 The direct involvement of the U.S. government in Ukraine crisis is proved by several
sources. The idea of a new “Reagan Doctrine” is a reading of author, based on these
sources. (Интересы РФ и США…2014: interview of George Friedman, CEO of Stratfor,
calling the overthrow of Yanukovych the “most blatant coup in history”); (Kaylan, 2014;
Ukraine crisis… 2014: transcription of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call); Milne S., 2014.
9 According to VoaNews, United Nations estimates around 10,000 people have been killed
and around 23,500 injured since 2014 to July 2017. (OHCHR: Deaths… 2017).

Journal of Global Initiatives

100

forecast is the possibility of a macro regional spread of the violence, and the
potential involvement of certain regions in the operation, due to high levels of the
instability factor. However, the instability factor could also be used to develop
targeted policies in order to prevent this spread by intervening on economic, social,
and cultural elements. For example, establishing policies that provide greater
autonomy to Russian-speaking regions and develop proper laws for the protection
and adequate representation of minorities, while also introducing measures to
reduce economic disparities including autonomous energy policies for Ukraine with
regards to both the European Union and Russia, could effectively mitigate against
the spread of the crisis. In conclusion, geography matters, in Ukraine such as
everywhere: the deeper the knowledge of the real situation of a country, through
territorialized regional-scaled data, the deeper will be the understanding of real
differences in territories and related problems, and the stronger will be the
preventive action of national and international policy and decision makers.
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Putin’s “Eastern Pivot”:
Divergent Ambitions between Russia and
China? Evidence from the Arctic
Thomas E. Rotnem and Kristina V. Minkova
Abstract
Focusing upon the warming Sino-Russian relationship in general, this paper also
examines in particular both countries interests in the Arctic region. The paper
begins with a brief overview of the developing Sino-Russian relationship since the
late 1980s. After discussing the blossoming of friendlier ties during the Putin-Xi
era, it reviews some of the arguments and assumptions that scholars have held
predicting either an ever closer relationship or an eventual rupture in those
relations. The paper then analyzes both countries’ interests in the Arctic realm,
using this case study as evidence supporting the view that the Sino-Russian
relationship–despite its many difficulties–has been effectively managed in this
arena for mutual benefit. As well, although it was not intended to be so, the
sanctions regime imposed by America and her European allies has been a key
driver in the closer Arctic relationship, in specific, and Sino-Russian relations, in
general.

The Russo-Chinese Relationship in Recent History
Since the earliest interactions between Russians and Manchus in the 1650s to the
summits between Russia’s post-communist leadership and China’s powerful
communist brokers in the early years of the third millennium, borders, trade, and
broader geopolitical strategic considerations have played a crucial part in the two
great powers’ relationship. From the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) to the Treaty on
Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation (2001), the relationship
between the two countries has either broken down or blossomed on these issues; at
the same time, during each successive era, historical experiences have played an
important role in shaping each party’s strategic behavior (Rotnem, 2014). In the
early 1980s, with the U.S.S.R. mired in the deepening Afghan struggle and Deng
Xiaoping’s domestic reforms having borne fruit, the senior leadership in Beijing
signaled a willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relations. In 1982, Beijing asserted
that a more independent foreign policy would henceforth be followed, perhaps
because the new Reagan administration indicated a more pugnacious U.S. foreign
policy was in the offing or possibly because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
wished to re-balance their relationship vis-à-vis Washington by repairing relations
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with Moscow. Whatever the rationale, the two former rivals began to consult
regularly on a variety of items of mutual concern, including issues of scientific and
technological exchanges, security, and trade. With Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s
assumption of power in early 1985, further stimulus was given to the improving
relationship.
“Novye Myshlenie” or “new thinking” was the rhetorical, pragmatic
cornerstone of Gorbachev’s foreign policy. Requiring a breathing space from the
Cold War confrontation between East and West, the new General Secretary of the
Soviet Communist Party devoted his energies to the domestic front, in order to reshape, re-balance, and transform the ailing command administrative economy.
While Gorbachev eventually made significant compromises with Reagan over arms
control and Soviet conventional forces in Europe, the General Secretary also made
important concessions to the Chinese, such as ending the conflict in Afghanistan,
reducing Russian troop commitments in Mongolia, and putting pressure on its
Vietnamese allies to end their occupation of Cambodia.
As a result, the first Sino-Russian summit in over 30 years was held.
Gorbachev’s meetings with Deng in early 1989 signaled the normalization of
governmental relations, as well as the renewal of ties between the “brotherly”
communist parties of both states. Though little else grew out of this meeting–in
large measure due to the ongoing and incipient democracy protests in Beijing that
spring–nevertheless, these meetings were an important first rung on the ladder
toward a more pragmatic, stable relationship, one in which both parties begged off
interfering in one another’s domestic affairs and participating in ideological
contestation, while also putting aside the potential for a renewed military alliance.
In 1990, both parties agreed to reduce their military deployments and
armaments along their lengthy border. In addition, military contacts were reestablished, as reciprocal missions visited one another’s capital. Thereafter,
Moscow began its first of many sales of military equipment to the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), with an agreement signed that fall to offer the Chinese transport
helicopters. Indeed, by the end of the Gorbachev era, trade in non-military goods
had also increased, from $380 million in 1985 to over $6 billion in 1991 (Menon,
2009, p. 11).
The warming trend continued under President Boris N. Yeltsin’s leadership of
the now democratic, post-communist Russia. Within months, Yeltsin made a state
visit to China’s capital city, laying the initial groundwork for the eventual
announcement in September 1994 that a “constructive partnership” had been
established between Russia and China. Economic trade continued to surpass the $6
billion mark annually into the mid- and late-1990s, with raw materials and energy
products heading the list of Russian exports to China, and consumer goods topping
China’s exports to Russia (Goldstein, 2001, p. 850). In addition, Yeltsin’s visit to
Beijing concluded with a partial resolution of ongoing border problems; a 1992
agreement signed between Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin delimited roughly 4,200
kilometers along the eastern Sino-Russian border. This agreement was followed by
increased sales of arms to China, with over $2 billion in deals struck yearly between

Journal of Global Initiatives

106

1992 and 1994 (Menon, 2009, pp. 10-12). Within several more years, Russia would
become China’s largest supplier of munitions and military equipment.
By 1996, both Russia and China began to realize their common interests in
challenging the Ameri-centric, unipolar world order, with the potential expansion
of NATO and the strengthened U.S.-Japanese relationship as partial motivating
drivers. As a result, their “constructive partnership” soon blossomed into something
more, i.e., the “strategic cooperative partnership.” Announced at the third SinoRussian summit meeting in April 1996, the new relationship heralded a series of
agreements signed between the two powers. One of these effectively settled almost
all remaining border issues, leaving a mere 400 kilometers still in dispute
(Ferdinand, 2007, p. 850). Another critical result of the thawing trend was the
Shanghai Agreement, a security-oriented arrangement that included not only China
and Russia, but also the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. The “Shanghai Five” met throughout the late 1990s to deal with
various security items, including extremism, separatism, and terrorism, issues about
which Moscow and Beijing surely held a shared interest (Tang, 2000, p. 371).
Ultimately, this organization developed into the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, adding Uzbekistan to the original membership, while broadening the
agenda to include economic cooperation. A major unstated goal of the organization
was to frustrate U.S. foreign and defense policy in Central Asia.

Strengthened Ties during the Putin Era
Sino-Russian relations continued to improve under Vladimir V. Putin’s tenure. The
two powers increasingly saw eye-to-eye on border and trade issues, as well as a
number of other strategic concerns, e.g., human rights, treatment of ethnic
minorities, as well as, perhaps most importantly, the U.S.’s role in the world.
In July 2001, Putin and Jiang Zemin signed the “Treaty of Good Neighbourly,
Cooperative and Friendly Relations.” The treaty established a variety of cultural
and scientific exchanges, as well as opportunities for greater economic cooperation.
The new treaty also included articles on security issues, among which were growing
military-to-military weapons transfers, including a billion dollar contract to supply
China with attack aircraft and a 15-year Military Cooperation Plan (Rangsimaporn,
2006, pp. 478-479). Since then, the two powers’ militaries have increasingly held
more frequent joint land and/or naval exercises, most recently in the Joint Sea 2017
maneuvers in the Baltic Sea (Bhadrakumar, 2017).
Outstanding border problems between the two countries were resolved in the
“2004 Complementary Agreement,” with the remaining disputes regarding three
islands in the Amur River dealt with amicably. Russia transferred the Tarabarov
Island and portions of two others to China, and in return Beijing dropped remaining
claims over other Russian-administered territories along their shared border. Both
countries’ parliaments ratified the treaty and the official ceremony on transfer was
later held in October 2008.
In terms of trade, the relationship continued to bear fruit. Bilateral trade
increased more than tenfold since the high-water mark of the late Yeltsin era,
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reaching $88.8 billion in 2013. To be sure, much of Russia’s exports to China
continue to be centered upon primary products, e.g., oil products, timber, ferrous
and non-ferrous metallurgy, etc. At the same time, arms exports remain a sizeable
portion of overall trade. The trade volume is set to rise much higher, though, in the
aftermath of historic gas export agreements inked between Putin and Xi Jinping in
Beijing in May and November 2014. The May agreement guaranteed Russian
annual deliveries of at least 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China, via the
“eastern route,” beginning in 2018 (“Russia-China to Sign,” 2014). In reality, with
China’s desire to replace aging, polluting coal-burning plants with cleaner-burning,
gas-powered generation in the near term, the size of Russian gas deliveries will
undoubtedly exceed the contract specifications. And, according to President Putin’s
statement on the May 2014 agreement, the level of bilateral trade was to exceed
$100 billion in the year, with a doubling of that figure within five years
(MacFarquhar & Herszenhorn, 2014.). The November agreement, signed during the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in Beijing and adding
an additional 30 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to China’s markets by 2019,
virtually guarantees that (Panin, 2014b).

A Confluence of Interests and a Marriage of Convenience …
Besides improving prospects for trade and the resolution of border issues, what has
spurred the very real warming as of late in the Sino-Russian relationship? To be
sure, there are a variety of strategic reasons for the marked improvement, the
Ukrainian crisis (and the sanctions regime) being only the most recent.
For one, both China and Russia are engaged in a battle with terrorist groups on
their peripheries. Although Ramzan Kadyrov’s oppressive dictatorship in Chechnya
has kept Islamists in the tiny republic on their heels, the terrorist presence in the
North Caucasus has by no means been extinguished, now and again creating
opportunities for striking even within Russia proper. As well, China is confronted
with its own Muslim separatist movement in Xinjiang, with numerous recent bloody
incidents proving that the threat has not been managed very well by central
authorities in Beijing. Indeed, one of the main rationales behind the formation of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was to create a region-wide organization
that could deal with international terrorism in the Eurasian region, writ large, in
addition to Central Asia, as both countries also fear the influence of terrorist forces
emanating from the five former Soviet republics in that realm.
The two countries have also been chafing at attempted (either alleged or
perceived) U.S. “imperial” undertakings, particularly in the Middle East during the
last decade. Russia sees its former client state regimes in Iraq, Libya, and Syria all
having been affected adversely by U.S. foreign policy moves. Although Moscow
was not wholly opposed to the U.S. invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein in
2003, U.S. and European allies’ actions in Libya (acting ostensibly under a UN
humanitarian mandate) that ended in regime transformation caused the
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Medvedev/Putin tandem to feel betrayed. 1 It can be argued that because of the
Libyan action, the situation in Syria today is so bloody and a resolution so far
removed. Similarly, “responsibility-to-protect-type” (R2P) proclamations from the
U.S. administration worries China, which deems any U.S.-supported human rights
actions as an unwelcome harbinger of potential outside interference in Beijing’s
internal affairs.
Closer to home, both Moscow and Beijing fear U.S. actions undermine these
regimes’ domestic stability, as well as generate a more threatening international
security environment. Russia believes that various “color revolutions” in its “near
abroad” over the last decade have been influenced, if not directly inspired, by
successive U.S. administrations, including the latest provocation in Ukraine in
November 2013-February 2014; their goal, according to the Kremlin, is to
undermine Russia’s leverage over these former states of the Soviet Union, if not to
challenge Putin’s right to rule in Russia, itself. 2 By the same token, attempts to
expand NATO or the European Union eastward send similar alarm bells ringing in
the towers of the Kremlin.
For its part, China views America’s “pivot to Asia”–along with concomitant
pledges of security assistance to its East Asian allies and recent U.S. basing
agreements with the governments of Australia and The Philippines–as measures
that reduce China’s freedom of strategic maneuver and ultimately reduce its ability
to become a regional hegemon. As well, China fears the ability of the U.S. Navy to
cut off its avenues of consumer exports, but especially impair its ability to import
fossil fuels, thereby threatening its all-important economic potential–a potential that
keeps the Chinese government firmly ensconced in power. This fear has also
encouraged a deepening in the Sino-Russian relationship, as China invests heavily
in oil and gas imports from Russia, along with pipeline infrastructure that would
not necessarily be imperiled by U.S. naval re-deployments in the region. Most
recently, President Putin allowed China to join Vankor, a huge oil production field
in Eastern Siberia (Chazan, 2014). It is for the same reason–access to new sources
of fossil fuels–that China has signed deals with Russia to jointly explore for oil and
gas deposits in the deep Arctic waters in Russia’s Kara Sea (Jakobson, 2013;
Mitchell, 2013.).
As well, the two have recently entered into agreements to reduce U.S. (and
Western) hegemony in the financial and trade arenas. At the sixth BRICS summit
in July 2014, Russia and China, along with India, Brazil, and South Africa, signed
agreements to create the BRICS Pool of Conventional Currency Reserves and the
New Development Bank. Meant to counterbalance the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, the new financial structures will provide $100 billion
for initiating a joint response to financial challenges and provide $50 billion in
capital for priority long-term projects in the member countries, respectively
1

Much the same could be said regarding Nato-led actions in Serbia that eventually created
an independent Kosovo.
2 For example, the Kremlin views the demonstrations following parliamentary elections in
December 2011 as having been linked in some way to “foreign influences.”
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(Alexandrova, 2014). Moreover, Xi and Putin announced the creation of a $10
billion Russian-Chinese development fund at a recent meeting (“Russia and China,”
2017). In addition, China and Russia have set up ruble-yuan currency swaps on
certain trade deals in an effort to bypass reliance on the U.S. dollar. (Indeed, China
has inked numerous deals with other large trading partners, e.g., Brazil and India,
which similarly push the greenback to the side.) Should China and Russia decide to
drop dollar-denominated energy prices entirely in their relationship, this could
undermine the U.S. dollar reserve currency status. The two are also attempting to
slowly reduce the size of their U.S. denominated debt (Halligan, 2014). And,
President Putin announced recently that Russia, alongside presumably China and
other countries, is developing its own indigenous bank clearinghouse system,
thereby replacing its reliance on the U.S.’s SWIFT clearinghouse system
(“President Putin Pledges,” 2014). Besides these financial undertakings, Russia and
China are also attempting to challenge U.S. control over transoceanic shipping and
trade by constructing the Interoceanic Grand Canal through Nicaragua, creating an
alternative to the U.S.-supported Panama Canal (Paniev, 2014.)

… Or, an Embryonic Alliance in the Making?
All of these events have caused some to wonder whether or not China and Russia
are creating more than a mere “relationship of denial”–i.e., denying terrorists easy
marks, denying challengers the opportunity to undermine authoritarianism in
Eurasian states, and denying the United States its hegemonic position, worldwide.
In other words, can the current marriage of convenience turn into an economic,
military, and political alliance between Moscow and Beijing?
Those who would discount this possibility point to the existence of many
fundamental differences that exist between the two great powers. Perhaps most
disruptive to a closer Sino-Russian relationship are the many geo-strategic issues
that confront it, from Central Asia to Northeast Asia, from relationships with
regional rivals of China’s to a potential contest between the two over access to the
Arctic, its resources, and perhaps its lucrative shipping lanes.
As for Central Asia, it looms large in both countries’ development plans. For
historic reasons, of course, Russia has many political, economic, and security ties
to the countries of Central Asia. Indeed, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tadzhikistan
are integral to President Putin’s plans to create a greater Eurasian Economic Union,
an entity that can vie with the EU, NAFTA, or ASEAN in global trade, while
preserving Russia’s influence in such circles, and anchoring the non-Russian states
of the former Soviet Union to Moscow’s orbit.
However, immediately upon coming to power, Xi Jinping unveiled his “New
Silk Road” (“One Road–One Belt”) policy–a strategy of massive Chinese
investment in Central Asian countries’ transport and pipeline infrastructure, oil and
gas field development, and consumer goods markets. To be sure, Xi’s move has
much more to do with securing reliable supplies of fossil fuels–as currently much
of China’s supply is vulnerable to the U.S. Navy–than it does replacing Russian
influence in the region. China also wishes to stabilize its western borders and
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develop its western regions in order to undermine support for domestic terrorism.
Still, Xi’s visits to the capitals of Central Asian states is said to have frustrated
Moscow to no end, concerned as it is about a wholesale reorientation of this realm
toward Beijing and East Asia.3
Northeast Asia is another theater of potential contest between the two Asian
powers, in particular because the two share a lengthy border there. Although all
outstanding border disputes had been officially settled in 2008, population
dynamics along that border cause alarms to ring in some Kremlin quarters. Indeed,
Russian lands east of Novosibirsk contain only 7 million citizens. However, over
100 million Chinese live within 100 miles of the Russian-Chinese border. And, the
fact is that the regions of Eastern Siberia and the Far East are full of resources
needed by the Chinese manufacturing sector, all at the same time some Chinese
maps reportedly portray lands to the south of the Ussuri River as “unreclaimed”
Chinese territory. Those who argue that this demographic issue acts as a check on
an ever-improving relationship between China and Russia point to Prime Minister
Medvedev’s repeated calls to develop the Far East as a “national priority” as
evidence of Russia’s heightened apprehension (“Russian Government,” 2017).
Each power is also paired with regional rivals of the other in South and
Southeast Asia, thereby further frustrating growing ties between the two, it is
suggested. To be sure, Russia’s warm ties with Vietnam rankles the Chinese,
particularly in view of the growing energy and defense agreements that have been
signed between Moscow and Hanoi. In November 2013, Moscow agreed to a host
of new energy and weapons projects, including those on manufacturing military
technology within Vietnam and developing alongside Hanoi several gas fields in
the disputed South China Sea (“Russia Strengthens,” 2013). As well, although India
and China are engaged in ongoing talks to repair their fraught relations, border
conflicts between the two and Chinese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean will
continue to constrain real progress in the relationship, whereas India’s relationship
with Russia is both enduring and multifaceted (Agrawal, 2014). To be sure,
Moscow recently delivered to New Delhi its first aircraft carrier, with joint air force
exercises completed in 2014. As well, Russia is negotiating with India for the
purchase of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports.
Moreover, some argue that Russia’s elites–who are well aware of the country’s
current and future global position and trajectory vis-à-vis China–do not wish to be
considered as a junior partner or raw materials appendage of China’s, even after the
sanctions imposed by the West over Ukraine have resulted in a more circumscribed
Russian future. Indeed, just as much as Mao disliked the notion of deferring to the
wishes of Stalin (or indeed Khrushchev), Putin and his entourage, it is argued, wish
to avoid the same vis-à-vis Xi Jinping. As well, having felt a definite “second class”
status at the hands of the West since 1991, the Russian leadership would certainly
not wish to replace the West with China in such an unequal relationship.
3

One outgrowth of Moscow’s frustration has been its lobbying to gain India’s entry into
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which would act as a counter-weight to China’s
growing influence in Central Asia.
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Among the many scholars who take a dim view of the prospects for genuine
Sino-Russian rapprochement are those who argue that such economic tensions,
great power pressures, and even an emerging status/power differential will keep the
two regional players from developing a closer relationship. Darden (2016) believes
that a closer relationship between the two is unlikely unless China eschews a deeper
integration with the world economy, and creates a much closer economic
relationship with Russia. Indeed, Duben (2015) concurs with this view, stating that,
despite statements to the contrary, little progress has been made on a host of bilateral
economic, financial, and infrastructural projects between Russia and China, while
arguing that the warming relationship is overstated and problem-laden. Ostrovsky
(2015) and Kortunov maintain, too, that the vaunted economic link is problematic,
but place the reasons for this in either lack of interest by the Chinese or in the mutual
lack of contacts and business ties between the two countries’ business elites (Hille,
2016).
Others point to non-economic concerns as major reasons for the absence
of a closer connection between Beijing and Moscow. Putz (2016) argues that
China’s economic, political, and military involvement in “Russia’s backyard,” i.e.,
Central Asia, will continue to frustrate closer political ties between the two.
Similarly, Hartwell echoes this concern–both with respect to Central Asia (and
elsewhere)–and claims that China’s hubris vis-à-vis Russian influence in the region
is a significant impediment to further comity (Hartwell, 2015). 4 Gabuev concurs
that a stronger relationship between the two countries is difficult to conceive of,
with Russia having to concede to China in both the economic and political realms.
In other words, the status/power differential grates on both the Russian elites and
masses, as they realize that “Russia needs China more than China needs Russia.
Russia has nowhere else to go” (Hille, 2016).
On the other hand, other scholars disagree, arguing as Nadege Rolland
does, that the Russia-China partnership is genuine, developing, and–that as it
strengthens–has the potential to manage both long-standing and emerging problems
that both would concede do in fact exist (Putz, 2016). To be sure, Farchy (2015)
maintains that it is not at all apparent that Russia’s elite fears overt Chinese
economic dominance in Central Asia and has ultimately accommodated itself to this
eventuality, while reserving for Moscow definitive responsibility for Central Asia’s
military and security policy realms.5 Some go further, arguing that China’s leaders
willingly cede to Moscow’s pre-eminence in this domain, while encouraging closer
cooperation between Beijing and the members of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) (Strokan & Mikheev, 2015; Vorobyov, 2017).
Others would argue the economic tensions that exist are subordinated to
economic drivers that are beneficial to both sides. For example, Lukyanov (2015)
4

Hartwell states that “China may see itself having a partnership with Russia in the region,
but it believes it–and not Russia–is the leader” (Hartwell, 2015).
5 Farchy argues that another limiting factor to Chinese economic dominance in Central
Asia are fears of that very eventuality that are held by citizens in the five Muslim states of
this region (Farchy, 2015).
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believes the Kremlin views China’s investments in the Silk Road projects of Central
Asia and beyond ultimately serve Russia’s long-term interests for economic selfdevelopment. Trenin, too, views China and Russia’s shared interests and goals–both
economic and geo-political–as mutually beneficial and supportive of a continued
closer association. As well, Trenin discounts both the “hubris” and the
“power/status differential” as impediments to the relationship, as he views the
Moscow-Beijing partnership as “coordination without a central command” (Trenin,
2015).
Our own view lies closer to these optimists’ assessments of a continuing,
closer affiliation between the two powers. Indeed, as it relates to the Arctic interests
of the two states–i.e., a major focus of this paper and a subject to which we shall
now turn–it is apparent that the two powers’ interests largely coincide. It is also our
contention that besides the economic drivers behind the Sino-Russian collaboration
in the Far North, U.S. and Western policy towards Russia since 2014 has
unfortunately contributed to this developing Arctic collaboration.

Climate Change, the Arctic, and Russia’s Far North
The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently
released its Fifth Assessment Report, entitled Climate Change 2013: The Physical
Science Basis. Among the many findings outlined in the voluminous document, the
IPCC establishes that climate warming is “unequivocal” and that the warming of
ocean currents there accounts for “… more than 90% of the energy accumulated
between 1971 and 2010” (Working Group I, 2013, p. SPM-4). The report also finds
that Arctic Sea ice and snow cover in Northern Hemisphere areas continue to
decrease in extent. More specifically, the report establishes that during the period
of 1979-2012, the average loss of Arctic Sea ice very likely reached somewhere
between 3.5% to 4.1% per decade (Working Group I, 2013, p. SPM-6). As well, the
report concludes that the Arctic’s sea ice may vanish within 30-40 years (Clark,
2013b).
A more recent estimate by Peter Wadhams, an applied mathematics and
theoretical physics professor at the University of Cambridge, indicates that by 2020
the Arctic will essentially be free of ice in the high summer months, certainly
enough to allow safe passage of container ships (Medred, 2014). Of course, should
this occur, a host of environmental and economic problems will ensue, from
dramatic increases in world ocean levels to the release of vast stores of methane
deposits–a particularly virulent greenhouse gas–to loss of habitat for polar bears
and other Arctic species. By one estimate, the total cost of a complete Arctic
meltdown approaches $60 trillion (Clark, 2013a).
To be sure, Russian Arctic waters–from the Barents Sea in the northwest to the
Chukchi Sea in the northeast–have experienced considerable warming. Indeed,
whole sections of Russia’s coastal Northern regions are ice-free for significant
periods of time throughout the year, whereas all of it has become virtually ice-free
during the early summer-through-October period (Crooks & Chazan, 2012).
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Moreover, climate change is also causing Russia’s permafrost region–which
totals some 69% of their territory overall–to melt, “… converting a large part of
Russia into a swamp” (Vorontsova, 2013). According to the head of the Russian
Emergency Situations Ministry Center for Predictions and Monitoring, by 2050 the
Russian permafrost region will decline by over a third (Goble, 2013). Such an
outcome will not only lead to the release of significant amounts of methane perhaps 500 times as much methane gas is trapped beneath the Arctic Ocean as
exists currently in the atmosphere (Medred, 2014) - but also create a transportation
and infrastructure nightmare in Russia’s permafrost areas, as over 5,000 kilometers
of railroad track and perhaps as much as 40% of infrastructure are at severe risk of
collapse (Goble, 2013). Such developments will put enormous stress upon an
already cash-strapped and fossil fuel-dependent federal budget.

The Climate Change Windfall?
A major discovery in late 2013 by the Austrian oil company OMV in a largely
unexplored section of the Barents Sea demonstrates the massive potential for the
five littoral states to the Arctic Sea; OMV claims to have found as much as 160
million barrels of recoverable oil (and 10-40 billion cubic feet of natural gas)
approximately 200 miles off the coast of northern Norway (Shotter, 2013). This find
was followed by a joint ExxonMobil/Rosneft discovery in September 2014–this
time in the Kara Sea–that holds upwards of 750 million barrels of oil (Kramer,
2014).
Indeed, according to the 2008 United States Geological Survey (USGS) study,
the Arctic region could hold as much as 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural
gas and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil. Of these figures, approximately 240
billion barrels of oil and oil equivalents (e.g., natural gas and methane, mainly) have
already been found, a figure that constitutes nearly as much as the total proven
reserves of Saudi Arabia. Beyond this, it is estimated that another 400 billion barrels
of oil lay “undiscovered” still in the Arctic region (Emmerson, 2010). For its part,
Russia’s federal geological agency claims the total figure of recoverable reserves–
both discovered and undiscovered–is far higher than the USGS estimate. One
estimate puts the overall energy reserves in the Arctic regions of Russia at more
than 1.6 trillion tons (Zamyatina, 2014). Of course, at today’s extremely low prices
for oil and gas, a significant portion of these Arctic reserves are unrecoverable.
A cursory perusal of the USGS study’s data on the likely areas for potential
recoverable assets demonstrate that two of these areas lie immediately north of
Russia, in the Barents Sea basin and the West Siberian basin (i.e., the Kara and
Laptev Sea regions) of the Arctic Ocean (See Table 1 and Figure 1). By USGS and
Russian estimates, therefore, the Arctic basins to the north of Russia constitute a
huge potential for hydrocarbon extraction (Sale & Potapov, 2010).
Although Russia has exploited natural gas and oil reserves in its Arctic regions
since the early 1970s, offshore areas that the aforementioned USGS study argues
hold promising hydrocarbon reserves have historically gained little attention for a
variety of reasons, owing mainly to the extreme environment. Due to warming
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climates, however, this is changing, with Putin’s administration turning its focus
resolutely toward exploring and developing these offshore Arctic reserves. Indeed,
President Putin recently stated at the International Arctic Forum in Salekhard,
Russia (capital city of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region, Russia’s main gas
producing region), that “… the time for an industrial breakthrough has come in the
Arctic” (Kravtsova, 2013).
Table 1: Arctic Basins with High Probability of Significant Fossil Fuel Deposits

Petroleum Basin

Natural Gas
(trillion
cubic ft)

Natural
Gas
Liquids6
(billion
barrels)
2.68

Crude Oil
(billion
barrels)

Total (oil
equivalent in
billions of
barrels)

Yenisey-Khatang
99.96
5.58
24.92
basin
West Siberian
651.50
20.33
3.66
132.57
basin
East Barents basin
317.56
1.42
7.41
61.76
East Greenland
86.18
8.12
8.90
31.39
Rift basin
West Greenland51.82
1.15
7.27
17.06
East Canada basin
Amerasia basin
56.89
0.54
9.72
19.75
Arctic Alaska
221.40
5.90
29.96
72.77
basin
Source: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and
Gas North of the Arctic Circle. Kenneth J. Bird, et al., United States Geological
Survey, Fact Sheet 2008/3049, July 2008.

Oil + Gas = National Security
To be sure, the leadership of today’s Russia continues to view oil and gas exports
as critical for the country’s future. Putin’s doctoral thesis of 1999 foreshadowed his
attempt as president in 2000-2008 to gain control of privatized oil companies for
the benefit of the Russian state, and its budget. As a result, a host of private oil
companies–from Roman Abramovich’s Sibneft to Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s
YUKOS–were bought or otherwise obtained by the Russian government during this
period. It appears that Putin’s entourage has decided recently to accumulate even
more private oil for state coffers; in September 2014 a Moscow court seized
billionaire Vladimir Yevtushenkov’s shares in Bashneft’, a large Russian oil
6

Natural gas liquids include fuels and chemicals that are separated out from either natural
gas or crude oil and include ethane, butane, propane, isobutene, and natural gasoline. They
may also be used as feedstocks to make a variety of chemicals and plastics (Friedman &
Puko, 2014).
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company active in Bashkortostan (Weaver, 2014). By the end of 2008, fully 4050% of Russia’s budget was accounted for through either taxation of fossil fuels
production or from oil and natural gas exports.
Although attempts were made under Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency to
diversify Russia’s economy, it appears that Putin–now in his third term as
president–jettisoned serious consideration of diversification and has returned to a
fuller appreciation of the role of oil and gas production for Russia’s future. And,
with declining oil and gas production in many of the country’s aging fields, Russia
is naturally looking to the offshore regions of the Arctic to avoid a production crisis,
even in the current era of extremely low oil/gas prices.

Figure 1. Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Basin Map. Source: Geology.com and
MapResources.
Such a production crisis would seriously undermine the country’s budget, the
Russian economy, the country’s national security, and, ultimately, its leaders’ grip
on power. As such, the Russian government has placed the Arctic near the center of
its national security priorities to 2020. In addition, Russia is pressing its claims for
undersea resources that lie beyond its 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and are
allegedly extensions of its continental shelf. As well, the government had been
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attempting for some years to lure Western oil majors’ interest in developing
offshore oil and gas fields.
And, Western oil majors–ExxonMobil, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Italy’s Eni,
France’s Total, and Norway’s Statoil–were taking notice, as “state-directed
resource nationalism” has reduced their range of investment and exploration
opportunities in Venezuela, Brazil, and many states in the Middle East. For
example, Shell returned to Russia in full force, after having been outmaneuvered by
Russia in 2006, when it lost control over its Sakhalin-2 oil and gas development
project in Russia’s Far East. Despite that loss in shareholder value, in April 2013
Shell’s Chairman inked a joint exploration and development deal with Russia’s
Gazprom that would allow Shell a 33.3% stake in the development of the SeveroVrangelevsky (North Wrangel) field in the Chukchi Sea and the Severo-Zapadny
(North-West) field in the Pechora Sea (ITAR-TASS, 2013). Additionally,
ExxonMobil signed an earlier deal with Russia’s largest oil company, Rosneft, to
explore 150 million acres in offshore regions of the Kara Sea (Koranyi, 2013b;
Crooks & Chazan, 2012). And, in early 2013, even China’s National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) got into the act, partnering with Rosneft to explore three
offshore Arctic areas (in the Pechora and Barents Seas); this signaled the first Arctic
offshore oil/gas deal that Russia has signed with an Asian company (Katakey &
Kennedy, 2013). And, although offshore natural gas development projects have
gained less interest recently by both the Russian government and Western oil
companies, drilling for oil in the offshore Arctic continued to be of high interest to
all parties, at least until the United States and the European Union imposed targeted
sanctions against Russia’s energy sector in summer 2014.
As stated previously, many Western oil majors view the offshore Arctic as a
potential boon in terms of future bookable reserves, despite the formidable
development barriers that exist. Moreover, unlike development of natural gas wells
in the Arctic offshore, there are reportedly plenty of oil projects in that region that
will breakeven even if oil prices continue to remain well under $80 per barrel
(Crooks & Chazan, 2012). Additionally, Western oil companies with an interest in
other, perhaps more lucrative onshore projects in Russia also felt pressure to invest
in what the Russian government perceives as a prestige project–opening up the Far
North to greater exploration and resource exploitation–in exchange for these same
Western oil companies having the chance to gain a stake in less challenging oil and
gas projects within Russia’s onshore regions, for example, on the Yamal peninsula
or in the Bazhenov fields.
For its part, Russia needs Western oil majors, both for their capital resources
and their technology and expertise. Although President Putin has cited plans to
spend as much as $500 billion on Arctic exploration over the next 30 years, Western
oil companies ponied up tens of billions of dollars in recent times to jointly explore
for oil alongside Rosneft in the Kara, Laptev, and Chukchi Seas (Amos, 2014;
Emmerson, 2012; Kramer, 2014). Joint exploration with Western oil majors also
made it easier for Russia to obtain loans from international banks. And, since
exploring and drilling in the Arctic is particularly expensive, additional non-Russian
financing of such activities is always welcome. As well, the Russian government–
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prior to the sanctions regime–lured Western oil companies with tax concessions and
other incentives in order to gain expertise in working in Arctic and offshore
environments and for Western oil companies advanced technologies for finding and
accessing such resources (Hamilton, 2012; Panin, 2014). Now, due to the sanctions
regime, much of these technologies and hardware is off limits to Russian energy
companies.
It is important to note, however, that even if sanctions are removed and such
joint development projects proceed in the near future, Russian capital and Western
technology and expertise will still meet significant constraints in developing these
offshore oil reserves. For one, with a time horizon of 20-30 years, it’s difficult to
gauge the profitability of capital projects, as well as the price of oil upon which they
must be based, that far out. Additionally, open sea conditions in the Arctic at this
point will allow for only a short summer installation (July-October) season that
frustrates attempts to make progress on such projects very quickly. Moreover,
iceberg activity in the regions under exploration mandate that companies build
extremely strong oil drilling platforms, each able to withstand in excess of six
million tons of impact; as well, pipelines need to be buried very deep to avoid
subterranean contact from the largest of these icebergs. Furthermore, at $120
million per ship, available icebreaking vessels are in short supply; as well, the daily
cost to operate a vessel today is more than $50,000. Lastly, of the four prime areas
in the Arctic–that together allegedly hold 75% of the oil reserves there–these areas
are also the most challenging because of ubiquitous ice floes (Hamilton, 2012).

The Suez Alternative?
“I want to stress the importance of the Northern Sea Route as an
international transport artery that will rival traditional trade lanes in service
fees, security, and quality.” – Vladimir Putin (Byers, 2013)
Climate change in the globe’s northernmost latitudes may also produce another
favorable consequence for the Russian Federation: an ice-free shipping route that
holds significant potential for transoceanic shipping, rivaling other major routes and
perhaps gaining Russia considerable transport revenues. Thus, the possibility of icefree cargo shipping for a considerable portion of the year across the Northern Sea
Route (NSR)7 may provide competition to shipping alternatives, be they rounding
the Cape of Good Hope or transit through the Suez Canal.

7

According to a July 2012 law passed by the Russian lower house, the NSR is defined as
“The aquatic space adjacent to the northern coast of the Russian Federation, covering
internal waters, territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone of the
Russian Federation and bound by division lines across maritime areas with the United
States and the parallel Cape Dezhnev in the Bering Strait, west meridian of the Cape of
Desire to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, eastern coastline of the Novaya Zemlya
archipelago, and the western boundaries of the Matochkin, Kara, and Yugorsky Straits”
(Bennett, 2013).
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Arctic sea ice achieved its lowest record ever in 2012, allowing travel that year
along the NSR for more than half of the year. Indeed, the U.S. National Snow and
Ice Data Center reported that Arctic ice covers only approximately 2,200 square
kilometers, about half of the total area covered by ice in 1979 (Bering Strait, 2013).
And, it is predicted that within a decade the ice-free season could extend for a full
eight months annually (Koranyi, 2013a).
The year 2009 marked the first commercial crossing of the fabled Northeast
Passage, an earlier and alternate name for the NSR. In 2012, almost four dozen ships
sailed from Norway to the Bering Strait. In 2013, 71 ships, including the first iceclass tanker, carried 1.35 million tons of cargo through the NSR; to be sure, the
Stena Polaris, owned by a Swedish transportation company, traversed the NSR with
40,000 tons of naptha months ago and successfully delivered its cargo to a South
Korean terminal (Dawson, 2014; Ice-class Tanker, 2013; Kramer, 2013). In another
first, the Yong Sheng, a Chinese container ship, traveled from the Bering Strait to
its destination in the Netherlands in September 2013 (Bering Strait, 2013).
According to one study, trans-NSR shipping is set to grow by more than 30 times
to 2020 (Koranyi, 2013a). 8 Another, attributed to the South Korean Maritime
Institute, estimates that the NSR may account for more than a quarter of AsiaEurope transport by 2030 (Milne, 2013b).
Why might shippers prefer the NSR, despite the need for Russian icebreakers
to accompany vessels during even some of the warmer months? For one, the route
between East Asia and Europe is much shorter than traversing the Suez Canal, by
as much as 40%; delivering cargo from East Asia to Europe via the Suez Canal can
take as long as 40 days, whereas the NSR is 7,000 kilometers shorter and requires
only 25 days (Ice-class Tanker, 2013). Thus, a shorter distance saves a considerable
amount of time that theoretically lowers shipping costs. Additionally, ships utilizing
the NSR avoid pirate-infested waters in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the
Straits of Malacca. 9 Moreover, using the route circumvents the unpredictable
impulses of an unstable Egyptian government, as well as the volatile Middle Eastern
region, in general. As a result, both European and Asian states are beginning to note
their interest in the route; among the most interested of these states are China, South
Korea, and Singapore. Even tiny Iceland is getting into the act, having decided to
build an Arctic port at the extreme northeast of the country, in Finna Fjord (Milne,
2013).
In response, the Russian government stepped up plans to invest in port
infrastructure, railway construction, and its aging nuclear icebreaker fleet. Indeed,
the Russian government and legislature passed appropriations bills worth billions
of dollars to repair existing and/or build new deep water ports along the NSR, as
8

This is projected, despite recent stiff declines in trans-NSR shipments in 2014 and 2015.
Reportedly, the uncertain opening of the NSR in 2014 was in part responsible for fewer
inter-continental transits; as well, the slowing Chinese economy is another reason.
9 China reportedly relies on the Strait of Malacca for delivery of upwards of 80% of its oil
needs; the NSR is considered so important for the future of China’s development that it is
referred to as the “Arctic Golden Waterway” in China (Byers, 2013).
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well as plan for an impressive Arctic railway–the Belkomur Railway–which will
run between Arkhangelsk to Perm (Bennett, 2013). Presently, Russia’s icebreaker
fleet counts among it six nuclear-powered vessels, but most of these are obsolete
and will have to be replaced in a few years. Long lead times for launching new
nuclear-powered icebreaking vessels–as much as six to seven years–means that the
world’s largest icebreaker fleet will be constrained for some time thereafter in terms
of maintaining open seas above Russia’s northern regions in colder months (Goble,
2013). Still, the government is investing in bringing new icebreaking vessels on line
in the shortest possible timeframe; a next generation icebreaker is set to be built by
the end of 2017 (Alexeev, 2013).
Still, there are significant problems connected with the NSR. As noted
previously, a larger icebreaker fleet is required if a substantial upturn in cargo traffic
is to ply the NSR. Beyond the other infrastructure constraints mentioned above,
there is also a definite lack of search and rescue facilities in the region that can
support needed rescue attempts for ships in trouble. And, since warming seas means
more icebergs the need for such facilities is not theoretical. Indeed, the head of
Denmark’s shipping conglomerate, AP Moller-Maersk, claims that the continuing
need for icebreakers, as well as the significant number of icebergs along the route,
make traversing the NSR an expensive option, an option that will only become
commercially viable in 20 years or more (Milne, 2013). 10
Moreover, the lack of reliable year-round scheduling of transit through the NSR
also acts to reduce the route’s importance by international shipping companies,
especially those carrying goods from China westward to Europe. Since the vast
majority of Chinese products destined for Europe are of a containerized nature, the
seasonality of the NSR and, therefore, its unreliability and unpredictability as a
shipping route, will limit its use as an East-West conduit for Chinese consumer
products. Furthermore, due to their extremely high time-charter costs per day,
certain vessels–for example, seismic and LNG ships–would find prohibitively
expensive any delay in transit through the NSR (Keil & Raspotnik, 2013).
At the same time, however, the ruling Russian elite considers the NSR to be of
significant economic value in the near- to medium-term, as evidenced by the quote
from President Putin at the beginning of this section. The Putin administration has
recently demonstrated its view that the NSR is a strategic asset as well, having made
plans recently to inaugurate regular naval patrols along the northern route; in late
2013 the Minister of Defense revealed the policy shift after sending the Russian
Northern Fleet’s flagship vessel, the “Pyotr Velikiy” (“Peter the Great”), through
much of the NSR. The stated reasons for the patrols include helping to stop the flow
of unwanted drugs and migrants into the northernmost reaches of Russia, while also
extending Russia’s sovereign claims to sparsely traveled coastal waters in its far
10

Additional expenses that must be factored in include extremely high insurance rates for
shipping, as well as the environmental cost associated with an oil tanker being holed by an
iceberg. According to Michael Frodl, an advisor to insurers from the consultancy, C-Level
Maritime Risks, “It’s still simply too risky a proposition for standard commercial insurers
…. And the risks haven’t been figured out enough to price insurance correctly” (Saul,
2013).
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north; it will also allow the country to exert sovereign claim to seabed resources in
areas adjacent to its continental shelf. 11 Thus, the result is an increasing
militarization of the Arctic region.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy to 2020
Before discussing China’s Arctic interests, this article will briefly analyze Russia’s
Arctic strategy. In support of Russia’s claims on Arctic resources and transport
corridors the Putin administration published the second iteration of an
acknowledged Arctic strategy. Entitled “The Strategy for the Development of the
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020,” the
document mainly sets forth a conceptual foundation for the development of the
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). As such, the document mostly
discusses purely domestic concerns, e.g., investment in critical infrastructure in the
region, protection of indigenous communities and their cultures in the AZRF,
sustainable development in pristine Arctic environments, etc. (The Development
Strategy, 2013). The strategy also discusses in detail possibilities for greater foreign
scientific and geological cooperation in the region. Increased international
cooperation in the areas of search and rescue, resource extraction, and
environmental protection are all discussed.
At the same time, however, portions of the new strategy raise certain questions
or concerns. For example, Russia’s stated desire to develop numerous floating
nuclear power stations is underscored in the document, apparently without regard
to neighboring countries growing apprehension concerning nuclear power
generation. Included as well are statements regarding Russia’s intent to legally
define Moscow’s claims in the region, while making somewhat veiled attempts to
support these claims with the “… provision of military security, protection, and
protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” (The
Development Strategy, 2013).
Within a week of the adoption of the new Arctic strategy, President Putin
addressed a gathering of Defense Ministry officials. His remarks there included “the
militarization of the Arctic” as a new Russian security concern of the same order as
perennial Russian concerns like a further eastward expansion of NATO or the
continued deployment of a global missile defense system (Rasshirennoe, 2013). 12
To be sure, Russia’s ruling elite deplores further NATO activities in the old northern
11

For example, these may include the Mendeleev and Lomonosov ridges, two seabed
formations that, if recognized as part of the Russian shelf, would extend Russia’s claims to
fossil fuel, additional non-hydrocarbon resources, and perhaps transport routes well into the
Arctic Ocean.
12 Putin’s exact words at the Defense Ministry Collegium were the following:
“Одновременно предпринимаются методичные попытки тем или иным образом
расшатать стратегический баланс. Фактически запущен второй этап создания
глобальной системы ПРО Соединённых Штатов Америки, зондируются возможности
для дальнейшего расширения НАТО на Восток, существует и опасность
милитаризации Арктики” (Rasshirennoe, 2013).
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flank of the Cold War, as well as a new arms race in the globe’s extreme north;
however, according to one Russian defense analyst, it is the Russians who have
made significant attempts to modernize their military facilities in the Arctic Circle
region (Baev, 2013).
Of course, Russia’s neighbors have long been worried about decaying nuclearpowered submarines in the High North, as well as aging nuclear warheads in the
Kola Peninsula. However, recent moves by Russia’s leaders are perhaps raising
eyebrows among the Arctic Eight powers, as well as other states with an emerging
Arctic presence of their own. For example, in September 2013 Russia reopened a
military base in the New Siberian Islands that had been shuttered at the beginning
of the 1990s. Commenting upon the re-christening of the Cold War-era base,
President Putin declared that the facility was being re-opened as these islands have
become an “… important point in the Arctic Ocean, a new stage in the development
of the Northern Sea Route” (Russia Reopens…, 2013). Upon its re-opening Russia
also conducted major naval exercises around the archipelago, while Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu proclaimed, “We arrived there, or, more accurately, we have
returned there forever” (Russia Reopens, 2013). 13
Moreover, Russia’s Northern Fleet, tasked with protecting its Northern
territories, will receive an additional 40 ships and logistics vessels by 2020, which
include a destroyer, large landing vessels, and six multi-purpose nuclear and
conventional submarines, among other vessels (Padrtova, 2014). Russia is also
beefing up its coast guard along its northern frontier, and has taken a decision to
form two Arctic motorized infantry brigades–totaling nearly 10,000 troops–to
protect its sovereign claims in the Arctic (Pugliese, 2012). Furthermore, the Russian
military deployed air defense forces and MiG-31 high altitude interceptors on the
Novaya Zemlya archipelago, the main island of which served previously as a testing
site for Soviet nuclear explosive devices (Russia Building, 2013).
An additional airbase in the Franz Josef Land archipelago is also being rebuilt.
Airfields at Naryan-Mar, Alykel, Vorkuta, Tiksi, Anadyr, and Rogachevo are all
scheduled for renovation and modernization. According to Lt. General Mikhail
Mizintsev, head of the new National Defense Control Center, Russia’s near-term
Arctic plans involve “… the building of 13 airfields, one land test range for the Air
Forces, 10 radar sites and direction centers” (Russian Army, 2014).
To be sure, such developments have served to put some Western military
analysts on edge, particularly when they are accompanied by alarming statements
from high-ranking Russian government officials. As Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry
Rogozin stated in mid-2013, “Active development of the Arctic shelf will
unavoidably lead to a conflict of interest between states aspiring for resources. It is
possible this conflict will exceed the diplomatic limits” (Rogozin: Active
Development…, 2013). Even more precarious, the former Russian representative to
NATO uttered, “It is also quite possible that Russian oil and gas production
13

In late 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated that Russia risked its
sovereign claims to the Arctic–its resources, transport corridors, etc.–by the mid-21st
century, unless it asserted its national interests there (Russia Reopens, 2013).
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facilities may become targets of secret acts of sabotage by rival countries”
(Rogozin: Active Development, 2013).
Still, perhaps many Russian government elites, specialists, and political pundits
would rather aver that recent Western actions in the Arctic are the cause of Russian
rearmament program in the region. As Tatiana Zamyatina (2014), a scholar at the
noted Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies, recently remarked,
As for the security of Russia’s Arctic shelf is concerned, the region has
been largely unprotected in military terms: there were no tracking systems,
radars, ground troops or naval forces. In the meantime, pretty close to it is
the U.S. bastion in Alaska, with its intelligence means, missile defense
systems and naval forces. Apart from that, the Scandinavian countries have
created their own military bloc inside NATO to protect their interests in
the near-Arctic zone. Anti-Russian exercises have been held regularly
there. Therefore the measures being taken to enhance the security of
Russia’s Arctic shelf are Russia’s proportionate response to Western
challenges (n.p.).

Sanctions and Russia’s Arctic Ambitions
As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern
Ukraine, a series of sanctions were placed on Russian energy companies and banks
by Western governments during the summer and fall of 2014. The sanctions’ intent
was to punish Russia by robbing its fossil fuel-dependent treasury of revenues from
future oil exports; by making it harder for government-controlled oil companies–
chiefly among these being Rosneft–to gain access to both Western bond markets
and to advanced technologies and expertise associated with oilfield exploration,
development, and recovery, particularly in hard-to-reach offshore deposits, the
European Union, United States, Canada, and Norway hoped to discourage Russia
from continued support of eastern Ukrainian separatism and efforts to undermine
the fledgling, pro-Western government in Kiev.
In response, Russia isn’t sitting idly by. For one, it is attempting to “Russify”
offshore oil production–that is, developing an import substitution approach–to
cultivate a domestic alternative to Western specialization in this area. For example,
the government has established a “hierarchy of procurement placing domestic and
Asian companies first, U.S. companies last,” according to Alexis Rodzianko, the
head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (Kramer, 2014). Secondly,
Russian companies have purchased stakes in Western oil exploration and servicing
companies, in order to gain the technology and expertise from the inside.
Importantly to this analysis, the Russian government entered negotiations with
the Chinese to sail drilling rigs from the South China Sea to Russia’s offshore basins
(Kramer, 2014). China may also provide Russia advanced technologies that Beijing
“refines” as a result of its own ties with Western oil companies. And, it is certain
that China’s state-owned banks will provide loans to Russia’s cash-strapped oil
producers. Indeed, Rosneft itself, as well as the Russian banks VTB, VEB, and the
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Russian Agriculture Bank all signed agreements recently with China ExIm bank to
open lines of credit (Soldatkin, 2014).
Thus, the sanctions regime has had several unintended effects, while not
succeeding in deterring Russia in supporting the rebels in eastern Ukraine. To be
sure, Russia’s activities in the Arctic have been more limited recently than expected,
but this is surely more a result of lower hydrocarbon prices and a slowing Chinese
economy than the sanctions effectiveness. Perhaps the main effect of sanctions has
been to push Russia further into the arms of the Chinese–particularly in the Arctic
arena as the next section will detail–thereby ultimately undermining both Western
oil/gas majors’ positions in the Far North and U.S. foreign policy aims, more
generally.

China’s Arctic Interests: Origins
Not being an Arctic littoral state, China’s involvement in the Arctic region is more
recent than Russia’s or that of other Arctic states. China’s first polar interest
appeared in 1984, the year it launched research expeditions to Antarctica, later
founding three research stations on the icy continent. Its first scientific sojourn to
the Arctic came more than a decade later, in 1995; the next year, China began an
affiliation with the International Scientific Committee on North Pole Research, an
organization that includes as members all five Arctic littoral states and three
additional Arctic states (The Development of China’s, 2007). Three years later, the
first state-led Chinese effort to scientifically explore the Arctic took place aboard
the Ukrainian-built icebreaker, later renamed “Xue Long” (“Snow Dragon”)
(Manthorpe, 2011); the three-month expedition included 124 members of China’s
scientific community, traveling over 14,000 nautical miles through Arctic seas
(Backgrounder: Chronology, 2008).
In 2003, Beijing sponsored a second scientific expedition to the Arctic; a year
later, China established its first (and only) scientific research station–the Yellow
River (“Huanghe”) station–on the Spitsbergen archipelago. 14 China concluded three
additional Arctic expeditions in the ensuing years, in 2008, 2010, and 2012; during
all of these expeditions, primary scientific emphasis focused on marine biology,
climate change, and hydrographic and hydrologic research, with increasing
involvement of foreign researchers.
Since then, Beijing has quietly, but steadily, developed a growing interest in
the region, particularly since scientific reports began predicting a greater likelihood
of a substantially ice-free Arctic by the end of the current decade. In June 2013, for
example, China announced the establishment of the China-Nordic Arctic Research
Center (CNARC) in Shanghai; its purpose is to support scholarly exchanges
between China and other littoral states, climate change research, and cooperation

14

Though sovereign control over Spitsbergen lies with the Kingdom of Norway, as a
signatory to the Svalbaard (Spitsbergen) Treaty since 1925, China is allowed unfettered
access to those islands lying north of the Arctic Circle.
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for sustainable development of the Arctic region (Zhenghua, 2013).15 This
development came shortly after China’s bid to become a permanent observer of the
Arctic Council (AC), an intergovernmental body that seeks a common
understanding on economic, environmental, and social issues affecting the area, was
accepted by the eight members of the organization in May. 16
In July 2014, 128 scientists took part in China’s sixth Arctic expedition, one
that placed eight short-term research stations on the Arctic ice (Wang, 2014). The
next year, China revealed plans to build an observatory in Canada’s Northwest
Territories; the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS), will support
polar science and related technologies (Wang Ru, 2014). 2015 also saw Beijing
send three separate research expeditions to the Arctic and near-Arctic regions
(China’s Participation, 2015). More recently, China’s State Oceanic Administration
announced plans for its seventh Arctic research expedition; this time their Arctic
scientific sojourn was jointly planned and conducted with significant Russian
participation (Pettersen, 2016b).

China’s Arctic Interests: Cooperation with Nordic States
By joining the AC in 2013, China demonstrated its desire for a much closer Arctic
relationship with its Nordic partners in Europe. To be sure, China’s interests in the
Arctic are not only limited to scientific research, climate change, and sustainability
issues, but also include interests in resource development and new shipping routes
through the NSR. Recently, China has negotiated a number of agreements with its
Nordic partners and some of these will be examined before turning attention to
China’s growing relationship with Russia in the Arctic region.
Denmark was perhaps the earliest Nordic state to support China’s bid to join
the AC. As early as 2011, the Danish ambassador to China suggested that Beijing
has “… natural and legitimate economic and scientific interests in the Arctic,”
including especially China’s interests in mining, fishing, and sea route development
near or on Greenland (Denmark Welcomes, 2011). For its part, Greenland’s
parliament facilitated foreign investment in uranium and rare earth minerals mining
easier by lifting bans on these activities (Greenlandic Minister, 2013). In 2014, Erik
15

Based at Shanghai’s Polar Research Institute, the CNARC opened in December 2013 and
coordinates its research activities with 10 research institutes from China, Iceland, Denmark,
Norway, Finland, and Sweden. Besides research on sustainability and climate change, the
CNARC explores issues related to Arctic shipping, resource exploitation, economic
cooperation, and policy/legislative issues (China-Nordic Arctic Research, 2013).
16 Besides China, India, South Korea, Japan, Italy, and Singapore also became permanent
observers at the AC. Although not a full voting member of the body, becoming a permanent
observer allows China to speak and offer testimony at AC meetings, as well as to take part
in agenda-setting activities (Xinhua Insight, 2013). As Tang Guoqiang, former Chinese
ambassador to Norway, stated the granting of permanent observer status allows China to
“…strengthen its cooperation with countries surrounding the Arctic in scientific research,
the opening of new shipping routes, and resource exploration,” all important areas of
Chinese interest (Xinhua Insight, 2013).
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Lorenzen, the Danish Arctic ambassador also re-iterated Denmark’s welcoming
attitude toward greater Chinese investment in such endeavors (Bigger Chinese,
2014). Within a year of Lorenzen’s statement, China’s General Nice Group
negotiated a $2 billion plan to take over a large iron ore mine in Greenland, the first
project of its kind by an Asian country in the Arctic (Du, 2015).
Another first had come two years earlier, when Iceland became the first
European country to sign a free trade deal with China in April 2013 (Xinhua Insight,
2013). Within months of the landmark treaty, the Icelandic prime minister stated
that Iceland “… seeks opportunities to work closer with China when it comes to
doing research and even doing business in the Arctic” (Interview: Iceland, 2014).
Iceland followed up by allowing China’s China National Offshore Oil Company
(CNOOC) to operate oil and gas exploration projects off its northeast coast, the first
time Chinese exploration in the Arctic was undertaken (Du, 2015); as a result of the
deal CNOOC Iceland, a subsidiary of CNOOC, will hold a 60% share in the
offshore projects. Though Norwegian-Chinese relations had been cool since
Norway awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to the Chinese dissident, Liu Xiaobo,
China apparently warmed to involving Norway’s Statoil in plans to exploit the
Icelandic lease (Fouche, 2013). 17
Although China’s involvement in the Nordic Arctic is still in its early stages, it
seeks opportunities to play a constructive role in this region, according to Jia Guide,
Deputy Director General of the Department of Treaty and Law in the Chinese
Foreign Ministry. Cooperation at the Arctic Council with its Nordic partners has
expanded beyond scientific research and cultural arenas to include resource
development and shipping (China Seeks, 2014). Indeed, speaking to the third Arctic
Circle Assembly in late 2015, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming
exclaimed Beijing’s intent to be a “major stakeholder in the Arctic” (China’s
Participation, 2015).

China’s Arctic Interests: Cooperation with Russia
Due to the sanctions imposed upon Russia by Western governments, Moscow in
recent years has hurriedly negotiated a host of offshore extraction agreements and
infrastructure projects with companies from China, a country that now declares
itself a “near Arctic state” (Higgins, 2014). Yet, these agreements were not the first
demonstrating a higher level of association between Russia and China in the Arctic.
Back in late 2009 Moscow and Beijing struck a joint investment agreement for
the construction of a huge shipyard in the Russian Far East to produce offshore oil
and gas rigs for the Yamal and Shtokman (now shuttered) gasfields (New Mega17

For its part, China views the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed with Iceland as a
model for future opportunities between China and other European countries. In the
meantime, the Iceland FTA allows the tariff-free export of Chinese products to other EU
countries. It also encourages additional Chinese investments for developing production
facilities in Iceland, as well as for those in upgrading Iceland’s transport infrastructure, as
China views Iceland as a key Arctic trans-shipment hub (FTA Offers, 2014).
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Shipyard, 2009). China reportedly also joined Russia in 2010 in constructing a
satellite project (“Arktika”) to monitor developments in the Arctic region. Several
months later the two inked a long-term arrangement concerning the transit of oil
and gas through the Arctic (Manthorpe, 2011).
For their part, Chinese oil companies have little experience operating in harsh,
Arctic-like climates, but their excellent financial position–and the absence of
sanctions against Western investment–provides them a unique ability to team up
with Western oil majors that do have such knowledge, and thereafter invest in key
technologies needed for offshore oil/gas exploration under Arctic conditions.
Thus, on his first trip abroad as President, Xi Jinping visited Moscow, signing
a number of agreements, including one that created a cooperative association
between Rosneft and CNPC, the first Arctic oil or gas deal signed with an Asian
country (Zhou, 2013). As part of the deal, Rosneft and CNPC will explore three
fields in the Barents and Pechora Seas. Later the same year, PetroChina gained a
20% stake in the giant $27 billion Yamal LNG project. 18
Two developments, however, spurred heightened Chinese interest in the Arctic
in 2014. The first has been mentioned before, i.e., Western sanctions against the
Russian oil and gas industry. The second was the 2014 annual strategic assessment
issued by the Chinese military in which it was noted that “the Arctic region has rich
oil and gas resources and quick and convenient shipping conditions, which has
important meaning for ensuring the sustained development of China’s economy”
(Chinese Army, 2014).
Within months, China’s CNOOC signed a major exploration and development
deal with Russia’s Rosneft to explore waters deep into Russia’s Kara Sea. As well,
CNOOC signed another agreement, this time to build equipment for the liquefaction
process on Novatek’s Yamal LNG project (China Signs, 2014). PetroChina, whose
parent company is CNPC, also stated their interest in further oil/gas extraction
projects with other oil/gas companies in the Arctic (China’s Energy Giant, 2015).
It’s believed that the company is interested in oil exploration in the Dolginsky field
in the Pechora Sea; the tract is licensed to Gazprom Neft’, whose general director,
Aleksandr Dyukov, noted, “We continue to look for a partner. We need a financing
partner, who will share the risk with us. More than likely, this will be an Asian
company that will partner with us” (Gazprom Neft’ Opredelitsia, 2014).
Furthermore, Russia also declared their interest in China’s participation in LNG
projects in the Gydan peninsula; Novatek’s Arctic LNG-1, Arctic LNG-2, and
Arctic LNG-3 projects were announced in late 2014, with an estimated construction
start date of 2018 (The Arctic Dimension, 2014).
Then, in early 2015, Arkadiy Dvorkovich, Vice-Chairman of the Russian
government, announced that the government would allow Chinese investors to hold
a majority stake in strategic oil and gas fields. Existing restrictions require foreign
18

The French oil company, Total, also has a 20% stake in the LNG project, with the
remaining 50.1% share held by Novatek, Russia’s largest privately held gas company. (The
Chinese Development Bank obtained an additional 9.9% share in the Yamal project in
2015; this gives China ownership of almost one-third of the total project.)
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investors to hold minority shares in oilfields that might produce more than seventy
million tons of oil or in gasfields that may yield more than fifty billion cubic meters
of gas. However, Dvorkovich stated then that “… if there is a request for control,
we will consider it” from our Chinese partners (Russia May Accept, 2015). 19
Moreover, China reportedly has made significant investment stakes in two
additional Arctic endeavors, the Belkomur railway, linking the Urals to the White
Sea via the hydrocarbon-rich, northern Komi Republic, and Arkhangelsk port
facilities, which would serve as the final transit stop along the Belkomur (Thompson
& Ohanyan, 2017).
In other developments, Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest shipping company,
maintained that only one of its LNG carriers will serve the Yamal LNG project; the
rest of the project’s LNG carriers will be owned and operated by Chinese concerns
(Staalesen, 2015b). 20 Another area in which China was given a key role in the
development of the Arctic shelf was a late 2015 agreement in which China would
produce much of the technology needed for offshore oil and gas development
projects in Russia. Since Western sanctions have affected Russia’s ability to acquire
more than 65% of the equipment needed for offshore oil/gas production, Russia is
now looking to China to replace this technology. The only caveat, according to
Deputy Prime Minister Arkadiy Dvorkovich is that such technologies must be
produced in Russia proper (Made in China, 2015). These significant developments
come on the heels of an agreement for CNPC to increase its share in the Yamal
LNG project by 9.9%, for a combined 29.9% total share.

China’s Shipping Interests
With approximately 90% of its traded goods shipped by sea, the Chinese
government stands to save billions of dollars in costs, if reliable transit through the
NSR (or the Central Arctic Shipping Route [CASR]) becomes a possibility. 21 An
Arctic transit route would save shipping companies $7 to 12 billion in insurance
premiums (Zhou, 2013). Thus, China is very keen on helping Russia to develop the
NSR infrastructure.
China first mentioned in 2010 its intention to significantly “boost” its Arctic
presence for use as a potential shipping route. As we have seen with regard to Arctic
resource exploitation, the Chinese government early on was much more skeptical
19

Western oil partners were specifically excluded from this same consideration. Indeed,
Western oil majors haven’t been given majority (or equal) control of Russian oil/gasfields
since the demise of TNK-BP in 2013.
20 China’s Sinotrans Shipping and Merchants Energy Shipping struck a joint venture
agreement with Greek Dynagas in 2015 to build five Arctic LNG vessels to ship gas from
the Yamal LNG project to China; the year prior, China LNG and Teekay LNG Partners
signed an agreement to build six LNG carriers for the route (China Shipping Firms, 2015).
21

For example, Beijing projects their trade to grow to almost $8 trillion by 2020; according
to these estimates, if 10% of that figure is shipped via the Arctic, transportation cost
savings would equal tens of billions of dollars per year (Zhou, 2013).
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about the role of Russia as a partner in its Arctic shipping exploits. For example, a
Chinese government researcher commented in 2010 that, “China is geographically
disconnected to the Arctic, which is a large disadvantage compared with littoral
countries. China would not like to see it (the shipping route) controlled by a country
or a certain group” (Yu, 2010).
For its part, Russian naval forces warily accompanied the “Snow Dragon” in
September 2012, as the Chinese research vessel transited the entire length of the
NSR for the first time (Chinese Icebreaker, 2012). When the Chinese cargo ship,
“Yongsheng” completed a similar journey in August 2013, Russian press releases
displayed a certain degree of skepticism regarding the transit.
Since the imposition of sanctions by the West in 2014, however, and Russia’s
resulting “pivot to the East,” the two governments have slowly begun to see more
eye-to-eye on the importance of mutual development of the NSR and related
infrastructure projects. For example, in May 2015 Chinese authorities noted keen
interest in buying the Arkhangelsk Sea Port, as well as the Yenisey River Shipping
Company from Norilsk Nickel (Staalesen, 2015a). 22 In addition, the Jilin provincial
government foresees teaming with both Russia and North Korea to ship products
from its manufacturing centers to Europe, via the NSR. Russia and China also
signed an agreement more recently that grants the Chinese company, Poly
Technologies, a concession to build 712 miles of the Belkomur railway (Pettersen,
2015).
All of these developments were followed in the winter of 2015 by two other
important developments. After the Yongsheng cargo ship completed a recordsetting 20,000 mile round-trip journey from Rotterdam to Tianjin, the China Ocean
Shipping Group Company (COSTCO) manager Cai Meijiang stated that the
company is “… considering increasing the number of ships sailing via the new path”
(China Mulls Routine Navigation…, 2015). This was followed in December by a
statement from Dmitriy Rogozin, the Vice-Chairman of the Russian Government
(and Chairman of Russia’s Arctic Commission), in which he explained that a new
“cold Silk Road” was under development and desired further Chinese investment
in order to bring it to fruition (Rogozin: Severnyi, 2015; Staalesen, 2015c). 23

22

These sales of important Russian infrastructure assets mirror similar Chinese interests
elsewhere; Beijing is interested in port facilities at Kirkenes, Norway, as well as a rail line
from Kirkenes to Rovaniemi, Finland (Staalesen, 2015b).
23

These events were important, despite the fact that NSR transits witnessed a
sharp downturn in the 2014 and 2015 shipping seasons.
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Conclusion: Russia and China in the Arctic,
Cooperation or Competition?
With regard to the Arctic, China and Russia have in the past viewed each other’s
activities in the Arctic with some degree of suspicion. In particular, differing
perspectives on commerce and shipping in the region, as well as seabed resource
extraction, have earlier caused the two countries’ overall warming relationship to
undergo some significant strains.
For one, Beijing was initially rather wary of Moscow’s attempts to extend its
claims to the Arctic shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in 2007. Apparently, Beijing was concerned when Russia began an
attempt to extend its shelf, perhaps as far as the North Pole in some areas. Some
Chinese scientists saw these claims as a Russian overstep in sovereignty extension,
viewing these claims to the Arctic shelf as a “challenge” to Beijing (Terekhov,
2010).
For its part, Russia was concerned with China’s perceived intent to assert
control over the 12% of Arctic hydrocarbon reserves not claimable by littoral states.
As one Russian expert mentioned in 2010, “They (China and other non-littoral
states) want their slice of the pie, i.e., in the open part of the Arctic basin”
(Terekhov, 2010, p. 2). More recently, Igor’ Sechin, Chairman of Rosneft and close
ally of President Putin, uneasy about China’s Arctic ambitions, remarked in 2013
that Russia faced “plenty of competition,” not only from littoral states, but also from
“… countries which seem to be far from the Arctic …. The struggle for resources
is getting tougher” (Glava Rosnefti, 2014).
As a major exporter, China was also engaged in the debate early on regarding
access to potentially lucrative Arctic shipping lanes. China proclaimed its
commercial interests in the north Pacific and Arctic Oceans, worried as it was (as
Wu Zhenfu, a professor from the Dalian Maritime University, stated concerning
China’s interests), that “(W)hoever has control over the Arctic route will control the
new passage of world economics and international strategies” (Manthorpe, 2011, p.
A6). Apparently, China’s leaders worried that, should the NSR become a normal
route for trans-oceanic shipping, Russia’s control over the region might make
traversing the NSR prohibitively expensive; therefore, Beijing forcefully
proclaimed its interests in keeping transit costs reasonable and shipping lanes open
(Jakobson, 2013; Mitchell, 2013).
However, although the two countries have not seen eye-to-eye in the past in the
Arctic, since mid-2014 a significantly closer relationship has indeed developed
between China and Russia there. Since that time–a time that obviously coincides
with the imposition of sanctions against Russia’s energy industry and Russia’s
“pivot to the East”–no longer does one often read in the official Russian press of
fears of Chinese economic or military intentions in the region (or beyond). Instead,
Chinese investment and involvement in infrastructure projects all along the “cold
Silk Road” have been announced with great fanfare. What is more, as we have seen,
hydrocarbon exploration and project development has been an especially important
and high profile arena of activity in the new Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic.
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To be sure, Russia’s goal of “mastering the Arctic”–a vital part of the Russian
leadership’s plan for the country’s economic resurgence–requires significant capital
investment; without the possibility of attracting Western capital for the vast
majority of these projects, China’s financial participation balances Russia’s
investment need.
Thus, this Arctic case study suggests that not only is it possible for China and
Russia to move beyond an uneasy association of convenience toward a genuine
partnership in areas of mutual interest–despite several continued difficulties
confronting the overall relationship–but also that the Western-backed sanctions
regime has acted as a catalyst for closer Sino-Russian relations.
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Political Homophobia
as a State Strategy in Russia
Nikita Sleptcov
Abstract
This article examines the current state strategy of political homophobia used by the
Russian government to create a sense of national identity by scapegoating Russian
homosexuals as "foreign agents," reinforcing the power of the governing elite, and
distracting people's attention from government misconduct.

Introduction
“West will fall in the same way as the Roman Empire fell before it, because
in the Roman army it all started with the fact that the soldiers were no
longer engaged in battles and indulged in “the charms of homosexual
love.” (State Duma deputy Vitaly Milonov in an interview to the Russian
News Service)1
Political homophobia as a state strategy is a phenomenon that has attracted
scholarly attention at the beginning of the 21st century as more states across the
globe resort to it in their domestic policies. 2 In the case of Russia discussed below,
I show that political homophobia as a modular oppressive strategy has been used
to legitimize the current authoritarian political regime, to unify national identity,
and to present the country’s particular values as distinct from those of the West.
In order to show what Wiess and Bosia call the “modular” character of political
homophobia, I rely on current research in the area of political homophobia,
analyze Russian homophobic legislation, and compare Russia to Poland , a country
that also previously introduced similar legislation and employed similar rhetoric
of political homophobia.
In this paper I argue that political homophobia as a state strategy is embedded
into Russian history and since 2012 has been actively employed by the Russian
authorities. This paper is an opportunity to look at the current homophobic
outburst as a deliberate political strategy carefully crafted in Russia. In my
1

Previously being a member of St. Petersburg city hall, Milonov was the main sponsor of
the city “gay propaganda law.”
2

See. Weiss, M. L., & Bosia, M. J. (2013). Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and
the Politics of Oppression. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
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understanding of political homophobia, I will rely on the work of Wiess and Bosia
(2013) who understand political homophobia as a
purposeful [strategy], especially as practiced by state actors; as embedded
in the scapegoating of an “other” that drives processes of state building and
retrenchment; as the product of transnational influence‐peddling and
alliances; and as integrated into questions of collective identity and the
complicated legacies of colonialism. Specifically, we target the overt
deployment of homophobia in political rhetoric and policy as a remarkably
similar and increasingly modular phenomenon across a wide range of cases.
(p. 14)
In their definition, Bosia and Weiss highlight the modular nature of political homophobia,
that is, exhibiting similar characteristic across cases where present. I argue that the new
round of political homophobia that was launched approximately in 2012 with regional and
federal legislation exposes the modular character of Russian political homophobia.
Approaching homophobia as explicitly the deliberate and modular political strategy offers
a different way to understand the power dynamic that goes beyond one case, one country.
Homophobia as a political strategy in not unknown to Russian politics. During the
Soviet period, Stalin skillfully used homophobia to attack political opponents and
consolidate power (Healey, 2002; Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008). With the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain, the young democratic
government in Russia was more focused on stabilizing the economy than on
building political participation. “Shock therapy” aimed at changing the economy
and “the initial impoverishment that came along with it had more of a
‘demasculinizing’ effect, as many men could not meet the new market-derived
standards for masculine achievement” (Sperling, 2014, p. 60). The effect was so
profound that some scholars called it “crisis in gender identities, and particularly
masculinity” (Goscilo & Strukov, 2010, p. 11). Together with the loss of the status
of superpower and, as a result, diminishing role of the country in international
affairs, led to the fact that “Russia in the 1990s was quite often portrayed not as a
mother but rather as a woman of easy virtue; prostitution became a metaphor for
the country’s foreign policy” (Riabov & Riabova, 2014, p. 25). Therefore, one of
the earliest political acts undertaken by Putin when he became president in the early
2000s was the change of discourse to include patriotic terms and images to
reinstate Russian masculinity on the political level and consolidate public support.
The state strategy of political homophobia, among other policies of nation
building, was deployed in 2012 as a response to the ideological vacuum that had
been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. I argue that modern Russia under
the rule of President Vladimir Putin has deployed political homophobia as part of
a range of policies aimed at (re)creating a sense of national identity that is not
based on western liberal values.
Being essentially an “imagined community” of separated individuals, nations
are constructed through language and discourse (Anderson, 1983, p. 15; Martin,
1995; De Cillia, Reisgl, & Wodak, 1999). Because they are “mobilized into
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existence through symbols invoked by political leadership” (Dryzek, 2006, p. 35)
discourses are powerful tools in constructing, perpetuating, transforming, or
dismantling national identities (De Cillia, Reisgl, & Wodak, 1999). Therefore,
discursive practices of homophobia used by the political leadership in laws and
public speeches constantly recreate a sense of national identity distinct from the
West with its emphasis on liberal values (Healey, Baer, & Stella 2008, pp. 6-7).
To denote the gradual shift toward a politics of nationalism, I introduce the
term “conservative heteronationalism”. Analogous to Jasbir Puar’s (2007)
homonationalism, heteronationalism deploys heterosexuality as a modular type of
sexual behavior forming the basis of nation where queer sexualities are not
included into the process and become marginalized as unproductive sexualities
(Foucault, 1990).3 The conservatism is expressed by the desire to look for role
models of sexual behavior in history, which is selective and biased. Conservative
heteronationalism is a state strategy that occurred in the Russian Federation under
Putin. A main objective in the deployment of modular political homophobia is to
create a collective identity for Russian nationalists.
For Bosia and Wiess (2013), political homophobia is connected to the legacy
of colonialism. Russia has never been colonized by a foreign power. However, the
period of the 1990s was characterized by the majority of common people as the
country’s ‘quasi-colonialization’, turning it into ‘a raw material appendage of the
West’ (Kotz, 1999). I argue that the feeling of lost sovereignty and independence
was the trigger that contributed to the formation of a public demand for a new type
of leadership that would not be directly associated with the West, and therefore in
the public eye would not look dependent. The people were searching for a hero,
someone who could bring the lost pride and political status back to them. Putin
was such a figure, whose “self-assertion as a tough, strong, masculine, and, above
all, patriotic leader protecting Russia” was seen as capable of rectifying the statusquo (Sperling, 2014, p. 78).
I associate the deployment of political homophobia in Russia with the impact
of internal as well as external factors. The introduction of conservative rhetoric
into Russian domestic politics is closely related to the international milieu around
Russia in the mid-2000s. The relations between the West and Russia started to
deteriorate after the famous Munich speech the Russian president Putin delivered
during Munich Security Conference in Germany on 10 February 2007. Putin
criticized the West in general and the USA in particular for “monopolistic
dominance in global relations” (Lekic, 2007). The speech marked the beginning
of a policy of deterrence in the relations between Russia and the West and the
further events (the Russian-Georgian war, the chain of color revolutions in the
countries of the former USSR and so on) laid the foundation for mutual distrust
(Koshkin, 2016, p. 6). The speech reignited the suspicion of the NATO
enlargement among Russian elite as well as Russian population (Jégo, 2008;
3

Thus heteronationalism is based, in part, on the idea that the result of the sexual behavior

is pleasure and not the birth of children.
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Kryshtanovskaya, 2008; Neef, 2016). Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who
replaced Putin in early 2008, in his address to the Federal Assembly the same year
expressed the concerns saying that “Russia’s strength is being tested” by the
NATO members (Medvedev, 2008).
The Putin administration changed its rhetoric toward a more critical position
on the West (Shimov, 2017). Confrontation with Western countries required a
change in internal discourse, which happened with the gradual introduction of the
language of traditional values. People impoverished and humiliated in the 1990s
politics of “shock therapy” welcomed the changed course. “Russia is getting up
from its knees” became a slogan of growing anti-westernization in the country
(Rubov, 2008). The new ideology of conservative traditional values involved
many actors such as the ruling United Russia party, Cossacks, and most
importantly the Russian Orthodox Church, whose position on homosexuality has
traditionally been hostile (Zorgdrager, 2013). The Russian Orthodox Church,
politically disempowered during the soviet times, became engaged in politics after
the collapse of the USSR in 1991 but did not gain political prominence until the
late 2000s when the newly invigorated Russian Orthodoxy has been deployed to
play a crucial part in the new politics of conservatism (Anderson, 2007; Mitrokhin,
2009; Willems, 2006).
I argue that the launch of political homophobia in Russia has been closely
connected to changes in the country's foreign policy due to deteriorating relations
with Western countries and the necessity to legitimize the current political regime
inside the country. Conservative heteronationalism, enshrined in the legislation,
excludes queer Russians from the definition of a truly Russian citizen. LGBTQ
advocacy groups, funded from abroad, are deemed “foreign agents” serving
interests of Russian adversaries. Such a hostility from the government promotes
societal homophobia within the nation and marginalizes the status of Russian
queers.

Literature Review
Homophobia as a social phenomenon has been a scholarly focus from many
different perspectives. Scholars have been studying the interconnections between
states and the homophobic attitudes of the population and their effect on LGBTQ
rights activists (Frohlich, 2011). Homophobic attitudes have been also scrutinized
from the position of relations between Christianity and homophobia (Birken,
1997) and homophobia and masculinity (Stein, 2005). Bosia and Weiss (2012)
pioneered the study of homophobia as a modular and deliberate political strategy
that has taken place in different parts of the world.
There is a growing body of scholarship focused particularly on examining
homophobia in Russia from the political standpoint. There is scientific research in
the area of history (Ashwin, 2000; Engelstein, 1995; Healey 1993, 2002, 2003;
Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008) and the sociology of homosexuality in Russia (Baer,
2002, 2009). This literature suggests a perpetuated feeling of homophobia within
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the Russian population due to the historical legacy of homosexuality in Soviet
times and negative discourse produced by the state today.
There is also a significant amount of research in the area of masculinity and
its nexus to the political regime, attitudes, and culture (Clements, Friedman, &
Healey, 2002; Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015; Riabov & Riabova, 2014;
Sperling, 2014). Sperling (2014) argues that masculinity plays a key role in
legitimizing the Russian political regime. She writes,
In the contemporary Russian case, the Kremlin deployed a legitimation
strategy that included stressing Putin’s machismo–a strategy that bled over
into popular cultural productions of the same ilk.[…] Traditional
masculinity, therefore, enables male political leaders (and some female
ones as well) to assert their power over others who can be identified or
characterized as traditionally feminine.[…] Political actors employ widely
familiar cultural notions of masculinity, femininity, and homophobia
(heteronormativity) as political tools in their performance of legitimacy.
(Sperling, 2014, p. 3)
Researchers also note a growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church as an
authoritative actor in producing homophobic discourse and reinforcing traditional
gender roles (Sperling, 2014; Stähle, 2015; Zorgdrager, 2013). Taking into
consideration the fact that the majority of the population identify as orthodox
Christians, the Church’s position on social issues has a significant impact on
societal perception.
Scientists have studied the role media plays in the construction of homophobia
within the Russian context (Persson, 2015). Media has a significant influence on
people’s attitudes toward such social issues (Gainous, 2007; Venzo & Hess, 2013).
Gomillion and Giuliano (2011) have examined how the media has influenced selfrealization, coming out, and current identities of American homosexuals “by
providing role models and inspiration” (p. 330). There is also a body of research
on discursive practices within local LGBTQ communities developed in response
to societal homophobia in Russia (Kondakov, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). The use of
such discrete language helps Russian queers stay unnoticed in the hostile
environment. For example, the usage of the phrase “byut v teme” (“to be in the
theme”) which means to belong to the LGBTQ+ community. For a person who
does not know, this phrase does not carry any obvious semantic load, for an
initiate, this kind of “fluid” identity allows one to avoid the daily hostile and
homophobic environment (Kondakov, 2013b).
In my research, I place Russia within a broader international context in order
to show that current homophobic discourse and “anti-gay” legislation passed in
2013 is not unique to Russia and represents a wider attempt of different
authoritarian states to use homosexuality politically to their advantage. 4 However,
The federal law “For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for
a Denial of Traditional Family Values” of June 11, 2013 and enacted on June 30, 2013 .
4
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unlike in places like Uganda or Egypt, Russian homosexuals are hostages of
complicated foreign policy games between Russia and the West. I argue that the
politics of homophobia launched by Putin is a direct consequence of deteriorating
relations with the United States and Western Europe.

Methods
In this study, I analyze regional as well as federal legislation that was developed
between 2006 and 2013 in Russia and which were aimed at regulating queer public
visibility. An examination of legislation is particularly important because it
denotes both the will of the legislator and demonstrates the perpetuation of
political homophobia in the law. For example: the Law of the Region of Ryazan
dated June 15, 2006 N 66-03, “On the Changes in the Law of the Region of
Ryazan”; “On the Administrative Violations”; and several other nearly identical
bills adopted by Arkhangelsk in 20115, Kostroma 6, Saint Petersburg 7,
Novosibirsk 8, Magadan9, Samara10, Baskortostan11, and Krasnodar12 in 2012, and
Irkutsk13 and Kaliningrad 14 in 2013. In addition to these, I consider the federal law
“For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial
of Traditional Family Values” which was unanimously passed on June 30, 2013.
Law of the Arkhangelsk Region of December 15, 2009 N 113-9-OZ “On certain measures
to protect the morality and health of children in the Arkhangelsk region”
6 Law of the Kostroma Region of February 15, 2012 N 193-5-ZKO “On Amendments to the
Law of the Kostroma Region “On Guarantees of the Rights of the Child in the Kostroma
Region and the Code of the Kostroma Region on Administrative Offenses”
7 Law of St. Petersburg of February 29, 2012 N 238 “On Amendments to the Law of St.
Petersburg" On Administrative Offenses in St. Petersburg”
8 Law of the Novosibirsk Region of June 14, 2012 N 226-OZ “On Amendments to Certain
Laws of the Novosibirsk Region”
9 Law of the Magadan Region of June 9, 2012 N 1507-OZ “On Amending Certain Laws of
the Magadan Region in the Protection of Minors from Factors Negatively Affecting Their
Physical, Intellectual, Mental, Spiritual and Moral Development”
10 Law of the Samara region of July 10, 2012 N 75-GD “On Amendments to the Law of the
Samara Region” and “On Administrative Offenses in the Territory of the Samara Region”
11
Law of the Republic of Bashkortostan of July 23, 2012 N 581-з “On Amending the Law
of the Republic of Bashkortostan,” “On Basic Guarantees of the Rights of the Child in the
Republic of Bashkortostan.”.
12 Law of the Krasnodar Krai of July 3, 2012 N 2535-KZ “On Amendments to Certain
Legislative Acts of the Krasnodar Region in Part of Strengthening Protection of Health and
Spiritual and Moral Development of Children.”
13 Law of the Irkutsk Region of April 24, 2013 N 29-OZ “On Amendments to the Law of the
Irkutsk Oblast “On Certain Measures to Protect Children from Factors Negatively Affecting
Their Physical, Intellectual, Mental, Spiritual and Moral Development in the Irkutsk Region”
14 Law of the Kaliningrad Region of January 30, 2013 N 199, “On Amendments and
Additions to the Kaliningrad Oblast Law “On Protection of the Population of the Kaliningrad
Region from Information Products Harming the Spiritual and Moral Development,” and Law
of the Kaliningrad Region of January 30, 2013 N 196, “On introducing amendments to the
Kaliningrad Oblast Law ‘The Kaliningrad Oblast Code of Administrative Offenses’”
5
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All of these laws. I argue, are discriminatory and anti-democratic nature. The
legislative measures establish social disparity in traditional and non-traditional
relations by prohibiting public displays of affection between same-sex partners,
which contradicts the principle of non-discrimination of international human
rights law (explain further, cite references). Homosexuality is defined as
corrupting the youth. The aforementioned Ryazan law directly states that it creates
“measures aimed at ensuring intellectual, moral and mental safety of children in
the Ryazan region” (Law of Ryazan oblast, dated June 15, 2006 N 66-03). The
state hierarchizes sexuality by defining homosexuality as an influence that
corrupts minors. Such a discourse produces a notion of the correct sexual behavior
that transcends into the political realm, reinforcing the heteronationalistic nature
of the nation-building. Discuss more.
The laws contain outdated, explicitly offensive language. Instead of using
internationally appropriate term “homosexuality,” the laws utilize the Russian
term “homosexualism,” which pertains to a set of ideas or ideology. The term is
often used by policy-makers to dismiss same-sex relations as a deliberate strategy
to undermine their inclusion in Russian society. The Kaliningrad law is to some
extent unique. Not only does it use the word “sodomy” and put homosexuality
together with pedophilia, it also forbids “propaganda” related to “non-traditional
relations” among all the citizens of the region, not just minors. The St. Petersburg
law also uses the word “sodomy” to denote same-sex practices among men.
The language utilized by the legislators aims at restructuring sexuality on a
political scale, subjugating homosexuality to heterosexuality. It allows for
deployment of political homophobia in order to create a sense of national unity
based on sexuality. Conservative heteronationalism reflected in the legislation
portrays the Russian nation as purely heterosexual. Russians who do not fit the
category are deprived of recognition and representation.

Political Roots of the Institutionalization of Homophobia in Russia
Political homophobia as a strategy of the Russian state cannot be understood
without reference to the destructive experience of the demasculinization of the
country that eventually led to the welcoming of authoritarianism. In this case,
Vladimir Putin used sexual minorities in order to construct an image of an external
threat and its internal “agents.” However, not only homosexuals were portrayed
that way. Russian NGOs that receive funding from foreign sources were also
marginalized and labeled as “foreign agents.”
Historically, the Soviet regime used the political ideology of communism to
lessen anxiety about the future of the society by creating and sustaining a stable
hierarchy of gender roles where masculinity was a central organizing norm. In
many ways, the current conservative turn and the emergence of the authoritarian
regime of Vladimir Putin find their political inspiration in the earlier periods of the
Soviet history (Cannady & Kubicek, 2014; Lukin, 2009; Prozorov, 2005). The use
of an external threat helped the government to demand loyalty within the country
and provided a sense of unity to the nation. A perpetuated feeling of paternalism
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placed the state in a position of decision-maker in every aspect of human life.
Adrian Ashwin (2000) speaking about governing gender norms, notes that
in the case of women, their role was defined as worker-mothers who had
a duty to work, to produce future generations of workers, as well as to
oversee the running of the household. Men, meanwhile, had an at once more
limited and higher-status role to play. They were to serve as leaders,
managers, soldiers, workers–in effect, they were to manage and build the
communist system–while the state assumed responsibility for the
fulfilment of the traditional masculine roles of father and provider,
becoming, in effect, a universal patriarch to which both men and women
were subject. In this way, masculinity became socialized and embodied in
the Soviet state, the masculinity of individual men being officially defined
by their position in the service of that state. (p. 1)
The fall of communism and disintegration of the country resulted in a deep
feeling of de-masculinization and loss of identity. The previously existing gender
roles carefully crafted and transmitted through generations were shaken by the
significant economic and political turmoil. Additionally, the abrupt and substantial
impoverishment of the population and the decline in male life expectancy
negatively affected the ability of men to provide not only for their families but to
the nation as well (Riabov & Riabova, 2014). The loss in the Cold War with the
West left a deep wound in the consciousness of the population. It also led to a
sense of demasculinization which, as Riabov and Riabova (2014) argue, had two
effects,
first, there was a significant weakening of the country’s international
position because of the nation’s defeat in the cold war, the collapse of the
USSR, and the Russian army’s defeat in the war in Chechnya in 1994–
1996. Second, human trafficking reminded Russian men that they were
unable to take care of their nation’s women. Moreover, Russia in the 1990s
was quite often portrayed not as a mother but rather as a woman of easy
virtue; prostitution became a metaphor for the country’s foreign policy. (p.
25)
The weakening economy of the country compelled Russian leaders to turn to
Western countries in order to seek financial support. This reinforced the image of
an impoverished country begging from its neighbors with an outstretched hand
and painfully harmed the national pride of Russians. The lost status was further
reinforced by Western countries expansion of NATO and the bombing of
Yugoslavia despite protests from Russia. No longer acting from a position of
strength (a traditionally masculine notion), Russian society harbored some
resentment against Western democracies.
Flush with victory in the Cold War, in the early 1990s Western European
countries failed to fully engage Russia in the democratic process and the work of
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European institutions. Weak ties between the European institutions made it
unfeasible to influence the Russian government on issues such as gay rights 15
(Ferrari, 2016). However, some European institutions such as the Council of
Europe in the early 1990s demanded decriminalization of homosexuality before it
could welcome Russia (Bohan, 2014). The Yeltsin administration in 1993
excluded “muzhelozhestvo” (male-to-male sexual practices) from the Code of
Criminal Offence. 16 The emergence of LGBT activism in post-Soviet Russia could
have been a first step towards the inception of a statewide LGBT movement. Yet,
as Laurie Essig (1999) notes, it was not the birth of the movement, but rather a
miscarriage (p. 67). After the abrupt emergence of the LGBT movement in the 90s
by the beginning of the 2000s, it was almost invisible (Essig, 1999; Nemtsev, 2008).
Decriminalization did not lead to de-stigmatization of Russian gays and
lesbians. Baer (2009) writes, “Western-style homosexuality, or what Altman has
referred to as the “global gay,” has become a convenient symbol of Western
cultural imperialism, involving the encroachment of Western values (overt
sexuality, non-reproductive sex, and consumerism) and Western political concepts
(tolerance, diversity, and civil rights)” (p. 6). For the government, juridical
decriminalization of homosexuality was a tool in negotiations with international
organizations and foreign governments. Therefore, homosexuality was used
politically in two ways. In domestic affairs, the government was silent about rights
of homosexuals in order not to attract unnecessary criticism of the public. In
foreign affairs, homosexuality was used to show ongoing democratization of the
country.
The growing visibility of sexualities on TV and on the streets of Russian big
cities quickly ignited a feeling of domestic homophobia within the population.
Homosexuality, in particular, was seen as “a foreign import, that is, a direct effect
of Western influence” (Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008, p. 6). As Massad (2002)
observes, “by inciting discourse on homosexual and gay and lesbian rights and
identities, the very ontology of gayness is instituted in a discourse that could have
only two reactions to the claims of universal gayness: support them or oppose them
without ever questioning their epistemological underpinnings” (p. 374). The
majority of Russians show strong animosity toward same-sex practices and
visibility of homosexuals.
It is important to emphasize that the decriminalization of homosexuality in
Russia was not a response to a growing LGBT activism. On the contrary, Russian
gay and lesbian groups, that started emerging as early as 1993, were weak and
disorganized nationally. As Bosia and Weiss (2012) suggest there is a clear pattern
of the diffusion of global homophobia because “in no context in the world are
LGBT citizens the threat they are made out to be; the ubiquitous specter of married,
child‐rearing gay men or lesbians inflates a tiny, often meek and nearly–or fully
invisible minority, to nation-destroying stature, much as anti-semitism has done,
15

Russia decriminalized homosexuality in 1993 while excluded it from the list of mental
illnesses in 1999.
16 Here and after all translations from Russian into English are mine .
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and frequently at the same time” (p. 20). This is certainly true for the Russian
Federation of the 2000s when domestic homophobia became a strategic political
tool. When this happened, the homophobic discourse and policies received
overwhelming support from the general public for whom gays and lesbian were a
symbol of Western liberalism (Koshelev, 2012; Levada-Center, 2015).
Therefore, the 1990s became a lost period for LGBT activism in Russia. In
the circumstances of a weak and dependent state, LGBTQ activists failed to push
the government to deliver rights to Russian gays and lesbians. The society, feeling
deprived of their masculine nature, associated homosexuality with
demasculatinity. As a result, a politics of compliance with the West in exchange
for scarce resources turned the Russian population against Western values. The
government later used such attitudes to support a carefully crafted state strategy
of political homophobia.

Putin’s Conservative Turn
and Institutionalization of Homosexuality in Russia
At the beginning of his presidency in the 2000s, Vladimir Putin attempted to
combine politics of “friendly relations” with the West and “patriotism” for his
domestic constituencies. Although Putin’s Russia was allowed into many
European and international political institutions, the country’s voice was barely
heard by the Western counterparts. The last straw was a round of NATO expansion
in 2007 with the inclusion of South and East European nations bordering Russia.
This move was perceived as unfriendly and even aggressive by the Russian
political elites. The offensive character of NATO and the reluctance to treat Russia
as equal pushed the Putin administration into isolation and the search for a new
ideology for domestic consumption. To unite the nation, the Kremlin turned to the
ideology of conservative heteronationalism.
Conservative heteronationalism in its Russian version represents an attempt to
create of sense of national identity based on the construct of traditional values and
heteronormativity. In such a social construct “nontraditional (that is, nonheterosexual and non-heteronormative) sexual relationships are understood to be
socially inferior” (Wilkinson, 2014, p.372).
With the growing conservative heteronationalism, homosexuals again
appeared to be the focal point of the policies of exclusion. In order to posit Russia
against the West, the government needed to identify a Russian group of people
that would represent non-Russian values influenced by the West and serving as
agents of Western corrupt influences within the country. Such tactics of carefully
crafted state homophobia facilitates the state’s objective of uniting the society
around its national leader. Writes Stähle (2015), “feared, condemned and
demonized, homosexuality has been used for contesting power relations,
articulating Russia’s sovereignty and defining the Self and the Other” (p. 52).
Politically, it allowed the government to shift public attention to the minor
problem, whereas the real social and economic issues remained without substantial
public criticism. The parastatal media effectively accomplished the task. LGBTQ-
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rights organizations, in particular, became an exclusive aim of governmental
criticism as agents of the western countries, especially the Unites States. It found
support among the population.
Russian researcher, Igor Kon, connects the initial conservative turn in 20052006 that started when Ryazan Regional Assemble (Ryazanskaya Oblastnaya
Duma) adopted a supplement to the local Law on Administrative Offenses to the
current round of homophobia, claiming that it is organically linked to other forms
of Soviet-Russian xenophobia (Kon, 2010; Nagel, 1998). 17 The law used the
Soviet derogatory term “homosexualism” combined with the outdated term
“sodomy” that has religious connotations and the relatively new “lesbianism”
which was not used previously. 18 The law was contested in the Constitutional Court
in 2009. In its decision the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on
January 19, 2010, declared, that
… as such the prohibition of the propaganda–as a purposeful targeted and
uncontrolled activity of the dissemination of information that may damage
the health, moral and spiritual development, including misconceptions
about the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional marriage–
among persons deprived due to their inability to critically evaluate such
information cannot be considered as violating the constitutional rights of
citizens (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 2014).
In 2012, the decision was appealed to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC).
The Committee decided that “the applicant’s conviction under the Ryazan Law on
Administrative Offenses (Ryazan Region Law) which prohibits public actions
aimed at propaganda of homosexuality among minors violated her right to freedom
of expression, read in conjunction with her right to freedom from discrimination,
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)”
(International Justice Resource Center, 2012). However, that decision did not

Zakon Ryazanskoi oblasti ot 15.06.2006 N 66-03 “O Vnesenii izmenenii v Zakon
Ryazanskoi Oblasti “Ob Administrativnih Pravonarusheniiah” [Law of the Region of
Ryazan dated 15.06.2006) N 66-03 “On the Changes in the Law of the Region of Ryazan
“On the Administrative Violations”] Retrieved May 27, 2013 from the Region of Ryazan
website: http://ryazan.news-city.info/docs/sistemsj/dok_oeqrlo.htm
17

It should be noted that The Russian language often uses words “homosexualism” and
“lesbianism” while in relation to heterosexual practices the word “heterosexuality” is
used. The suffix “-ism” in many languages (Russian is not an exception) is used to create
ideological concepts (socialism, capitalism, feminism, etc.). I would argue that artificially
made mistranslation of homosexuality aims at showing political nature of the homosexual
practices as if homosexuality was an ideology.
18
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change the situation since the UN HRC does not have an effective leverage to
pursue Ryazan Administration to change the law.
Several other Russian regions followed the example – Arkhangelsk in 2011,
Kostroma in 2012, St. Petersburg in 2012, Novosibirsk in 2012, Magadan in 2012,
Samara in 2012, and Krasnodar in 2012–and adopted similar regional gay
propaganda laws. Some of them are particularly important for analysis. St.
Petersburg, considered the most European among Russian cities, adopted anti-gay
law “On Amendments to the Law of St. Petersburg On administrative offenses in
St. Petersburg” on March 30, 2012. Being homophobic in its very nature, the law
also uses the outdated repressive language, interpreting the “LGBT” acronym as
“sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality, transgenderism” (Sperling, 2014, p. 299).
The federal law “For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information
Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values,” that unanimously passed
the State Duma (one deputy abstained) put an end to regional legislative initiatives
on June 30, 2013. The law became known as the “gay propaganda law” or the
“anti-gay law.” It mainly faced criticism from abroad, while inside the country
only a small number of democratically oriented organizations and human rights
groups opposed the legislation and tried to appeal it but did not succeed.
The vagueness of the language of the legislation opened up the possibility for
authorities to eliminate almost all actions related to LGBT community–not only
pride parades and other public marches, but also festivals, seminars, conferences,
publishing, even the organizations themselves could be closed. Potentially, these
legislative changes aim to erase all non-normative sexualities from the public
sphere to sustain the Russian nation as purely heterosexual. As Healey (2003)
argues, “Russians created a national sexual mythology that celebrated their own
natural purity and located Russia between the dangers of a neurasthenic Europe,
and a depraved and ‘backward’ East” (p. 4).
The state explicitly politicized homosexuality, thereby making it a political
force that is capable of influencing politics and hence change it. Homophobia lifted
to the level of state policy created a scapegoated group of Russian homosexuals
who became “representatives” of the Western culture, alien and dangerous to
Russian state and society. Now they were the agents of the foreign government,
traitors, and spies. The accusation of homosexuality deprives oppositional
politicians of a chance to be elected. Governmental and Orthodox groups are often
used to attack NGOs that work to shed light on government misconduct. Suspicion
of promoting LGBTQ rights is utilized as an excuse for such actions. The Putin
Administration uses homosexuality and those groups to blame the West for
attempts to change the current political regime in Russia. It allows the leadership
to intensify censorship and to suppress protest activity.

Human Rights Regime
Another major factor facilitating the creation of state homophobia policy is
Russia’s indifference toward international norms and its own commitments.
Russia is not part of the European Union, an organization that imposes some
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legislative regulations on its members including regulations aimed at the
prevention of homophobia. Even within the EU, there are cases like Poland, which
attempt quite successfully to defy the EU recommendations and launch state
homophobia after nationalists came to power in the mid-2000s. The United
Nations institutions of human rights are weak and powerless in their ability to
impose any kind of policies protecting people from deliberate policies of state
homophobia. As Picq and Thiel (2015) insist, there has been no global treaty that
would explicitly recognize rights of gays and lesbians within the worldwide
context. This is not least due to countries such as Russia, where homophobia
received state policy support. The only institute that can influence Russian
legislation is the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), decisions of which
Russia has to respect by the virtue of being a part of the Council of Europe and
signing the treaty sanctioning superiority of the Court’s decision in respect to
domestic laws. However, I argue that the dearth of legal and political mechanisms
that are at the disposal of the international community leaves Russian homosexuals
vulnerable to the machinery of the state. The state effectively uses Western
critique of Russian LGBTQ policies to strengthen its own power by exposing
interests of foreign governments as interfering with Russian domestic affairs and
attempts to change the political regime inside the country. Homophobia is an
excuse used to weaken an already faint Western influence in Russia that creates
more severe conditions for homosexuals while strengthening the power and
influence of the leadership, and diverting public attention from domestic problems.
The Russian Constitution of 1993 declares that “in the Russian Federation
recognition and guarantees shall be provided for the rights and freedoms of people
and citizens according to the universally recognized principles and norms of
international law and according to the present Constitution” (The Constitution of
the Russian Federation, 1993). The recognition of and the emphasis on “universally
recognized principles and norms” de jure puts Russia within a broader context of
human rights regime embraced by the countries of Europe. In Article 15, it states
that “the universally-recognized norms of international law and international
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its
legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation
fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the international
agreement shall be applied” (The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993).
This means that where the domestic laws are silent, international norms should be
used to clarify blind spots. The provision would allow what Kollman (2013) calls
socialization of international norms in Russia. Socialization is a “staged process
of norm creation, promotion and internalization” that facilitates dissemination of
same-sex unions and marriage laws within the European continent (Kollman,
2013, p. 73). She notes an important role of national and international human rights
activist groups in the socialization of norms and adoption of national legislation
protecting rights of homosexuals. However, unlike in Europe, Russia’s weak
LGBTQ community lacked the organizational and financial support necessary to
successfully campaign for the promotion of gay rights legislation or set aside
same-sex union laws until the mid-2000s when it faced a backlash from the
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government in the form of state homophobia. As discussed, the state perceives
attempts to define any human rights regime as an encroachment on its sovereignty.
Timid attempts by gay rights activists to hold public events were not just banned
by the government, but were also used as evidence of how corrupt and dangerous
Western influences are at undermining the country’s moral and family values. The
traditional value discourse that was subsequently produced sought to justify a
departure from the policy of Europeanization.
On February 28, 1996, the Russian Federation joined the Council of Europe.
Its entry meant that the country became part of the continental legal space with
commitments arising from the generally recognized norms of European law.
Today Russia is involved in more than 30 European conventions, among them the
European Convention on Human Rights of November 4, 1950. Despite the fact as
Kollman (2013) notes that the Convention never explicitly stated gay rights as
human rights, it nevertheless imposes some restrictions and obligations on
countries that signed it. For Russia, its provisions with some reservations started
applying in 1998. One of the major provision installs jurisdiction of ECHR.
Since its creation, Russia along with Turkey and Poland have all had lawsuits
filed against them. After the mayor of Moscow banned gay parades in the city in
2006, 2007, and 2008, Russian gay rights activists filed a lawsuit against Russia.
In 2010, the ECHR upheld the claim of one of the leaders of the Russian gay
movement, Nikolai Alekseev. The Court found a violation of articles of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: Article 11 (“Freedom
of assembly and association”), Article 13 (“The right to an effective remedy”), and
Article 14 (“Prohibition of discrimination”). In its decision the ECHR ordered the
Russian side to pay Alekseev 12,000 euros and reimburse the costs in the amount
of 17,500 euros.
These and other human rights cases that Russia lost compelled the authorities
to publicly denounce the court’s decision as political and deliberately anti-Russian.
In 2007, the chairman of the Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin stated that “the
European Court of Human Rights, replacing the Supreme Court, the Arbitration
Court and the Constitutional Court of Russia, performs the role of national
authority, which is contrary to its nature and purpose” (Savina & Ivanitskaya, 2007,
p.1). In 2010 Chairman Zorkin and then President Dmitry Medvedev said that
Russia did not give the ECHR power over Russian sovereignty to make decisions
about Russian legislation. Zorkin (2010) emphasized that,
having no direct precedent, the decision on the granting a parental leave to
a male soldier for child care, the Strasbourg Court, in this case, used the
legal position from the case of “Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom,”
which granted the dismissal from the armed forces of homosexuals. Of
course, in the Russian Federation, as in any modern country, sexual
minorities are protected by the principle of legal equality, that all are equal
before the law and the courts; State guarantees equality of rights and
freedoms, regardless of sex (Art. 19 of the Constitution). However, the
“enthusiasm” of the modern European legal systems in protecting rights
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and freedoms of homosexuals acquired grotesque forms. Sometimes this
can lead to a tragedy, as it happened recently in Serbia, where rejection of
the gay pride parade in the traditionally Orthodox country resulted in riots.
(p.1)
The position of the Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court presents Europe
as aiming to change Russian values and impose a gay agenda. Regardless of the fact
that most of the cases in the European Court against Russia did not concern rights of
gays and lesbians, the justification used to criticize the Court was often connected
to homosexuality. Even slight, timid attempts to promote gay rights within the
country caused a massive backlash used to justify not only tougher measures
towards Russian homosexuals but a massive criticism of European institutions and
their human rights doctrines.
In 2014, the ECHR again attracted criticism when President Putin highlighted
that gays and lesbians may threaten national security. He responded that just like
the United States, Russia has the right to comply or not comply when “it is
advantageous and necessary to ensure our interests” (Putin, 2014). He also noted
that the Court’s decisions are most often political. In 2015, a group of State Duma
deputies appealed to the Constitutional Court to assess the possibility of
recognition and enforcement of judgments of the ECHR that contradict the
provisions of the Constitution and the legal positions of the Russian legislation.
The court decided that “Russia may exceptionally depart from the execution of
entrusted obligations if such derogation is the only possible way to avoid the
violation of fundamental constitutional principles” (Mikhailova & Makutina,
2015). On December 15, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill
allowing the Constitutional Court to wholly or partially ignore the ECHR’s
decisions.
Despite the fact that the Russian Federation is a member of many European
political institutions including the Council of Europe, the EU as a whole as well
as its individual members have very limited mechanisms of influence over
Russia’s attitude towards Russia’s gay community. Unlike in the case of Poland
that at the beginning of the 2000s had to go through the EU inspection and change
its laws in order to become a member, Russia did not experience such pressure.
However, similarities exist in the cases of Russia and Poland. Both countries have
experienced the impact of totalitarian communist ideology. Communism in its
Soviet version was an ideology “where ‘the other’–any other–is reflexively
identified as hostile and created by immutable forces of history, something to be
feared and ultimately crushed” (Hayden, 2016). The sense of suspicion of “the
other” and the fear of the overthrow of the regime from abroad deeply penetrated
the ruling class psychology in Russia which was socialized during the Soviet
period (Hmelevsky, 2014; Shevtzova L.F., 1996).
There are also some peculiar similarities in the positions of churches in both
states. In the Russian Orthodox Church as well as the Roman Catholic Church in
Poland, both Churches stressed national identity in opposing gay rights. In Russia,
as Stähle (2015) argues, “the Russian Orthodox Church made a significant
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contribution to the articulation of traditional family values and moral standards,
arguing that Russian society was endangered by individualism, consumerism,
secularism, and homosexuality” (p. 52). The position of the Russian Orthodox
Church was outlined by Patriarch Kirill (2013) who depicted attitudes toward
homosexuality in Western Europe as “dangerous apocalyptic symptom” and
highlighted the necessity to “ensure that sin is never sanctioned in Russia by state
law because that would mean that the nation has embarked on a path of selfdestruction” (p.1) .
Poland used the rhetoric of “propaganda of homosexuality” approximately
five years before the same homophobic discourse was deployed by the Russian
politicians. In the case of Poland however, there was a response and efforts of joint
actions of European institutions and community to pursue the government to soften
their homophobic rhetoric and policies. But those efforts proved weak even within
the EU boundaries. The nationalist-led government did not stop using homophobia
to oppose the EU until it fell in 2007 (Weiss & Bosia, 2013). The weakness of the
European legal and political systems does not allow them to influence Russian
politics. This is especially true of verbal attempts to point out any Russian
government misconduct with respect to homosexuals. Even an eminent
intergovernmental organization such as the UN lacks the capacity to drive its
members to adopt national legislation prohibiting homophobia and promoting
rights of gays and lesbians. There is no “legal binding global treaty” that would
explicitly recognize rights of LGBTQ community worldwide and by the virtue of
the UN, authority prohibits homophobic policies of certain states (Picq & Thiel,
2015, p. 54)
Lack of the enforcement power of the UN is due to its origin as a post-world
war institution, perpetuating the realist political vision of countries as winners and
losers. The only body that has the power of decision-making–the Security
Council–does not concern itself with human rights or LGBTQ rights. Even if it
had to deal with such issues, the Council is divided between two often opposing
forces of the Western democracies on the one side and Russia and China on the
other.
The General Assembly consisting of all member-states is an even more
polarized institution. It became clearly visible in 2008 when only 66 of the 192
countries “mainly from Europe and Latin America endorsed a non-binding
declaration of human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity” (Picq &
Thiel, 2015, pp. 54-55). The Declaration faced opposition from Russia and some
other countries. The United Nations Human Rights Council, the body whose main
goal is to oversee and protect human rights around the globe, also adopted a
resolution on June 30, 2016, on “Protection against violence and discrimination
based on sexual orientation, and gender identity” (Human Rights Watch, 2016, p.
1) Russia, which lost its seat in the Council in 2016, voted against the resolution
(Roth, 2016). The symbolic victory of LGBTQ community perpetuated by the
adoption of the resolutions, has, unfortunately, little power to change homophobic
legislation that exists in Russia.
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Thus it is evident that the international human rights regime, created by
multiple institutions, has little impact on Russia. In the absence of significant
leverage over Russian politics, attempts by European and international
organizations to combat the state homophobia are either neglected by the state or
used to justify tougher measure to protect national sovereignty and identity. Voices
of human rights advocacy groups, international institutions, and politicians are not
heard in Russia. On the contrary, the state by the means of controlled media
produces a homophobic discourse that portray gay rights as part of a larger attempt
to undermine national sovereignty from abroad.

Conclusion
State homophobia in Russia is being used to create a sense of national unity in the
face of “the other” portrayed as the collective West with its values, discourses, and
policies. The regional “anti-gay propaganda” laws that were finalized by the
enactment of the federal law banning so-called propaganda of non-traditional
sexual relations among minors follows from the idea that the Russian nation is a
heterosexual nation, and homosexuality is non-Russian. However, homosexuality
is not simply non-Russia, it is Western. This anti-Western homophobic discourse
produced by politicians has existed within public consciousness since the Soviet
times. Accompanied by societal homophobia, the government scapegoats LGBTQ
rights activists within the country. Any attempts by international groups and
governmental bodies from abroad to point out government misconduct is criticized
as the desire to influence the internal politics of the country, undermine the
foundations of its constitutional regime, and violate the democratic will of the
Russian people. This strategy is used primarily as an excuse for non-fulfillment of
decisions from the International Court of Human Rights in confrontation with UN
decisions to protect the rights of LGBTQ people. Domestic audience perceives it
as a sign of strength rather than weakness.
The government also uses such state homophobia to divert public attention
from domestic problems. Blaming the West for the struggling economy is
currently one of the main strategies the government employs (Polunin, 2017;
Rapoza, 2014). In this situation, Russian homosexuals are presented as Western
agents that are paid to destroy family values and national identity. The current
Russian policy is to build the nation based on conservative heteronationalism
characterized by stable gender norms, traditional family values, the aggressive
rejection of non-normative sexuality, and opposition to the West. That approach
helps stabilize the regime during difficult times of international instability.
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Is “This Guy” a Dictator?
On the Morality of Evaluating Russian
Democracy under Vladimir Putin
Amir Azarvan
Abstract
Is it morally defensible to single Russian president, Vladimir Putin, out as a
dictator? The popular impression that he is a dictator has been used to legitimize a
dangerously adversarial policy towards what a U.S. Army general described as “the
only country on earth…that could “destroy the United States.” I argue that this
perception is in some ways misleading, and has contributed to escalating tensions
with Russia, which is both unnecessary and harmful both to Russia and the U.S.

Introduction
Vladimir Putin is a dictator. He's not a leader. Anybody who thinks
otherwise doesn't know Russian history and they don't know Vladimir
Putin. Hillary Clinton knows exactly who this guy is. John McCain said,
I look in his eyes and I see KGB.
Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA)
On five separate occasions during the 2016 vice presidential debate, Senator Kaine
referred to Russian President Vladimir Putin as a dictator (White, 2016). Such
remarks, expressed by those who form what I call the “American anti-Putin
community” (or AAPC), are becoming increasingly commonplace in American
politics. The popular impression that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a dictator
has been used to legitimize a dangerously adversarial policy towards what a U.S.
Army general described as “the only country on earth” … that could “destroy the
United States” (KyivPost, 2015). I argue that this perception is morally indefensible,
misleading, and has contributed to escalating tensions with Russia, which is
unnecessary and harmful both to the United States and Russia.
In the next two sections, I will introduce my working definition of
“dictatorship” and will explain the moral framework employed in this study. I then
situate (in the following sections, Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Soviet
Russia and What Public Opinion Can Tell Us) the Putin regime in its relevant
context by examining trends in the areas of human rights repression, democratic
change, corruption, and public opinion. Next, I address (in Sincerity or National
Security: Must We Choose?) the question of whether Russia poses a threat to U.S.
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national security, in which case some may argue that our moral requirements in
foreign policy ought to be relaxed. I conclude (in A Call for International Empathy)
with a brief summary, as well as the suggestion that a foreign policy that is more
ethical and beneficial to our national security may depend on our willingness to
acquire greater international empathy.

Defining Dictatorship
There are political contexts in which certain words connote far more than - or, in
some cases, express something quite different from – what their denotative
meanings indicate. This is certainly true of the term dictatorship. While it formally
denotes “a form of government in which one person or a small group possesses
absolute power without effective constitutional limitations” (“Dictatorship”, 2017),
modern society takes it to mean a lot more. In its contemporary usage, dictatorship
can be defined as a political regime characterized by “extraconstitutional authority
seized for selfish purposes and exercised over unwilling subjects” (Harris, 1938).
In this paper, my use of the term corresponds to the latter, more clearly pejorative
meaning.

The Moral Starting Point of My Analysis
Before continuing, I wish to state a key working assumption informing this
investigation: In foreign affairs, we should act in accordance with our stated moral
values as consistently as possible. I write “as consistently as possible” because there
may be occasions on which our values are in tension with one another, and we are
forced to prioritize among these conflicting values. For instance, one might argue
that although leaders should not generally mask their true intentions while
conducting foreign policy, it may be necessary to make insincere appeals to
democracy in order to generate public support for a policy of hostility towards a
country that poses - or is perceived as posing - a national security threat. In other
words, when leaders are compelled to choose between sincerity and security, the
latter ought to be preferred (be that as it may, I will briefly explain why I do not
believe that Russia actually does pose such a threat to the United States).
Also, given the moral requirement to apply our values consistently, we must,
if we wish to determine whether this requirement is being met, be able to
systematically compare cases, in this case, between Putin and his contemporaries
and/or his predecessor. Acting on the belief that Putin is a dictator is, therefore,
morally indefensible unless we are willing to behave similarly towards other leaders
who are equally or more dictatorial. 1 I suggest that each time we condemn President
1

Suppose I unfriended someone on Facebook on the grounds that he supported Donald
Trump–whom I depicted as a vile racist–while remaining friends with those who are just as
or more openly supportive of him. Aside from the question of whether my characterization
of the president is accurate, most people would rightfully view my inconsistency as morally
problematic.
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Putin as a dictator we open ourselves up to the moral criticism that we are not
applying our professed moral principles in a consistent manner.
As for the particular bases of comparison that I will be examining, I have
chosen to focus on trends in the following areas: human rights repression,
democratic consolidation, corruption, and public opinion. I will explain how these
areas relate to the connotative meaning of dictatorship discussed earlier.

Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Soviet Russia
Human Rights Under Putin
In its most recent yearly report, Amnesty International (AI) painted a grim picture
of human rights conditions in Russia, marked by increased restrictions on civil
liberties, torture, and other ill-treatment in prisons, failures to respect the rights of
refugees and asylum seekers, and abuses in Chechnya, Ukraine, and Syria (Amnesty
International, 2017). Since 2004, the country has been classified as “not free” by
Freedom House in its annual Freedom in the World report. 2 Human Rights Watch
(HRW) puts the matter quite boldly: “Today, Russia is more repressive than it has
ever been in the post-Soviet era” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).
This last statement is particularly germane to this discussion, as it points to a
comparison. As I argued, it is necessary to be able to compare cases systematically
in order to determine whether we are applying our values consistently across them.
Qualitative reports issued by organizations like AI or HRW do not lend well to such
comparisons. Fortunately, however, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) numerically
codes annual human rights reports published by AI and the U.S. State Department
(SD) according to systematic criteria. 3 Countries are scored from 1-5, where 5
means that “terror has expanded to the whole population,” and that “the leaders of
these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue
personal or ideological goals” (Political Terror Scale, 2016).
Have human rights’ conditions improved under Putin, or worsened? The
answer depends on which series of coded reports one turns to. As Table 1 reveals,
AI’s average score was higher in the first eight years of Putin’s presidency than over
the corresponding length of time under Yeltsin - pointing to an increase in
repression - while the SD’s score was lower.
Of course, the PTS is but one indicator of human rights repression, one that
focuses on “personal integrity rights,” examples of which include political
imprisonment, extrajudicial executions, torture, and disappearances. Among other
categories of human rights (and time does not permit to exhaust all of them), it does
not measure the repression of civil liberties. Under the latter category, press
freedom merits special – but by no means – exclusive attention. Between 2002 (the
2

To access Freedom in the World data, visit https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2017
3 To access Political Terror Scale data, visit
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Download.html
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first year that Freedom House began collecting data on this variable) and 2016,
Russia’s press freedom score steadily worsened from 60-83 (100 being the worst
possible score). 4
Table 1: Average Political Terror Scale Scores Under Presidents Yeltsin and
Putin
Source of Coded Reports
Amnesty International

Under Yeltsin
(1992-1999)
3.4

U.S. State Department

4.1

Under Putin
(2000-2007)5
4.1
More repression
3.9
Less repression

Source: Political Terror Scale.
One factor that is often emphasized concerning this trend is the murder of
journalists. According to data provided by the Committee to Protect Journalists
(CPJ), an American-based NGO, 24 journalists have been murdered under
presidents Putin and Medvedev (as of May 28, 2017). 6 While it ought to go without
saying that one death is one too many, it is helpful to put this figure in a comparative
context. A direct comparison would involve contrasting the number of murders
during the length of Yeltsin’s tenure analyzed by the CPJ with the number slain
over the same length of time under Putin. 7 The Yeltsin and Putin periods did indeed
differ, but only by one life: 13 journalists were murdered under Yeltsin, and 14
under Putin. However, if the length of Yeltsin’s tenure analyzed by the CPJ were
contrasted with the Putin and Medvedev presidencies combined, we would discover
that the yearly average number of journalists slain diminished, albeit slightly, from
1.6 to 1.4.
The American anti-Putin community (AAPC) will naturally be inclined to
question the relevance of the latter comparison by noting that Yeltsin ruled during
a very different, tumultuous period, in which all manner of socioeconomic and
political evils were supposedly inevitable. But this seems to presuppose that Yeltsin
does not bear much of the responsibility for the tumult itself, as well as its varied
consequences. The difficulties of the 1990s were not, at least in their entirety, the
necessary growth pains of transitioning from the Soviet political and economic
model, but were to some extent the result of policies actively pursued by Yeltsin.
4

To access Press Freedom data, visit https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedompress/freedom-press-2016
5 In 2015, the latest year in the PTS dataset, the AI variant of the PTS dropped to 3.
Otherwise, neither the AI and SD score has changed from 4 since 2008.
6 Although the CPJ’s database compiles all documented killings, I restrict my attention to
murders. To access the CPJ’s database, visit https://cpj.org/killed/
7 Thus, the periods investigated were 1/1/1992-December 30, 1999 (under Yeltsin), and
December 31 2000-May 6, 2008 (under Putin). I included Putin’s time as acting president
in the latter period.
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Indeed, as Stuckler and Basu (2013) point out, the dramatic increase in poverty and
reduction in life expectancy witnessed in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet
Union “did not occur everywhere in the former Soviet sphere. Russia, Kazakhstan,
and the Baltic states … which adopted economic shock therapy programs …
experienced the worst rises in suicides, heart attacks and alcohol-related deaths”
(para. 12).
By no means do I wish to suggest that journalist killings have ceased to be a
problem, and it is to be admitted that a more thorough comparison would involve a
careful examination of the circumstances of each documented murder. Having said
that, the AAPC’s representation of the problem brings to mind the following
hypothetical scenario. Imagine two pairs of friends. In each pair there is a drug
addict. In the first pair, the addict's friend is responsible for nurturing his addiction,
or at least does little to free him from it. In the second, the friend is helping the
addict slowly wean himself from his addiction. The AAPC tends to liken Putin to
the addict’s friend in the first pair. Perhaps, however, it is time to consider the
possibility that he is in certain regards comparable to the addict’s friend in the
second.

Democratization Under Putin
To what extent is Russia governed democratically? To arrive at an answer, I relied
upon a modified version of the Polity score, which is based on the openness and
competitiveness of elections and institutional constraints on the chief executive’s
power (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016). This measure takes on values ranging
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). As Figure 1 shows,
Russia’s Polity score has never exceeded 6, and persisted at its most recentlyrecorded level of 4 since 2007 (see Figure 1).
Two points are worth noting with respect to this data. First, although Russia
has, by Western standards, a very low Polity score, it is not ruled by an absolutely
autocratic government (as are U.S. allies Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia). Thus,
if one remains faithful to the actual meaning of dictatorship, which, again, involves
absolute political power, then it would be absurd to describe Russia’s government
as dictatorial. Nor will it do to opt for “partial dictatorship,” as this term would be
an oxymoron (perhaps “democratically challenged” is more fitting).
Second, while singling Putin out as a dictator seems to imply that his regime is
more authoritarian than that of his U.S.-allied predecessor, the fact is that Russia’s
Polity score has been higher under the former than under the latter. As Sakwa (2008)
notes, “although the aim of Yeltsin’s reform was the creation of a capitalist
democracy, his methods were divisive and on occasions flouted basic democratic
norms and appeared to be an inverted form of the authoritarian order that he sought
to overcome” (p. 49). And yet, as we will soon see, this fact does not appear to have
invited stronger condemnations of the more “dictatorial” Yeltsin.
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Figure 1. Regime Trends in Russia (1992-2015). Source: Polity IV Project.
Furthermore, one of the first things one notices upon reading Polity IV
Country’s Report (Center for Systemic Peace, 2010) is that its negative assessment
of Russian democracy rests largely on appearances: “it appears as if the Unified
Russia bloc is using its current situational advantages to effectively restrict
competition and establish itself as a dominant party” (p. 5); “Although Putin’s
manipulation of the 2008 presidential elections did not directly violate the
constitution, he did appear intent on circumventing the mechanisms that ensure
competitive executive recruitment” (p. 2); and “[His] apparent indifference to
democracy continues” (p. 2). Such appearances all too easily translate into objective
facts in the minds of those who are predisposed to criticizing the Putin government.
But what is to be made of conclusions drawn by those assigned to monitor
Russian elections? Do they not speak to the absence of genuine democracy in the
country, despite the façade of electoral institutions? Although observers from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the
2016 parliamentary vote “was more transparently administered than previous
elections,” it was marred by “an array of shortcomings” (Radio Free Europe / Radio
Liberty, 2016, para. 1). As for the most recent presidential election, the OSCE
(2012) alleged that, in spite of the government’s effort to improve electoral
transparency, Putin’ victory was predetermined.
Following Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2010, p. 69) classificatory
scheme, by which a regime is categorized as either democratic or dictatorial, one
might conclude that Russia’s recent electoral experiences demonstrate that the
country’s regime falls under the latter group. “For a regime to be democratic,” they
argue, “both the chief executive office and the legislative body must be filled by
elections. Contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance
of winning office as a consequence of elections” (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland,
2010, p. 69; see also Przeworksi, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 16). Such
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“contestation” did not seem to have transpired in the latest presidential election.
According to an OSCE observer, “there was no real competition and abuse of
government resources ensured that the ultimate winner of the election was never in
doubt” (Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe, 2012, para. 6).
But even if one accepts Cheibub et al.’s dichotomous classification, it remains
to be determined whether Russia is less democratic under Putin than under Yeltsin.
As I have explained above, this, too, is a morally relevant issue. Although the OSCE
did not monitor the 1996 presidential election, evidence suggests that it was no less
problematically run. It was widely reported that Yeltin’s campaign “was secretly
managed by three American political consultants who on more than one occasion
allegedly received direct assistance from Bill Clinton’s White House” (Wilson,
2016, para. 4). Further, Russia’s notorious oligarchs stated on record that their
objective was to get “Yeltsin a second term by any means necessary” (Shuster,
2012, para. 7). His victory is all the more suggestive given that his approval rating
was initially at 6% at the start of his campaign; lower even than Joseph Stalin’s
(Randolph, 1996).

A Question of Sincerity
Although the U.S. government, assisted by the media’s “generally uncritical
coverage of U.S. foreign policy” (Hook, 2010; see also Aday, 2014), seems to have
more or less successfully promoted the notion that Russia is being governed by a
dictator, the United States has maintained friendly relations with a number of
countries that are also deemed unfree (e.g., see Ritter, 2014). Several of these have
even lower Freedom House scores than Russia. These countries, together with their
parenthetically noted Freedom House scores, include the following: Azerbaijan
(14), Bahrain (12), Ethiopia (12), Tajikistan (11), Saudi Arabia (10), Equatorial
Guinea (8), and Uzbekistan (3).
This invites the charge that Russia’s real or perceived authoritarianism is
merely a smokescreen, a ruse to legitimate a policy of hostility towards a country
that is increasingly challenging U.S. hegemony. At a minimum, it does not appear
that democracy promotion tops the list of the U.S. government’s foreign policy
priorities, nor does it seem to be a top priority for the general American public
(Drake, 2013). We have seen how Yeltsin can scarcely be described as a less
“dictatorial” president than his successor. Nevertheless, the former’s U.S.
counterpart “was strongly inclined not only to like Yeltsin but also to support his
policies, in particular, his [supposed] commitment to Russian democracy” (United
States Department of State, n.d.). Even after the bloody standoff with the Russian
Duma in 1993, when “tanks set fire to a Parliament filled with civilians” (Cockburn,
1993, para. 6), President Clinton “vowed that the United States would not waver in
its backing for the Russian President as he sought to restore order,” pinning the
blame for the violence on Yeltsin’s political opponents (Jehl, 1993, para. 1).
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Corruption in Russia
That I would dare to use corruption data in order to partially redeem Putin might
leave the reader gasping for air in a fit of hysteric laughter. However, while Russia
is consistently rated among the world’s more corrupt countries in Transparency
International’s annually-updated Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), our
indictment of Putin, in particular, appears to presuppose that corruption overall has
worsened under him.8 However, this does not appear to be the case. On a 1-10 scale,
whereby the higher the country’s score, the less corrupt it is, Russia’s average CPI
score was no lower during the first four years of Putin’s presidency than under the
last four years of his predecessor’s, but was in fact slightly higher (see Figure 2). 9

Figure 2. Russia’s Corruption Perception Index Score (1996-2016). Source:
Transparency International.
The AAPC may prefer to stress the fact that Russia was near the bottom 25%
of countries in the 2016 CPI, but it is at least equally helpful to point out that its
most recent score – while still comparatively low - was its highest on record. “The
Yeltsin period,” Sakwa (2008) argues, “was one of rampant corruption, despite
several desultory attempts to halt the frenzy” (p. 165). Yet, as far as CPI scores are
concerned, the most that Putin could be faulted for, perhaps, is not presiding over a
more rapid and steady improvement.

8

To access Corruption Perceptions Index data, visit
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016
9 The scores were 2.45 and 2.41, respectively. The reason for this particular temporal
comparison is that Transparency International’s data covers only the last four years of
Yeltsin’s presidency.
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What Public Opinion Can Tell Us
To reiterate its connotative meaning, the term dictatorship signifies absolute power
over unwilling subjects. To call Putin a dictator is, therefore, to imply that he
governs against the will of the Russian people. The best way to test this claim – the
best available means of ascertaining the willingness of a people to be ruled by a
particular regime – is to consult public opinion data.
According to the World Values Survey, no more than 45% of Russians believed
that having a democracy was a good thing, 10 lending credence to the notion that
Russians are not culturally prepared for a democracy. 11 However, this figure jumped
to 66% in 2006, and increased by another percentage point in 2011. In other words,
it appears that a democratic culture is developing, even if Russians still trail behind
Americans in their support for democracy. Interestingly, while Russia’s Polity score
dropped from 6 to 4 in 2007, Russians’ perception of their level of democracy
increased somewhat between 2006 and 2011. It could, therefore, be argued that
Russians’ conception of democracy differs from that on which traditional measures
are based.
Table 2 displays less encouraging data. Americans express much greater
confidence in their justice and law enforcement systems. The difference between
Russians and Americans is especially stark with respect to the police. Twice as
many Americans as Russians have had confidence in their police. With respect to
the judiciary, Russia’s already low level of confidence declined from 2006-2011.
Table 2: Institutions in which Confidence is Comparatively Lower in Russia
Confidence in the Police
2006
Russia
A
great
deal or
quite a
lot
Not
very
much
or not
at all

Confidence in the Justice System

2011
US

Russia

2006
US

32

68

32

68

64

29

64

30

A
great
deal or
quite a
lot
Not
very
much
or not
at all

2011

Russia

US

Russia

US

36

55

32

68

58

41

64

29

Source: World Values Survey.
10

To put this in perspective, the comparable figure in the United States was 85%.
For a critique of this view, see Out of Order: Russian Political Values in an Imperfect
World, by Ellen Carnaghan, 2007, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
11
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However, Russians have had greater (and growing) confidence in their national
government and legislature than Americans (see Table 3). Of course, in both Russia
and the United States, confidence in each of these institutions falls below a majority.
Nevertheless, while there is no cause for celebration in either country, the implicit
assumption that Russians are more politically dissatisfied than their American
counterparts is by no means entirely correct.
Table 3: Institutions in which Confidence is Comparatively Higher in Russia
Confidence in the National
Government
Confidence in the Parliament
2006
Russi
a
US

2011
Russi U
a
S

A
great
deal
or
quite
a lot
43
37
47
Not
very
muc
h or
not
at all
52
57
47
Source: World Values Survey.

33

65

2006

A
great
deal
or
quite
a lot
Not
very
muc
h or
not
at all

2011

Russia

U
S

Russia

US

27

20

31

20

63

75

59

77

If the data presented in Table 3 on perceptions of confidence speaks to the
willingness to be governed, and if such willingness is understood to be a defining
trait of a dictatorship, then, in particular regards to these two political institutions,
the inescapable conclusion is that the United States bears this dictatorial trait in
greater measure than Russia.

The Popularity of President Putin
Special attention must be devoted to the notorious popularity of President Putin
himself. For having cited Putin’s remarkably high level of support among Russians,
President Trump was mocked by his predecessor:
“When the interviewer asks him [Trump], ‘why do you support this guy
[Putin]?’ He says, ‘He is a strong guy. Look, he’s got an 82 percent poll
rating.’ Well, yes, Saddam Hussein had a 90 percent poll rating. If you
control the media and you’ve taken away everybody's civil liberties, and
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you jail dissidents, that's what happens,” Obama claimed, addressing the
crowd at a Hillary Clinton campaign event in Philadelphia (RT, 2016,
para. 3).
While suspecting that the Kremlin’s “tight control over the media” may
influence Russian public opinion, Politifact (which cannot reasonably be accused
of serving as a mouthpiece for either Trump or Putin) acknowledges that Trump
correctly estimated Putin’s popularity (Carrol, 2015). Even after adjusting for the
“possibility that respondents have been lying to pollsters out of fear or social
expectations,” Western pollsters confirm that Putin’s high public approval is not a
myth (Carrol, 2015, para. 23). The truth is that Russians are happy under their
president, at least much more so than Americans are under theirs. This adds another
wrinkle to the claim that Putin governs an unwilling populace and is, on that
account, a dictator.

Sincerity or National Security: Must We Choose?
Not only is “dictator talk” misleading, but it arguably renders our country less
secure. Earlier, I noted that there may be occasions on which we are compelled to
choose among conflicting values. While it is generally true that we should not
employ double standards in the area of foreign policy, might it be necessary to do
so in order to generate public support for hostile actions against a supposedly
aggressive Russia? While Keene (2017) believes that Putin is “a modern-day
Russian czar,” he is skeptical of the claim that he heads “a regime wedded to an
ideology bent upon dominating and transforming the world into its own image”
(para. 8). Indeed, Putin’s military actions have been restricted to areas in which
there is a large population of ethnic Russians or Russian citizens. While these
actions may undermine America’s hegemony in the region, they do not appear to
pose a threat to its national security, at least no more so than the West’s vilification
of Putin has done. According to Cohen (2017), “demonizing Putin is gravely
endangering America” (para. 2). For one thing, “by treating the Russian president
as a ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ leader, it is ruling out Putin as an essential U.S. national
security partner, which any Kremlin leader should be” (Cohen, 2017, para. 2).

Conclusion: A Call for International Empathy
While both sides of this debate may agree that Russia is not a posterchild for
democracy, I have argued that ascribing the term “dictator” to Vladimir Putin is
misleading and unnecessarily and dangerously polemical. The American public
should therefore resist the demonizing narrative put out by the AAPC. We should
abandon our self-righteous views on Russia, as well as other countries whom (we
are told) are our adversaries. Rather than viewing Russia’s actions through a
Manichean prism of world politics, we should opt for a more sophisticated and less
manipulative lens, one that places these actions in their appropriate and
continuously evolving contexts. Ignoring the historic, socioeconomic, and political
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contexts in which Russian behavior is situated may entail the effect of reducing
public empathy for our (supposed) adversary; facilitating the adoption of a
simplistic view by which Russia’s actions are attributed mainly to the evil that is
believed to be inherent - or at least more pronounced - in it. Empathy requires the
development of a deeper more nuanced understanding of others that certainly goes
beyond the overt demonization that has often characterized U.S.-Russia relations.
Research has demonstrated the positive role of empathy in resolving interpersonal
conflict (e.g., see Navidian, Bahari, Kermansaravi, 2014). Future studies should
explore its potential in mitigating conflicts at the international level.
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Stanislavsky:
Acting Lessons for Life and Leadership
Harrison Long
Abstract
An artist’s creative work can become the primary lens through which he or she
sees the world; it is a fundamental tool for interpreting life. But artistry can also
teach a great deal about effective leadership. Based on the principles of Konstantin
Stanislavsky, the father of modern acting, this essay reflects on five important
lessons for life and leadership: The Power of Purpose, The Power of Context, The
Power of Listening, The Power of Partnerships, and The Power of Community.
After a year of studying Russian culture, history, and foreign policy, I believe these
lessons can be applied on the international level as well as the personal. How might
a Russian actor advise our leaders in Moscow and Washington? Read and find out.

A Brief History of the Stanislavsky System
European and American culture of the late 19th century touted science as a social
panacea. As early 19th century Romanticism gave way to modern science,
overblown, melodramatic acting began to fade, and a new dramatic form emerged:
Psychological Realism. For the first time, theatre artists were social scientists,
recreating life on stage to examine and diagnose society’s ills (Bert, 1991, p. 363).
In March 1906, Konstantin Stanislavsky, co-founder of the world-famous
Moscow Art Theatre (MAT), experienced a crisis on stage that would forever
change the direction of modern acting. While playing the role of Dr. Stockmann in
Henrick Ibsen’s Enemy of the People (Benedetti, 2000, p. 35), Stanislavsky found
himself thinking of business matters rather than living fully “in the moment”
(Tcherkasski, 2007). Disturbed that he was cheating the audience, Stanislavsky
nearly retired from the stage. Thankfully, he did not. Instead, he began to formulate
an objective, scientific approach to performance, one that addressed the
psychological complexities of the latest dramatic forms. Before that time, actor
training consisted of “tricks of the trade” taught by experienced actors who merely
indicated the results they wanted, but not the means to achieve them (Benedetti,
2000, p. 4). Stanislavsky’s ideas, research, and his resulting actor training “System”
transformed the art of acting and continues to do so in the present day.
Stanislavsky experimented with the actor’s craft for over 60 years, attempting
to identify an empirically derived, unified theory of acting. In theory, any actor can
apply Stanislavsky’s practices to achieve a highly developed, emotionally truthful
embodiment of a living character. As Stanislavsky’s ideas developed, his students
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began teaching what they knew of “the System” throughout Europe and America
(Bartow, 2006, p. xxiv).
In 1923, when the MAT appeared on Broadway, American acting schools
slowly began to proliferate, each offering its own version of Stanislavsky’s System;
thus American “Method” acting was born (Gordon, 1994, p. 188). While there are
many American branches of the Stanislavsky System, the three main schools were
formed by Lee Strasberg, Stella Adler, and Sanford Meisner (Bartow, 2006, p.
xxiv). All three teachers began with the intention of revealing Stanislavsky’s
System rather than developing their own. In truth, each highlighted a different
developmental stage of Stanislavsky’s 60-year process (Judd, Long, Maloof,
Patillo, Wallace, & Wiernik, 2008).
Through the years, the Stanislavsky System has continued to evolve through
teachers like Jerzy Grotowski, Michael Chekhov, Uta Hagen, and others. Sergei
Tcherkasski (2007) of the St. Petersburg Theatre Arts Academy, suggests that
studying various American acting techniques is like taking your family to Disney
World: one day you might visit the Magic Kingdom, the next the Epcot Center, the
next Animal Kingdom, but it’s all Disney World! Similarly, the techniques of Adler,
Strasberg, Hagen, or Meisner are all “Stanislavsky World!” (Tcherkasski, 2007).

Transferrable Skills
The benefits of Stanislavsky training reach far beyond the classroom or the
proscenium arch. Actor training encourages students to observe the social forces
governing the roles they play from day-to-day, both on and off the stage. Acting
exercises sharpen a student’s ability to critically observe the world. A foundation
of solid performance skills not only helps students understand the fundamentals of
theatrical artistry, it teaches the social consequences of human behavior.
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that actor training, and other arts-based curricula
cultivate transferrable skills that are highly sought after in the marketplace.
According to Steven Tepper (2014), dean of the Herberger Institute for Design
and the Arts at Arizona State University, arts training develops the skills business
leaders desire most, including creative problem solving, critical thinking,
collaboration, the ability to deal with ambiguity, the ability to adjust or revise work,
and associational and analogical thinking. A study conducted by
PricewaterhouseCoopers Global (2016) reported that 77% of CEO’s surveyed
consider it difficult to find employees who possess essential creativity and
innovation skills, skills we develop every day in artistic training. The Strategic
National Arts Alumni Project (2011-2013) reports that, of 92,113 arts alumni
surveyed, 80% believe artistic technique is important to their work, regardless of
the nature of that work. The survey also notes that those who have worked or are
currently working as professional artists score higher on a list of important
professional competencies and skills, especially in the areas of business and
entrepreneurship.
In 2016, the Chronicle of Higher Education published a popular essay by
Tracey Moore entitled “Why Theatre Majors are Vital in the Digital Age.” The
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article, which celebrates the broad value of Stanislavsky training, points out that
many theatre majors find their livelihood teaching presentation skills, conflict
resolution, and collaborative problem-solving to corporate clients. Moore’s
argument in support of actor training, however, goes deeper than artistic merit or
even the marketability of actor skills: “The actor’s ability to envision multiple
outcomes or motivations in a play must be based on the character’s circumstances,
not the actor’s. That requires a kind of stepping into another person’s shoes that
social scientists say is dwindling among college-age students” (Moore, 2016, p. 2).
As technology increasingly dominates our ways of relating in the world, actor skills
such as concentration, self-reflection, imagination, and empathy help us to
remember what it is to be human.

Powerful Lessons for Life and Leadership
Like many people who are passionate about their work, I see my craft as a metaphor
for my place in the world; my identity as an actor and acting teacher shapes the way
the world appears to me, and the means by which I function within it. Stanislavsky’s
ideas are the core of what I teach regardless of textual style or period. The wildly
different plays of Tennessee Williams, George Bernard Shaw, Bertolt Brecht,
Shakespeare, and Moliere all come to life effectively through Stanislavsky’s
approach. Moreover, Stanislavsky’s lessons for actors provide a vehicle for selfexamination and human understanding, as well as a way of interacting and
collaborating with greater awareness. For me, the System has become far more than
a method to approach my work as a teacher and professional theatre artist; it
permeates all of my interactions, both in life and in the workplace. Simply put, actor
training can teach us a lot about life and leadership.
The following five lessons are derived from Stanislavsky’s System with
examples of their efficacy provided from my own experiences as an actor, director,
teacher, and administrator following in the footsteps of numerous theatre
professionals trained in the Stanislavsky System.

Lesson One: The Power of Purpose
“Whatever happens on stage must be for a purpose.” (Stanislavsky, 1964, p. 35)
One of the first things a new actor has to contend with is stage fright, the fear of
looking foolish in front of an audience. We’ve all experienced this at one point or
another - your knees shake, your mouth gets dry, your palms sweat. You’re so
worried about how you’re doing you can’t focus on what you’re doing. Sometimes
a less experienced actor allows his ego to take over: he gets so involved in trying to
be the best actor on the stage, he loses track of his purpose for being up there in the
first place.
Nerves are a natural physiological response to perceived stress. We all get
nervous. So how do we harness our nerves onstage? It’s simple: we take action. We
focus on our purpose in the scene and take action to achieve it. Stanislavsky called
our purpose the character’s goal or objective.
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Objective: What the character is trying to achieve, the character’s goal or
purpose.
Here’s the irony: In order to play a character convincingly, an actor has to care
more about achieving the character’s goals than he does about impressing the
audience with his talent. In other words, an actor must be committed to something
more meaningful than protecting his own ego. On stage or off, our character is
defined by our actions.
Action: the greatest acting teachers in history have always focused on action.
Sanford Meisner (1987), who taught Robert DeNiro, Alec Baldwin, Robert Duvall,
and Tina Fey said when “[you] are working to achieve a task, you’re not focused
on yourself,” instead, “you’re attached to something outside yourself.” (Meisner, p.
24). The great Uta Hagen (1973), who also taught DeNiro (along with Whoopi
Goldberg, Mathew Broderick, and Jason Robards), said "The sum total of your
actions (what you do from moment to moment) reveals your character” (Hagen, p.
185).
The same can be said of leaders. A leader’s goals and the way she goes about
achieving them, can tell you everything about her character. A good leader is
dedicated to something more important than her own ego; good leaders always keep
the objective in mind.
In his Ted Talk entitled “The Walk from No to Yes,” William Ury (2010), one
of America’s top conflict mediators, tells about the time he brokered a tough
negotiation between Russia and Chechnya. The talks got off to a rocky start when
the vice president of Chechnya insulted the United States in front of all the other
negotiators. At first, Ury said he wanted to defend the United States, but then he
remembered his objective. He hadn’t come there to defend the United States, but
rather to facilitate a peace agreement. So, he took a deep breath and thanked the
vice president for his candor. Then, Ury gently reminded the group that the reason
they had come together was to stop the war in Chechnya. Because Ury remembered
his purpose, negotiations got back on track and they accomplished their objective. 1
Good leaders and good actors know the power of a clear purpose. Leaders keep
the objective in mind in order to know what action to take. But how do they
determine that objective in the first place? They examine motives - their own and
others. They engage in self-reflection. They gather the facts. Good leaders know: if
you want to determine a strong purpose, if you want to make sure you’re fighting
for what you really need, you have to know the context.

Lesson Two: The Power of Context
Context is everything in the theatre. When I start work on a play, the first thing I do
is sit down and read the script again and again. I research the history and events
around when and why the play was written. I do this so I can understand the play’s
1

I learned about Ury’s Ted Talk from Melanie Martin Long’s (2015) video: Mastering
Stage Presence: How to Present to Any Audience, Lecture 10: Playing Status
Relationships.
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context. In the theatre, we call context the Given Circumstances.
Given Circumstances–All the relevant facts that influence a character’s
behavior (Barton, 1993, p. 115).
Knowing the given circumstances means you’ve gathered all the facts. And
those facts, that context, can make all the difference in how an actor chooses to play
the scene. To illustrate, my fellow acting teacher, Allan Edwards, conducts a simple
acting exercise. He asks his students to say the Pledge of Allegiance twice: the first
time they recite the pledge just as themselves sitting in his acting class. The second
time, however, the students are asked to imagine they are refugees from a land of
oppression, immigrants who have worked many years to become naturalized
citizens. With this new set of circumstances, the students speak the Pledge of
Allegiance for the very first time as American citizens.
As you can imagine, the additional circumstances make a big difference in the
way the actors speak. The first time through the pledge, the students seem slightly
embarrassed and a little bit awkward. That’s because they haven’t been given a clear
purpose. But the second time through the students seem reverent and committed,
sometimes even emotional. It’s very dramatic, and very interesting to watch.
Like good actors, good leaders must understand the power of context. Effective
leaders make it a point to learn the relevant facts before deciding what action to
take. Currently, the world is experiencing a critical time of change characterized by
increased divisiveness on the global, national, and local levels. With the
proliferation of electronic media sources, sources with varying levels of credibility
and little accountability, gathering the facts has never been more difficult.
Unfounded personal accusations, assumptions, and “fake news” obscure our ability
to understand context.
An extreme example of misunderstanding context happened in December
2016. Edgar Maddison Welch burst into a Washington, D.C., pizza joint armed with
a semi-automatic rifle. Welch was convinced children had been imprisoned in the
restaurant’s basement as part of a child sex ring run by Hilary Clinton (Haag &
Salam, 2017). When no children were found, Welch surrendered to police revealing
he had been spurred on by radio host Alex Jones, who also runs the website
InfoWars.com. Apparently, Jones, a conspiracy theorist, had publicized the false
“pizzagate” allegations and encouraged his audience to investigate for themselves
(Killelea, 2017).
Voltaire once said, “Anyone who has the power to make you believe
absurdities has the power to make you commit injustices.” It has never been more
important for leaders to get the facts straight, and to communicate those facts
accurately. Knowing the facts means knowing the truth. Good actors are in touch
with the reality they inhabit and react truthfully to it, even if that reality is a fictitious
one.
“You may play well or you may play badly; the important thing is that you
should play truly.” (Stanislavsky, 1964, p. 14)
If a leader wants to determine the best course of action, she needs to get all the facts
on the table.
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What’s the best way to understand context in this age of questionable
information? You study the issue from every trusted angle, you consult the people
who will be affected by your decision, and you consider every credible opinion on
the matter. That means you have to listen.

Lesson Three: The Power Listening
Along with understanding the given circumstances, the larger context, it’s important
to understand personal context as well. After I’ve studied the play to learn all the
given circumstances, after I’ve examined the script to determine all my objectives,
it’s time to start working with the other actors. The most important thing you can
do at this point is to listen … really listen. If you do, you’ll discover some important
things about the play that never would have occurred to you on your own.
Actors have to listen to stay on track. If they don’t, they forget the next line or
even which scene comes next. (I can tell you from personal experience how
terrifying it is to forget your lines!) When an actor is truly listening, she is
spontaneous, unpredictable, authentic, and interesting! But when an actor isn’t
listening, her performance is stale, mechanical, and lifeless; she has all the dramatic
appeal of a cinder block. But what makes us listen? We listen because we need to
find out more information. We listen so we can decide what to do next.
We all want to be good listeners, but what does that really mean? Real listening
is an active process, not a passive one. It means living in the “here and now.”
Listening means being open to the influence of the other person. Listening means
taking the time to hear the whole thought rather than waiting impatiently until it’s
your turn to speak or present your agenda–that’s the mark of the self-centered actor.
The best acting is reactive. The best actors respond to the reactions of their partner.
In other words: the best actors listen!
Of course, effective listening is a quality of good leadership too. That’s one of
the best ways to gather the given circumstances, the relevant facts. But even the
most credible sources of information are subject to bias. For that reason, good
leaders must consider more than one point of view. Sometimes the most valuable
information comes from the least expected source or is discovered in the least
expected ways.
A few years ago, while serving as Interim Director of our School of Art and
Design, the elevator broke down. Far from being an uncommon occurrence, this
had been happening every two or three weeks for quite some time. This was an
enormous problem because, on a few occasions, injured or disabled students or
faculty had to be carried up or down the stairs to get to their next class.
The problem persisted, and every time the elevator stopped working our
administrative assistant would kindly call the maintenance department who
eventually sent over the repairman. This happened over and over again, but nothing
seemed to permanently solve the problem.
One day, out of desperation, I asked the assistant to tell me when the elevator
technician arrived. When I introduced myself as the School Director, his defenses
shot up. It was clear that the poor fellow was used to being badgered and complained
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at whenever he showed up to fix a campus elevator. It was clear that there was a
history here. In the theatre, we call this history the character’s “backstory.”
Backstory: a character’s offstage history that explains her/his behavior in the
scene.
Sensing there was a backstory, I quickly reassured him that I only wanted more
information. Once he knew I was willing to listen, he was happy to show me around
and teach me about the problem.
By the end of our conversation we discovered something: all that was needed
to fix the elevator was a simple maintenance check each month, which he kindly
agreed to do. Do you know what? There hasn’t been a problem with the elevator
since!
Good leaders understand the power of listening. Good leaders know that
everyone has a backstory. They try to understand the whole person and not just the
surface issues. No matter how difficult or defensive a person may seem, it is
important to remember that everyone is the hero of his own story.
But in order to understand personal context, you have to do more than hear the
words someone is speaking, you have to empathize, you have to imagine what the
other person is feeling. Sometimes the actor knows more than the character she is
playing. Sometimes the actor may not even approve of his character’s behavior. But
in order to play the scene truthfully, Stanislavsky insisted that his actors avoid
judging a character and choose to empathize with him instead. In essence, the actor
has to listen deeply to the character. To accomplish this, Stanislavsky used a simple
trick he called the “magic if.”
Magic If: When the actor simply asks himself: “What would I do, if I were
actually in the situation that the character is in?” (Stanislavsky, 1964, p. 46).
While they may not know the term “magic if,” good leaders use it all the time.
They listen so well they can imagine what it is like to be in the other person’s shoes.
Whether on the local, national, or international level, good leaders make it their
business to study every side of an issue and learn how it impacts different
constituents. Empathic listening is an important step in building the kinds of
positive relationships that foster collaboration.

Lesson Four: The Power of Collaboration
Theatre is a collaborative art form; the director, writer, actors, designers, and
technicians all work together to create a unified production. Every moment on stage
is a collaboration between actors who, according to Stanislavsky, must respond
authentically and spontaneously to one another. In fact, every performance is a
collaboration between the actors and the audience (Stanislavsky, 1964, pp. 178,
180, 193, 294-295). Theatre simply can’t exist in a vacuum. But … collaboration
isn’t always easy. Sometimes it is a tug-of-war, a battle over supreme authorship.
No one understood this better than Stanislavsky, who constantly shifted roles from
producer, to director, to designer, to actor, to teacher. Yet, Stanislavsky also knew
that collaboration can magnify our creative efforts in astonishing ways.
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The challenges of producing a play based on historical events illustrate how
theatrical collaboration goes beyond the stage. Examining the past can be a difficult
and painful process, but it is an essential one, especially when it unearths local
history that many would like to forget or ignore. One particular production, Parade,
conjured two of our most destructive, local demons: antisemitism and racism. Yet,
despite the volatile subject matter, divergent communities came together to examine
the past, understand the present, and envision a better future.
On the night of April 26, 1913, 13-year-old Mary Phagan was found dead in
the basement of the National Pencil Company in Atlanta, Georgia. After a highly
publicized trial Leo Frank, the factory’s Jewish manager, was convicted of murder
on sketchy evidence. After studying the case carefully, Governor John Slaton
commuted Frank’s sentence. But on August 17, 1915, a group of men abducted
Frank from his prison cell and lynched him from an oak tree on the outskirts of
Marietta, just a few miles from our campus. This true story inspired the Tony
Award-winning musical, Parade.
As a resident of the town where Frank was lynched, I had been interested in the
musical for a long time. I became even more interested when I realized two things:
first, the musical had never been performed in Marietta. Secondly, 2015 was to be
the centennial of Leo Frank’s death. I began to see Parade as an opportunity to
explore local history and perhaps generate some healing discussions in the process.
But I knew what an ambitious project it was, and that our theatre department
couldn’t do it alone, so I began looking for partners.
It didn’t take long to find others interested in exploring the Frank case. The
resulting Seeking Justice Initiative, of which Parade became a part, was much more
exciting than anything I could have conceived on my own. Our impressive list of
partners included: The Southern Museum of Civil War and Locomotive History,
The Bremen Jewish Heritage Museum, The Museum of History and Holocaust
Education, our own College of Humanities and Social Sciences and the Temple,
Atlanta, Leo Frank’s home congregation. Through this experience, I learned that
collaboration can prove powerful for several important reasons.
The first and most obvious reason is that sharing resources means you can do
more with less. In the current economic climate, topflight organizations are eager
to forge partnerships with like-minded collaborators. Parade benefitted enormously
in this way. For example, one of our partners, the Bremen Museum, provided highresolution slides of obscure historical images at no cost. These became an essential
production element.
The second reason collaboration can be powerful is that it helps make the case
for additional resources. Our university, like many other institutions, likes to fund
projects that include more than one group. In this way funders get more bang for
their buck. The fact that we were collaborating with several units on and off campus
helped me convince our president to contribute an additional $5,000 to the project.
As a result, we were able to have a marketing budget, hire sound support for our
Temple performance, and fund a campus residency for Pulitzer Prize, Tony and
Academy Award-winning playwright Alfred Uhry (Parade, Driving Miss Daisy).
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Thirdly, collaboration opened our work to a much wider audience. Because
each of our partners has a separate patron base, we were able to reach more people.
In fact, our Marietta performance was completely sold out, far exceeding our box
office projections. Because of our increased exposure, Playwright Alfred Uhry and
I were invited to interview on Georgia Public Radio. Broadwayworld.com
published a feature article on Parade and we even got a good mention in the
international magazine The Economist.
The final reason partnerships are so powerful is that they increase impact.
Reaching a wider audience certainly meant increased visibility for our College of
the Arts. Furthermore, audience members who had attended the previous Seeking
Justice events were primed to experience our work in a much more meaningful way.
Most importantly, however, the student experience was enriched. As a part of the
Seeking Justice initiative, our students were active participants as performers and
technicians. They and other students attended panel discussions by experts, and
were given a curator-led, private tour of the Southern Museum’s Leo Frank exhibit.
Parade became powerful experience for many reasons, but most of all because
collaboration helped us connect with our community in new ways. This leads me to
my fifth, and final lesson.

The Power of Community
On June 22, 1897, Russian theatre critic and playwright Vladimir NemirovichDanchenko asked Konstantin Stanislavsky to meet him at a restaurant in Moscow,
where they talked, uninterrupted for 18 hours. Both men were deeply concerned
about the lack of discipline in the Russian theatre. That night, the two formed a
partnership to create one of the world’s greatest theatre companies, the MAT. Early
on, company members lived communally at an estate in Pushkino, where they
alternated between rehearsals and housekeeping duties (Gordon, 1994, p. 18).
Living together so closely meant there were few distractions from the work. It also
contributed to the collaborative spirit of the ensemble. Stanislavsky’s goal was to
create a true ensemble of players with no stars (Benedetti, 2000, p. 24). His goal
was to create a community.
What is a community? Is it the town we live in? Is it our neighborhood? People
often refer to the academic community, the online community or the arts
community. For me, community is something that binds us together.
In 2011, I directed a play called Splittin’ the Raft, an adaptation of Huckleberry
Finn as told by Frederick Douglass. A generous grant from the National
Endowment for the Arts made it possible to tour seven North Georgia communities,
ranging from inner-city schools to rural mountain towns. The struggles we faced
and the conversations we encountered prove the lasting and devastating legacy of
American slavery.
Ours was the first production of Splittin’ the Raft to be staged in the Deep
South. Months of struggling to arrange tour dates taught me why. Some
communities and schools were reluctant to host our production fearing the same
kind of backlash Twain’s novel has provoked since its publication (Long, p.136).
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Still, this highly entertaining production allowed people to open up and approach
difficult issues with a spirit of mutual respect. One student responded: “This
production is a call to action.” In an interview with the Douglas County Sentinel,
Laura Lieberman of the Douglasville Cultural Arts Council, stated: “The message
of Splittin’ the Raft and the outstanding quality of this production are too important
and relevant for our community to miss” (2011). Despite early resistance, Splittin’
the Raft prompted productive, community-building dialogue about race, gender,
and economic equity wherever we went.
On November 11, we loaded up the truck and drove over miles of winding
mountain roads to our final tour stop at the Sautee Nacoochee Cultural Center in
White County, Georgia. As more than one White County resident put it, “the name
of our county speaks for itself.” Today, much of the area is still owned by the
descendants of the slave-owning Williams family. Only a few miles down the road
from the center stands Bean Creek, a community largely still inhabited by
descendants of the Williams family slaves. One Bean Creek resident told me,
“There's a long and painful history of discrimination, some of which is relatively
recent” (Long, H., 2015, p. 146).
At curtain time, the theatre filled quickly. There was a wide cross-section of
locals in attendance (both white and black, rich and poor, from Sautee Nacoochee
and Bean Creek). Kathy Blandin, the center’s director, was pleased to see some of
the “old families” in attendance, along with several people from the Bean Creek
community, some who hadn’t set foot in the building for several years because of
recurring racial tensions.
The performance that night was among our most powerful. After the applause
died down only a few people left the room. The audience needed to talk. The postshow discussion was particularly passionate. People who wouldn’t typically find
themselves in the same room with one another were having a serious discussion
about race and class in their community.
At one point, however, a local white woman became agitated. She couldn’t
understand why we were going on and on about slavery, something that had
happened so long ago. Strangely, she kept using the phrase “Am I living with Santa
Claus or …..” For example: “Am I living with Santa Claus or hasn’t that all been
dealt with? Am I living with Santa Claus or are those people just avoiding
responsibility? Am I living with Santa Claus or are they simply trying to live off my
taxes rather than pay their own way?”
The air went out of the room. Everyone was stunned into silence. I was
embarrassed for the woman and for all of us. Most of all, I was ashamed to face the
Bean Creek folks who had reached out in good faith. How could someone hear so
many stories of discrimination from her own neighbors and still miss the point?
Then, something changed: Sabrina Dorsey from Bean Creek smiled at the woman.
With humor and with gentleness, she raised her head and said, “Ma’am, with all
due respect …. you’re living with Santa Claus!” (Long, H., 2015, p. 146).
The room erupted with good-natured laughter and suddenly the woman began
to relax and really listen. I’m not suggesting “Mrs. Santa Claus” underwent a full
conversion that night, but there had been a clear turning point. By the end of the

Journal of Global Initiatives

186

conversation she understood something about the experience of her black neighbors
that she hadn’t considered before. For me, that understanding is “community.” 2
In order to build community, we have to let our true and imperfect selves come
out into the open. We have to acknowledge what we really think and feel. We have
to be open to opinions different from our own. We have to be relaxed enough and
trust enough to let down our defenses. Only then can we risk being influenced by
one another.
What does it take to build community? It takes respect. It takes trust. It takes
commitment. It takes the courage to react with honesty. Interestingly, that’s a lot
like what Stanislavsky told his actors. You see, you build community in the theatre
the same way you build it in life. Good actors and good leaders build community.

The Year of Russia
In May 2017, I had the opportunity to visit Russia for the first time with a faculty
delegation from our university. This extraordinary trip was the culmination of our
“Year of Russia” celebration which included weekly lectures, concerts, films, food,
and panel discussions focused on various aspects of Russian culture, history, and
foreign policy. These events were eerily relevant because they coincided with the
2016 presidential campaign and the early months of the troubled Trump
administration. By the time we left for Moscow, many Americans were convinced
Russia had meddled in the presidential election, but to what degree? I was eager to
hear the Russian point of view. Despite my fascination with all of this, however,
my primary preoccupation was, of course, Stanislavsky. After all, this was my
pilgrimage to actor Mecca!
Russian culture is rich and beautiful. We strolled the streets of stately St.
Petersburg and stood slack-jawed in astonishment at the masterworks housed in the
Hermitage. I toured Anton Chekhov’s estate, and, of course attended an outstanding
production at the MAT! I was impressed by the pulsing vitality of modern Moscow
with its sparkling skyline of glass superstructures. Whatever my personal feelings
about Vladimir Putin, I understood his popularity; for many, Putin has restored
Russian national pride and a general feeling of hope for the future.
We visited several universities where we attended lectures and panels on
Russian foreign policy, domestic policy, and economic strategy. We toured the
Kremlin, the American Embassy, and Russia Today, one of two top governmentrun news agencies. Everywhere we went, we were welcomed graciously and
respectfully. Through all of this, Stanislavsky sat perched on my shoulder.
I was struck by how much we have in common with the Russian people, and
by a few fundamental differences in the way we perceive the role of our nations in
the world. Perhaps American playwright Lee Blessing explains it best in his cold
war drama, A Walk in the Woods, about a series of fictitious conversations between
2

This story was first recounted in my article Theatre across Communities: A Tale
of Two Slave Cabins in the Journal of Higher Education Outreach and
Engagement, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 146-147.
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Soviet and American negotiators in Geneva between 1984 and 1985. In 2013, I
directed a production of the play at Atlanta’s Serenbe Playhouse, a professional
theatre company. To put this in historical context, the play ends a few months before
Gorbachev courageously announced a unilateral moratorium on intermediate-range
nuclear missiles, and proposed a freeze on all nuclear weapons testing (Tsygankov,
2016, p. xiv).

A Walk in the Woods
BOTVINNIK: … Americans and Russians are just the same. But their
history is different. What is history? History is geography over time. The
geography of America is oceans–therefore no nearby enemies. The
geography of Russia is the opposite: flat, broad plains–open invitations to
anyone who wants to attack. Mongols, French, Germans, Poles, Turks,
Swedes, anyone …. So, what is the history of America? Conquest without
competition. What is the history of Russia? Conquest because of
competition. How best to be America? Make individual freedom your god.
This allows you to attack on many fronts–all along your borders, in fact–
and maintain the illusion that you are not attacking at all. You don’t even
have to call your wars, wars. You call them “settling the west.” … How
best to be Russia then? Fight collectively. Know that you are trying to crush
those around you. Make control your god, and channel the many wills of
the people into one will .… Americans, who never had to confront
themselves as conquerors, are still under the delusion that they are
idealists. And Russians, who did have to confront themselves, are under
the equally powerful delusion that they are realists. I’m speaking now of
those in power. Common Americans and common Russians share a much
simpler delusion: that they are peace-loving people. (Blessing, 1988, pp.
26-27)
A Walk in the Woods seems more resonant than ever, partly because we know
what the characters do not: that the Berlin Wall would crumble, that the end of
communism would give way to unforeseen freedoms - of markets, of technology,
of information. On June 19, 2013, a few days before the opening night of our
production, President Obama publicly stated that the dissolution of the Soviet Union
had brought “a sense that the great challenges have somehow passed.” In order to
“move beyond Cold War nuclear postures” Obama called for reducing the number
of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads by one-third if the Russian government
agreed to a similar cut. In Moscow, however, Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Dmitry Rogozin quickly responded, saying, “How can we take seriously this idea
about cuts in strategic nuclear potential while the United States is developing its
capabilities to intercept Russia’s nuclear potential?”
Sadly, four years later, it is clear that President Obama was incorrect. In fact,
the divide between our countries, it seems, is widening by the day. Despite our
respective progress in the realm of individual freedoms, issues of poverty,
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ecological devastation, and a possible nuclear disaster continue to threaten global
stability. Homegrown terrorists and sophisticated cyber-warriors undermine
democracy across the globe. In short, world peace seems just as tenuous now as it
was then, if not more.
Recently, the U.S. Congress passed sweeping economic sanctions, which
prompted a game of one-upmanship as both countries downsized each other’s
diplomatic corps (Gordon & Schmidt, 2017). While sanctions can be an important
foreign policy tool, I wonder how much these are motivated, not by their potential
effectiveness, but by the need of national leaders to appear powerful to their own
people - to at least appear as if they are taking action? Wouldn’t we accomplish
more if our leaders began engaging more rather than less? After all, we are dealing
with people here, people similar to ourselves. This is community at its broadest,
most global level.
In his book titled Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National
Identity, distinguished professor of international relations, Andrei Tsygonkov,
explains the complex framework of forces that influence Russia’s fluctuating
foreign policies in the post-Soviet era. Tsygankov concludes his text by advising
Russia and the West to remain engaged and resist the tendency toward isolationism.
Rather, they should:
... double their efforts to explain their international policies as consistent
with their vision of the global world. … Isolationism cannot be practical
in a world that has grown increasingly global in terms of both new
opportunities and new threats. … staying engaged is not just an option,
but a foreign policy imperative.” (Tsygonkov, 2016, pp. 269-271)
Make no mistake, I find much of Russian foreign and domestic policy
objectionable. Admittedly, it is as hard for me to set aside my judgments as it is for
anyone. Still, like Tsygankov, I am just as skeptical that stifling communication,
rather than promoting it, will have the desired effect. Our leaders must not lose track
of their purpose. Our leaders must remember we can’t move forward without
listening to each other in empathy and respect.
As members of the world-wide community, there are many circumstances that
provide the context for continued collaboration. Russia and the West are unified by
our common global responsibilities, economic opportunities, the need for natural
resources, and our shared efforts to counter terrorism. While I only spent two weeks
in Russia, my experiences there have convinced me we share many common values.
How can we achieve lasting progress without trust, without the ability to look
across the negotiating table and recognize ourselves in one another? How can we
break through the gridlocks, both at home and abroad, brought on by our individual
and collective need for power and security? With increased globalization, our
futures are linked together more now than they have ever been. For that reason,
there are no lasting unilateral solutions. Whether on the global, national, or local
level, our leaders will do well to remember what Stanislavsky taught:
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•
•
•
•
•
•

the wisdom to choose a purpose greater than our own egos;
the diligence to gather and accurately represent the facts in their full and
complete context;
the character to choose actions of integrity;
the empathy to listen deeply and understand another’s point of view;
the understanding that, by working together, we can become greater than
we are on our own; and
the courage to reveal our true selves and to risk being influenced by one
another.

Imagination refers to the actor’s ability to accept new situations of life and
believe in them. (Adler, 1988, p. 20)
At the center of Stanislavsky’s System is perhaps the greatest lesson of all: the
power of imagination. Imagination is important because it allows each of us, as
leaders, to see beyond our current limitations and to visualize what we are capable
of becoming. As Albert Einstein observed, “Imagination is more important than
knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we now know and understand, while
imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and
understand.” The opportunity to study Russia and engage with Russian students and
scholars has inspired me to better understand today’s shared global context as an
interdependent community in need of greater collaboration. Imagine that!
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